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Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an engineering
approach to design economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired welfare objectives,
where players have decentralized information and act in a Bayesian rational way. It has
been studied since 1970s and applied extensively in practice, for example, in designing
auctions as FCC spectrum auctions and Google AdWords auctions. The interface of
mechanism design and computation also promotes innovations in electronic commerce.
In this thesis, I further investigate mechanism design theory for general social choice
problems.
The contents are organized as follows: In chapter 1, I provide an axiomatic charac-
terization of the probability-weighted minimal norm solution for social choice problems
with reference points. In chapter 2, I investigate the problem of characterizing feasibility
conditions for general social choice problems. The examples include voting, auctions
with externalities, combinatorial auctions and exchanges with complementary objects.
In chapter 3, I consider the problem of selecting among ex post efficient solutions for a
two-person bargaining problem, when multiple ex post efficient solutions exist. In chap-
ters 4 and 5, I investigate two specific problems of designing trading mechanisms with
monetary transfers to achieve certain welfare objectives. In chapter 4, I discuss the choice
of information partitions together with a trading mechanism for the seller and the buyer
in order to enlarge the trading surplus. In chapter 5, I consider a revenue-maximizing
problem for a seller who wants to sell two complementary objects, in the presence of
inter-buyer resale.
Chapter 1 provides a characterization of the probability-weighted minimal norm solu-
tion in a Bayesian social choice environment as introduced by Myerson (1979). In such a
problem, incentive compatibility restricts the set of feasible utility allocations. I assume
that there is some socially desirable reference utility allocation, but that this allocation
is unattainable. For example, the allocation in the past may become infeasible when
players receive more information. A problem is: If such a reference allocation is relevant
for the compromise, which allocation will players finally agree on? The proposed solution
prescribes the incentive feasible utility allocation that minimizes a probability-weighted
norm to the interim reference point. The solution is uniquely determined by eight ax-
ioms: an IIA axiom, a Pareto optimality axiom, a symmetry axiom, a fairness axiom, a




Chapter 2 considers the implementability of reduced form allocation rules for social
choice problems with general utility functions and finite types. This class of problems
is motivated by Maskin and Riley (1984), which discusses the optimal auction with
risk averse buyers. Due to general utility functions, the optimal auction problem raises
a reduced form implementation problem: Can a system of interim expected winning
probabilities be generated by a feasible allocation rule? Border (1991) characterizes
the implementability condition for single unit auctions. I consider general social choice
problems and obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for implementability, as well as
a necessary condition with finitely many inequalities. The results in this chapter can be
used to study voting problems, package exchanges with complementary valuations, and
package auctions with risk averse players.
Chapter 3 studies disagreement point monotone bargaining solutions. I consider a
two-person bargaining problem where players’ disagreement payoffs are correlated and
it is common knowledge that players must agree. I investigate the existence of any ex
post efficient utility allocation such that each player’s interim utility is non-constant and
weakly responsive to his disagreement payoff. I establish some impossibility results for
such monotone solutions.
Chapter 4 revisits the bilateral trade problem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
It investigates how the information structure (i.e. how information is distributed among
players) influences the attainability of ex post efficient allocations. I construct coarser
partitions together with a feasible trading procedure that induces more efficient trade
than the constrained efficient solution of Myerson and Satterthwaite.
Chapter 5 considers the optimal sale of two complementary objects to two buyers
in the presence of resale. It is assumed that it is common knowledge that one buyer
obtaining the bundle is efficient. Assuming full transparency of the seller’s auction
outcome, I show that if buyers use a mediator to maximize the resale surplus in a
sequentially optimal way, then the optimal revenue, as in Myerson (1981), is unattainable.
I introduce a modified Myerson auction (MMA) that requires selling the bundle with
some personalized reserve prices and the seller withholding one object in case these
prices are not met. The revenue from MMA when resale is not allowed serves as an
upper bound of the seller’s revenue.
2
Chapter 1
Characterization of the Minimal Norm Solution
with Incomplete Information
1.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of an arbitrator trying to select a decision
from a finite set of social alternatives for a group of players, when the arbitrator does not
have information about their preferences except some prior estimate. On the one hand,
the arbitrator has to respect incentive compatibility constraints: Each player must be
incentivized to reveal his true preferences. That the social choice must be made at the
interim stage (i.e. the players know their types but the arbitrator does not) restricts the
set of feasible utility allocations. On the other hand, the players may agree that some
incentive infeasible allocation is a relevant aspiration point. Such a reference point may
be generated by some feasible allocation in the past or in the future. To determine a fair
compromise, the arbitrator has to also respect the players’ aspirations of what they are
entitled to receive.
Consider a bilateral trade example. The seller has value zero for the object and the
buyer’s value can be either 1 or v > 1, with probabilities p = (p, p). In case of no trade,
both players receive zero. In any incentive compatible, individual rational, and ex post
efficient trading mechanism, the object is always being transferred and the buyer pays
the seller a constant price d ∈ [0, 1]. The set of interim utility vectors for the seller and
types 1 and v of the buyer is given by X = {(d, 1 − d, v − d) : d ∈ [0, 1]}. A natural
question is: What would be the fair trading price at the interim stage?
A mediator trying to answer this question, could consider two possible benchmarks:
(i) Taking an ex ante point of view, i.e. the buyer not knowing his value, Nash’s
bargaining solution requires an equal split of V = p+ pv between the two players.
(ii) Taking an ex post point of view, i.e. both players knowing the buyer’s value,
Nash’s solution requires an equal split of 1 or v, depending on the state.
Now consider the interim stage. There are two alternatives to modify Nash’s solution:
(i) The ex ante Nash’s solution used for the seller and both types of the buyer is
given by (V/2, V/2, V/2). This utility vector is infeasible.
(ii) The interim expectation of the ex post Nash’s solution for the seller and each
type of the buyer is given by (V/2, 1/2, v/2). This utility vector is again infeasible.
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While such a utility allocation in either (i) or (ii) is infeasible, the players may agree
that it is qualified as a relevant interim reference point, hence, that it should influence
the fair compromise. It turns out that with each of these perspectives in either (i) or
(ii), the solution provided in this chapter (the minimal norm solution) prescribe a price
(p + pv)/2 and the solutions of the two problems are the same. In this case, the seller
and both types of the buyer are indifferent between these reference points. Notice that
an increase in p leads to a higher price and both types of the buyer are worse off.
Apart from this bargaining example, Bayesian social choice problems with reference
points arise more generally in economic environments. An example is the bankruptcy
problem with complete information as in Aumann and Maschler (1985). A man dies and
leaves debts r1, ..., rn totalling more than his estate E. The authors investigate the rules
about how should the estate be divided among n creditors. Now suppose the estate is
indivisible and the creditors may value it differently. Ẽ1, ..., Ẽn are random variables and
each creditor privately observes his value of the estate. A question is: How should the
estate be divided among the creditors under incomplete information?
For social choice problems with complete information, Yu (1973) was the first to pro-
pose a class of Euclidean compromise solutions. Such a solution minimizes the Euclidean
distance between the feasible set and the utopia point of that set.1 It reflects that players
must reach a compromise based on an endogenously determined, but generally infeasible,
ideal point whose coordinates correspond to the maximum feasible payoffs attainable by
the players. Thus, the solution minimizes a measure of the group regret. Voorneveld,
van den Nouweland and McLean (2011) and Conley, McLean and Wilkie (2014) obtain
two characterizations of Yu’s solution. In this chapter, we consider (and axiomatize)
a generalization of Yu’s solution for social choice problems with reference points under
incomplete information.
Each problem (p,X, r) specifies a system of marginal probabilities p = (pi)i∈N with pi
supported by the individual type set Ti for each player i ∈ N . The set of incentive feasible
interim utility allocations X is a convex compact subset in the interim utility space, and
a reference point r is an interim utility allocation outside X, which is further required to
strictly dominate one of the strong Pareto optimal allocations. Then, the minimal norm
solution F selects the unique vector in X that minimizes the total quadratic utility losses
from r weighted by the marginal probabilities p of different types of players. An increase
in the marginal probability of a certain type lowers the utility loss that this type has to
bear.
We characterize the minimal norm solution by eight axioms: independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA), weak Pareto optimality (WPO), symmetry for TU problems
(TU), individual fairness (IF), splitting types (ST), scaling (SCA), translation invariance




(T.INV), and feasible set continuity (F.CONT).
The first axiom is similar to Nash’s IIA axiom, except that a feasible set is defined
differently and the disagreement point is replaced by the reference point. Weak Pareto
optimality requires that the solution belongs to the weak Pareto set of the feasible set.
The axiom of symmetry for TU problems requires that if the feasible set induces an ex
ante transfer hyperplane and the interim reference point induces a symmetric reference
point ex ante, then in the solution, the ex ante utilities of the players must be equal. It
reduces to Nash’s symmetry axiom in case of complete information. Individual fairness
requires that all types of the players bear some losses in a TU problem. The axiom of
splitting types, modified from Harsanyi and Selten (1975) and Weidner (1992), requires
that if one problem is derived from another by splitting a type of a player into a twin,
then the new solution is derived from the previous solution by splitting this type. We
use symmetry for TU problems and splitting types to establish a consistency across
problems with different systems of marginal probabilities. Scaling, translation invariance
and feasible set continuity are used by Voorneveld et al. (2011) and Conley et al. (2014)
to characterize the Yu solution.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 introduce
social choice problems with reference points and the axioms. Section 1.4 provides the
characterization theorem. Section 1.5 investigates a minimal norm duality and indepen-
dence of the axioms. Section 1.6, discusses the generation of reference points in specific
economic contexts. Section 1.7 reviews the related literature and investigates whether
the minimal norm solution satisfies the axioms in the literature. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2. The Problem
1.2.1. Bayesian Social Choice Problems with Reference Points
We introduce Bayesian social choice problems of Myerson (1979), in which privately
informed players select some social alternative from a finite set and there are no monetary
transfers. Let N be a finite set of players. For each player i ∈ N , there is a finite type
set Ti. Let T = ×i∈NTi be the product type set, with the common prior π ∈ ∆(T ). We
assume π(t) > 0 for all t ∈ T . Denote T−i = ×j 6=iTj. The conditional belief of player
i with type ti on the set of other players’ types is given by πi(t−i|ti) for all t−i ∈ T−i.
Denote pi,ti the marginal probability of ti, or pi,ti =
∑
t−i∈T−i π(t), and denote p the
system of the marginals of π. Let T̊ =
⋃
i∈N Ti.
Let D be a nonempty finite set of decisions. The utility function of player i is given
by ui : D× T → R.2 A social choice problem S is given by (π,D, (ui)i∈N). Denote S(π)
2As we mention later, the minimal norm solution is not invariant to positive affine transformations
of the utility functions, which implies the domain of a mechanism cannot be measurable with respect
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the set of all such problems by fixing π (and hence N and T ) and varying (D, (ui)i∈N).
Let S ∈ S(π). A mechanism is a function µ : D×T → [0, 1] satisfying
∑
d∈D µ(d|t) =
1 for all t ∈ T . Let M(S) be the set of all mechanisms for S. For any µ ∈ M(S), the
expected utility for type ti ∈ Ti from reporting t̂i ∈ Ti, while the other players report






µ(d|t̂i, t−i)ui(d, t)πi(t−i|ti). (1.2.1)
A mechanism µ is incentive compatible (IC) if Ui(µ, ti|ti) ≥ Ui(µ, t̂i|ti), for all t̂i, ti ∈
Ti, and i ∈ N . Denote B(S) the set of all IC mechanisms for S. For µ ∈ B(S), denote
the interim utility of player i by Ui(µ|ti) = Ui(µ, ti|ti).
There are situations where no information transmission is available among the social
planner and the players and decisions must be made under the veil of ignorance. With
such communication constraints, we define a “simple lottery problem” from S, in which
the social planner is constrained to choose from the set of constant mechanisms,
Mc(S) = {µ ∈M(S) : µ(·|t) = δ for all t ∈ T, for some δ ∈ ∆(D)}. (1.2.2)
Any mechanism in Mc(S) is IC, hence, Mc(S) ⊂ B(S).
Every µ ∈ B(S) defines an incentive feasible interim utility vector U(µ) ∈ ×i∈NRTi .
Denote n the dimension of the interim utility space, i.e. n =
∑
i∈N |Ti|. Denote U(S) ⊂
Rn the set of all incentive feasible utility vectors, and by Uc(S) ⊂ Rn the set of all
incentive feasible allocations from all constant mechanisms of S.
For any X ⊂ Rn , the strong (interim) Pareto boundary is given by3
PO(X) = {x ∈ X : for all y ∈ X, y ≥ x implies y = x}. (1.2.3)
Similarly, we define the weak Pareto boundary by
WPO(X) = {x ∈ X : @y ∈ X such that y > x}. (1.2.4)
In some contexts, the players might agree that some infeasible utility allocation is
relevant for a compromise. A reference point is an interim utility allocation r ∈ Rn that
strictly Pareto dominates some strong Pareto allocation. We write R(X) for the set of
all such reference points with respect to X,
R(X) = {r ∈ Rn : ∃x ∈ PO(X) such that r > x}. (1.2.5)
to the equivalent classes of vNM utility functions.
3For x, y ∈ Rn, y ≥ x means yk ≥ xk, for all k = 1, ..., n, and y > x means yk > xk, for all k = 1, ..., n.
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That is, a reference point yields strictly higher utilities for all coordinates than some
point on the strong Pareto boundary.
By varying (D, (ui)i∈N), we obtain two classes of interim utility sets generated either
by all social choice problems or by all simple lottery problems, given by4
X (π) = {X : ∃S ∈ S(π) such that X = U(S)},
Xc(π) = {X : ∃S ∈ S(π) such that X = Uc(S)}.
By fixing (N, T ) and varying π, we obtain the classes of interim utility sets generated
by different priors on a common type set. By fixing N and varying (T, π), we obtain
the classes of interim utility sets across different type sets. Our axioms used for the
characterization result allow for this consistency over different type sets.5
1.2.2. The Reduced Problems








X0 = {X : X is a polytope in Rn for some finite n}.
In this chapter, we consider X0 as the domain of the feasible sets. On the other
hand, Myerson (1984) requires the domain of the feasible sets to be X . While X is the
most natural domain, the next result shows that X is “coarse” since it is a subset of all
polytopes. As we will mention in Section 1.6, a characterization on X is more difficult
than that on X0.
Lemma 1.1: (i) For every π ∈ Π, Xc(π) contains all polytopes in Rn. That is,
Xc = X0. (ii) X ( X0.
We define a Bayesian social choice problem with the reference point, or a reduced
problem Γ = (p,X, r) by
i. An interim utility space Rn.
ii. p ∈ Rn++,
∑
j∈Ti pij = 1, for all i ∈ N .
6
iii. X ⊂ Rn is a polytope.
iv. r ∈ Rn with r > x for some x ∈ PO(X).
4These classes of interim utility sets implicitly assume a welfarism: Two social choice problems with
the same players, types sets and priors, but with different decision sets and utility functions can generate
the same utility sets. Notice that we do distinguish two utility sets in the same space but with different
priors.
5By fixing (N,T ) and varying π, we may investigate alternative axioms and characterizations.
6We write Rn+,Rn− and Rn++ for the vectors with all coordinates nonnegative, nonpositive, and strictly
positive in Rn.
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This definition implicitly assumes that if two problems have the same marginals and
differ only in the priors, then their solutions are the same. We emphasize that this
reduction is only for simplicity.7 We can instead use some prior π ∈ Π as input of Γ.
Finally, p and X are consistent in the definition, since every polytope X can be generated
by Uc(S) for some S ∈ S(π).
Denote Σ the set of all (reduced) problems. A solution f assigns a unique feasible
utility allocation for each problem,
f : Σ→ X0 such that f(p,X, r) ∈ X, for all (p,X, r) ∈ Σ. (1.2.6)
Notation. Before the formal analysis, we introduce some notation. For any x, y ∈
Rn, define the vector from coordinatewise multiplication x ∗ y ∈ Rn by (x ∗ y)k = xkyk
for all k = 1, ..., n. If xk 6= 0 for all k = 1, ..., n, define the inverse x−1 by (x−1)k = 1/xk,
for all k = 1, ..., n. For X ⊂ Rn and h ∈ Rn, define h ∗X = {h ∗x : x ∈ X}. For y ∈ Rn,
define X + y = {x + y : x ∈ X}. For x, y ∈ Rn, the line through x with direction y is
given by l(x, y) = {x+ αy : α ∈ R}.







The q-inner product induces the q-norm ‖x‖q =
√
〈x, x〉q. For any closed convex set
X ⊂ Rn and vector r ∈ Rn, define the q-projection of r onto X by
φ(q,X, r) = arg min
x∈X
‖r − x‖q. (1.2.8)
The q-projection is well defined: By the projection theorem for closed convex subsets in
an Euclidean space, the q-projection of r onto X exists and is unique. For r ∈ Rn and
m > 0, the q-normed ball Bq(r,m) is given by {x ∈ Rn : ‖x− r‖q ≤ m}.
1.3. The Axioms
A solution F is the minimal norm solution, if for every problem Γ = (p,X, r) in Σ, it is
the p-projection of r onto X, or
F (Γ) = φ(p,X, r). (1.3.1)
7The information of marginals is sufficient for our characterization result. One consequence of this
definition is that it requires to introduce an axiom of splitting types based on marginal probabilities,
which must be modified from those in Harsanyi and Selten (1975) and Weidner (1992).
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In this section, we provide eight axioms that characterize the minimal norm solution:
An IIA axiom, a weak Pareto optimality axiom, a symmetry for TU problems axiom,
an individual fairness axiom, a splitting types axiom, a scaling axiom, a translation
invariance axiom, and a feasible set continuity axiom.
Axiom 1.1: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Let Γ = (p,X, r) and
Γ′ = (p,X ′, r) in Σ. If X ⊆ X ′ and f(Γ′) ∈ X, then f(Γ) = f(Γ′).
The first axiom requires that if a feasible set becomes smaller and the solution for
the larger set remains feasible, then it must be chosen in the smaller set. It resembles
Nash’s IIA axiom where the disagreement point is replaced by the reference point. With
our domain, every larger feasible set can be extended trivially from a smaller feasible set
in the interim utility space. The underlying economic environments or incentives do not
restrict the existence of such an extension. This is in contrast to the extension axiom of
Myerson (1984), which is defined on the space of social choice problems. We discuss this
issue in Section 1.7.
The second axiom requires that for each problem, the solution belongs to the weak
Pareto boundary of that problem.
Axiom 1.2: Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO). Let Γ = (p,X, r) in Σ. Then f(Γ) ∈
WPO(X).
The third axiom is a new symmetry axiom introduced in this chapter. First, consider a
complete information problem (e.g. each player’s type set is a singleton) with transferable
utility, defined by the reference point r0 = 0 ∈ RN and the feasible set
X0w,κ = {x ∈ RN :
∑
i
xi ≤ w and xi ≥ κ for all i ∈ N}, (1.3.2)
for some κ < w < 0. Then, Nash’s symmetry axiom requires that each player obtains
the same utility.
To apply Nash’s symmetry to incomplete information problems, the third axiom
introduces a linear map from a class of interim hyperplane problems to a class of ex ante
transferable utility problems. We call these hyperplane problems (probability-weighted)
TU problems. A problem Γ = (p,X, r) is a p-TU problem, if r = 0 ∈ Rn and X is given
by





pijxij ≤ w and xij ≥ κ, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊}, (1.3.3)
for some κ ≤ min(i,j) w/pij < w < 0. By varying (w, κ), we have all p-TU problems, and
by varying p, we define the class of TU problems.
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To see that Γ is well-defined, notice that Xw,κ is a polytope and 0 ∈ R(Xw,κ).
As shown below, requiring κ being uniform for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ is such that the ex ante
transferable utility problems are symmetric. Requiring κ < 0 small enough relates to a
larger class of linear problems derived from p-TU problems.8






pkmfkm(Γ), for all i, k ∈ N. (1.3.4)





pijxij, for all i ∈ N, (1.3.5)
then ϕXw,κ = X
0
w,κ and ϕr = r
0. Then the ex ante utility allocation is symmetric among
the players.
The fourth axiom is a modified form of the individual fairness axiom of Conley et
al. (2014). It requires all types of players bearing some losses in TU problems. As the
hyperplane in a p-TU problem intercepts all axes with strictly negative values, each type
of a player should be given some weight in determining the final allocation. Then, every
type of a player must bear some strictly positive loss.
Axiom 1.4: Individual Fairness (IF). Let Γ = (p,X, 0) be a p-TU problem. Then,
f(Γ) < 0.
The fifth axiom on irrelevant splitting of types was first introduced by Harsanyi and
Selten (1972), which considers an inessential way of transforming a problem. Since our
problems are defined by marginal probabilities rather than priors, we use a modified
version which is implied by their definition.
Definition 1.1: Let Γ = (p,X, r) and Γ′ = (p′, X ′, r′) in Σ, with p,X, r in Rn and
p′, X ′, r′ in Rn+1. Γ′ is obtained from Γ by splitting a type s of player 1 with probability
α ∈ (0, 1), if
i. N ′ = N , T ′i = Ti for all i 6= 1, and T ′1 = (T1 \ {s}) ∪ {a, b}.
ii. p′ij = pij for all j ∈ T ′i , i 6= 1, and p′1j = p1j for all j ∈ T ′1 \ {a, b}, and p′1a = αp1s,
p′1b = (1− α)p1s.




iv. x′ ∈ X ′ if and only if there exists x ∈ X such that x′ij = xij for all j ∈ T ′i , i 6= 1
and, x′1j = x1j for all j ∈ T ′1 \ {a, b}, and x′1a = x′1b = x1s.
8This requirement is for technical convenience and becomes clear in the proof of Lemma 1.2 (ii).
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This definition is a reduced version derived from a more primitive definition by com-
paring two social choice problems with different priors, as in Weidner (1992). To see it
intuitively, suppose the system of marginals p is derived from a prior π, then Definition
1.1 (ii) is implied by the following operation on the prior,
π′(j, ·) =

π(j, ·) if j ∈ T ′1 \ {a, b},
απ(j, ·) if j = a,
(1− α)π(j, ·) if j = b.
This operation does not affect the utility functions and the conditional beliefs of types a
and b. Hence, both types a and b of player 1 have the same decision problems. Also, the
operation does not affect the utility functions, the conditional beliefs, the decisions of
other types of player 1 and of types of other players. So, these two social choice problems
must generate the same incentive compatible utility allocations, except that the interim
utilities that types a and b receive from x′ will be the same as type s receives from x.
Now the axiom of splitting types is self-explanatory.
Axiom 1.5: Splitting Types (ST). Let Γ = (p,X, r) and Γ′ = (p′, X ′, r′) in Σ. Sup-





f1j(Γ) if j ∈ T ′1 \ {a, b},
f1s(Γ) if j ∈ {a, b},
and
fij(Γ
′) = fij(Γ), for all j ∈ Ti, i ∈ N \ {1}.
The following scaling axiom is modified from Voorneveld et al. (2011) and Conley
et al. (2014). It establishes a link between the class of TU problems and a larger class
of linear problems. If a linear problem is derived by scaling a p-TU problem, in which
type j of player i has twice the relative weight of type m of player k as in the original
problem, then the utility loss to type j relative to that of type m should be half the
utility loss to type j relative to that of type m in the original problem.
Axiom 1.6: Scaling (SCA). Let Γ = (p,X, 0) be a p-TU problem. For any h ∈ Rn++,
define a linear problem h ∗ Γ = (p, h ∗X, 0). Then
hijfkm(Γ)fij(h ∗ Γ) = hkmfij(Γ)fkm(h ∗ Γ), (1.3.6)
for all (i, j), (k,m) ∈ T̊ .
To see h ∗Γ is well defined, notice that h ∗X is a polytope and 0 ∈ R(h ∗X). If each
player’s type set is a singleton, this axiom reduces to the scaling axiom of Voorneveld
et al. (2011), except that they define a hyperplane problem differently and the utopia
point is replaced by the reference point.
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Axiom 1.7: Translation Invariance (T.INV). Let Γ = (p,X, r) in Σ. For any z ∈ Rn,
define Γ + z = (p,X + z, r + z). Then f(Γ + z) = f(Γ) + z.
The last axiom is a mild regularity condition. It states that a small change in the
feasible set does not lead to a drastic change in the solution outcome.
Axiom 1.8: Feasible Set Continuity (F.CONT). Let Γ = (p,X, r) and Γk = (p,Xk, r),
k = 1, 2, ..., be a sequence of problems in Σ, and Xk → X in the Hausdorff metric9. Then,
f(Γk)→ f(Γ).
We now provide some final remarks on these axioms.
IIA is often used in individual and social choice theory, but a solution that satisfies IIA
may violates an axiom of individual monotonicity introduced by Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975), which requires that if players have more resources to share, all of the players
must be weakly better off. Also, IIA is too strong to be satisfied by any voting rule in
some environment.
WPO is a weak interim welfare criterion. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) shows that
various concepts of Pareto optimality under uncertainty can be equivalently represented
through measurability restrictions on individual weights in a social welfare function. At
the interim stage, it is natural to require the welfare weights depending only on one’s
own types.
To interpret TU, notice that the arbitrator as an outsider has no private information.
A hyperplane problem and the corresponding ex ante transferable utility problem are
observable equivalent to him, and a symmetry on the set of players applies. ST is a fairly
weak axiom. Since the operation of splitting types is an inessential transformation of a
problem by dividing a type, the arbitrator should not distinguish two problems before and
after the splitting. IF implicitly requires players being treated fairly in a TU problem,
which is probability-weighted symmetric. For the uniform marginal probabilities, IF
requires the solution not to favor a certain type of a player. IF is weaker than symmetry
across all types of the players. SCA and T.INV impose certain ways of comparison of
utilities across types and players. Finally, F.CONT is for technical reasons.
1.4. Characterization
In this section, we provide a characterization of the minimal norm solution. The following
theorem is the main result of the chapter.
9Let X,Y be two nonempty closed subsets in Rn. The Hausdorff metric is given by
h(X,Y ) = max{sup
x∈X
dE(x, Y ), sup
y∈Y
dE(y,X)}, (1.3.7)
where dE is the Euclidean metric on Rn and dE(x, Y ) = miny∈Y dE(x, y).
10
Characterization
Theorem 1.1: A solution f satisfies Axioms 1.1-1.8 if and only if f = F .
It is easy to verify that F satisfies IIA, T.INV, F.CONT, and WPO. We use Lemma
1.2 to show that F satisfies the other axioms. The proofs of the lemmas are provided in
Appendix 1.A.
Lemma 1.2: F satisfies TU, IF, SCA, and ST.
The proof that F is the unique solution that satisfies all axioms is divided into
several steps. Denote the normalized p-TU problem Γp = (p,Xp, 0) by Xp = Xw,κ where
(w, κ) = (−|N |,min(i,j)−|N |/pij). Denote the solution to the normalized p-TU problem
by
e = f(Γp). (1.4.1)
f being IF implies e < 0. Lemma 1.3 states that if f is IIA, WPO, and SCA, then
for any linear problem Γ = (p, h ∗ X, 0) scaled from a p-TU problem Γ̃ = (p,X, 0) for
some h ∈ Rn++,
f(Γ) = φ(pe, h ∗X, 0), (1.4.2)
where
pe = p ∗ (−e)−1. (1.4.3)
Then by TU, ST, and Lemma 1.4, we have for the normalized p-TU problem, e =
(−1, ...,−1). Finally, by IIA and F.CONT, we establish f = F .
Lemma 1.3: Suppose f satisfies IF, IIA, WPO, and SCA. For any p-TU problem
Γ = (p,X, 0) and h ∈ Rn++, f(h ∗ Γ) = φ(pe, h ∗X, 0).
Lemma 1.4: Suppose f satisfies IF, IIA, WPO, SCA, TU, and ST. Then for the
normalized p-TU problem Γp, f(Γp) = (−1, ...,−1).
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Suppose f is a solution satisfying all the axioms. Fix Γ =
(p,X, r). By T.INV, we can translate the problem to r = 0. Denote y = F (Γ).
Then X and the ball Bp(0, ‖y‖p) has y as the unique point in common. Since both sets
are convex and compact, by a hyperplane separation theorem, there exists a hyperplane
Hλ,w = {x ∈ Rn : 〈λ, x〉p = w} (1.4.4)
that separates X and the ball Bp(0, ‖y‖p), and supports the ball at y. Since Bp(0, ‖y‖p)
is smooth, λ = −y. Furthermore, φ(p,Hλ,w, 0) = y.
Case 1. y < 0. Then λ ∈ Rn++ and w < 0. Now consider a linear problem h ∗ Γ̃ =
(p, h ∗ X̃, 0), where h = λ−1 and Γ̃ = (p, X̃, 0) is a p-TU problem with w̃ = w and
κ̃ < 0 small enough such that X ⊆ h ∗ X̃. Because h ∗ X̃ ⊂ {x : 〈λ, x〉p ≤ w},
and y ∈ (h ∗ X̃) ∩ Hλ,w, it implies φ(p, h ∗ X̃, 0) = φ(p,Hλ,w, 0) = y. By Lemma 1.4,
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e = (−1, ...,−1) and pe = p. By Lemma 1.3, f(h ∗ Γ̃) = φ(pe, h ∗ X̃, 0) = φ(p, h ∗ X̃, 0).
Since f is IIA, f(Γ) = f(h ∗ Γ̃) = y = F (Γ).
Case 2. y ≤ 0 and yij = λij = 0 for some (i, j) ∈ T̊ . Lemma 1.8 in Appendix 1.A
shows that there exists a sequence Γk = (p,Xk, 0), k = 1, 2, ..., such that yk = F (Γk) < 0
for all k, Xk → X in the Hausdorff metric, and yk → y. Then apply the result in Case
1, f(Γk) = yk = F (Γk). By F.CONT, Xk → X implies that f(Γ) = limk→∞ f(Γk) =
limk→∞ F (Γk) = F (Γ). 
1.5. Discussion
1.5.1. Minimum Norm Duality
We now discuss a minimal norm duality between welfare weights and interim utility for
the minimal norm solution. In a canonical two-person complete information bargaining
problem (X, d) with X being a convex compact subset of R2 and d ∈ X, Harsanyi
(1963) and Shapley (1969) characterize that a feasible allocation x ∈ X is the Nash
solution if and only if there exists a welfare weighting vector λ ∈ R2++ such that x is






λiyi and λ1(x1 − d1) = λ2(x2 − d2). (1.5.1)
For such a λ, the solution is desirable in terms of both efficiency and equity, and hence
λ is a natural weighting vector. Myerson (1984) shows that the set of neutral bargaining
solutions under incomplete information have a similar property. For our social choice
problem with a reference point, a natural question is how to define λ-egalitarian alloca-
tions and whether the weighting vector in our solution has a similar characterization.
Definition 1.2: Let Γ ∈ Σ. (i) x ∈ X is interim λ-utilitarian, if there exists
λ ∈ Rn++ such that
〈λ, x〉p = max
y∈X
〈λ, y〉p. (1.5.2)







for all (i, j), (k,m) ∈ T̊ .
To see what a λ-equal loss allocation refers to, consider a feasible set X ⊂ R2 with a
reference point r ∈ R(X). A λ-equal loss allocation requires that the players bear losses
proportional to their social weights, i.e. λ1/λ2 = (r1 − x1)/(r2 − x2). Then, the player
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with the higher social weight bears more losses.10
With these definitions, we have the following result that characterizes F by a natural
welfare weighting vector.
Proposition 1.1: Let Γ ∈ Σ with F (Γ) < r. Then, y = F (Γ) if and only if there
exists λ ∈ Rn++ such that y is interim λ-utilitarian and has interim λ-equal loss.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. (Only If) Among the supporting hyperplanes of X at y =
F (Γ), there exists one hyperplane Hλ,w = {x : 〈λ, x〉p = w} with λ = r − y being the
normal vector. From F (Γ) < r, λ ∈ Rn++. Then y is interim λ-utilitarian and λ-equal
loss.
(If) Suppose there is y′ ∈ X and λ ∈ Rn++ such that y′ is λ-utilitarian and λ-equal
loss. Then with λ′ = r − y′ = kλ where k = ‖r − y′‖p/‖λ‖p, y′ is also λ′-utilitarian
and λ′-equal loss. Since y′ is λ′-utilitarian, 〈r − y′, x − y′〉p ≤ 0, for all x ∈ X. By the
projection theorem, y′ = y. 
To interpret this result, note that the minimum p-norm from r to X, or
min
x∈X
‖r − x‖p (P)
is equal to the maximum of p-norms from r to hyperplanes separating r and X. Hence,









By a no duality gap theorem (Luenberger, 1969), when (P) has a solution x∗ = F (Γ),
then the optimal solution λ∗ to (D) is aligned with r−x∗. Define the linear social welfare
function by






for some welfare weights λ ∈ Rn++. We have
‖r − x∗‖p = 〈λ∗, r〉p − 〈λ∗, x∗〉p = SW (λ∗, r, p)− SW (λ∗, x∗, p). (1.5.5)
The duality pair (x∗, λ∗) allows the following interpretation. First, λ∗ is the only
weighting vector such that x∗ is both interim λ∗-utilitarian and λ∗-equal loss. With such
a natural weighting vector λ∗, the value of the primal problem has a “transferable utility”
10This may counter the intuition that the player with a higher social weight bears less loss. In this
case, two players’ weighted losses are equalized, i.e. λ1(r1 − x1) = λ2(r2 − x2). However, for the λ-
egalitarian criterion in a bargaining problem, a player with a higher weight receives a lower utility gain
and thus is disadvantaged in the solution. Since λ is endogenously determined, the λ-equal loss criterion
is more consistent with the λ-egalitarian criterion.
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interpretation: It is equal to the utility gap between the λ∗-weighted social welfare from
the reference point and the λ∗-weighted social welfare from the optimum.
1.5.2. Independence of Axioms
We investigate the logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 1.1 by considering
that one of the axioms is violated while some other axioms are satisfied. We provide
some counterexamples for some, but not all of the axioms.
Example 1. Let q be a function that associates each system of marginals p with a
system of marginals q(p) such that q(p) and p have the same type sets but q(p) 6= p. For
each Γ ∈ Σ, define
F q(Γ) = φ(q(p), X, r). (1.5.6)
For all q, F q satisfies IIA, WPO, IF, SCA, T.INV, and F.CONT, but F q violates
TU. Depending on q, F q may satisfy ST. For example, for every Γ = (p,X, r) and
Γ′ = (p′, X ′, r′) derived from Γ by splitting type s of player 1, q(p′) is derived from
q(p) by splitting type s of player 1. On the other hand, if q(p) associates with uniform
distributions for all problems, we have the minimal Euclidean distance solution. Then
F q violates TU and ST.
Example 2. For each Γ = (p,X, r), define the nadir point m(X) by mij(X) =
minx∈X xij, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ . For each Γ ∈ Σ, define







Then, NB satisfies WPO, IF, T.INV, and F.CONT. Moreover, NB satisfies TU and ST.
However, NB violates SCA. Voorneveld et al. (2011) observe that the scaling axioms
are special to quadratic norms.
1.5.3. Other Axioms
It is worth noting that F also satisfies the following two properties. The axiom of prior
continuity says that the solution is robust to small changes in priors. Here, N, T and
hence n are fixed.
Axiom 1.9: Prior Continuity (P.CON). Let Γ = (p,X, r) and Γk = (pk, X, r), k =
1, 2..., in Σ and pk → p. Then f(Γk)→ f(Γ).
Finally, we introduce an axiom of reference point convexity. This axiom requires that
for any problem, when a mixture of the original reference point and the solution point
is used to generate a new reference point, the solutions of two problems are the same.
Axiom 1.10: Reference Point Convexity (R.CONV). Let Γ = (p,X, r) in Σ, and for
α ∈ (0, 1], let Γα = (p,X, αr + (1− α)f(Γ)). Then f(Γ) = f(Γα).
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The axiom is related to the literature of repeated games with “satisficing” players
(Bendor, Mookherjee and Ray, 1995)11, in which each player’s aspiration level is endoge-
nous and is consistent with his long run average payoff. Each player may adjust his
aspiration level in period 1 based on his aspiration level in period 0 and the personal
payoff experience in period 0.
1.6. Applications and Examples
1.6.1. Social Choice Problems
We now discuss the generation of feasible sets and interim reference points in economic
contexts. A reference point can be generated separately from a social choice problem.
We provide three scenarios in which an interim reference point naturally arises. (i)
Contract obligations, i.e. creditors have debt claims. (ii) Subjective entitlements. When
there is flexibility in a contract, each contracting party may interpret the same term
differently in one’s own favor and believe to be entitled. (iii) Repeated interaction and
dynamic adjustment of aspirations. In a long-run relationship, players may adjust their
aspirations based on past experiences.
Bankruptcy. Suppose two creditors divide the estate. There are two options, either
creditor 1 or 2 obtains the estate. The feasible set is generated by the set of incentive
compatible allocation mechanisms. Each creditor’s interim reference utilities can be
generated by his debt claim. For example, if creditor i has a claim equal to ri, then the
interim reference utility of creditor i with any type is given by ri.
Contracts. Suppose one seller and one buyer trade one object. In period 1, the players
know their private values of the object. Suppose the players can sign a contract at period
0. A flexible contract specifies a range of all potential transaction prices. The players
then trade at one of these prices or there is no trade.12 The feasible set is generated by the
set of incentive compatible trading mechanisms.13 Given the early contract prices, the
seller is entitled with the highest price while the buyer is entitled with the lowest price.
Then these subjective entitlements generate interim reference utilities. For example, the
interim reference utility of each type of the seller is given by the highest price.14
Compromise. Suppose two players vote among three alternatives, L,M and R. Player
1’s preference is given by L M  R and player 2’s preference is given by R M  L.
11An action of a player is deemed “satisfactory” if its current payoff exceeds some aspiration level held
by the player.
12Here, the decision set is endogenously determined by a contract.
13This model, adapted to our social choice environment, is different from the model of Hart and Moore
(2008). In their model, there is no incomplete information between the players.
14Hart and Moore (2008) introduces the notion of contracts as reference points. In their model, each
player can aggrieve the other player if the final price diverges from his entitlement.
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Each player receives utilities of 1 and 0 from his best and worst alternative, respectively,
and privately observes his utility between 0 and 1 from alternative M . Players need to
make decisions in period 0 and 1, and the utility shocks are independently distributed
across players and across periods. In period 0, suppose that an equal randomization over
L and R was chosen. In period 1, suppose L is eliminated and the past allocation is now
unattainable. The players then need to select a decision between M and R given the
past experience.
Consuming Public Goods. Suppose two players decide to consume some public good
l ∈ {a, b}. The budget constraint in period 0 is given by paqa + pbqb ≤ m, where pl, ql
are the unit price and the quantity of good l, and m is the budget. Suppose in period
0, the players experienced a consumption bundle (qa0 , q
b
0). In period 1, the prices may
change and the past bundle is not affordable. If player i with type j receives some private
observed utility ulj from consuming one unit of good l, the interim reference utility of







The above examples require that the reference point has been formed at some earlier
period before the decision making. On the other hand, the reference point can be gen-
erated endogenously by a social choice problem. If X is the set of incentive compatible





for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ . For r∗(X) /∈ X, we have r∗(X) ∈ R(X).
1.6.2. Illustration of the Minimal Norm Solution
We provide two examples to illustrate the minimal norm solution.
Example 1.1: Let N = {1, 2}, D = {d1, d2}, Ti = {0, 1}, i = 1, 2. (ui)i∈N is given
by
ui(d, ti) 10 11 20 21
d1 0 1 0 0
d2 0 0 0 1
Suppose π(t) = p1,t1 × p2,t2 for all t ∈ T , and p11 > p21.
The example fits a bankruptcy problem: Either creditor 1 or 2 obtains the asset and
in any state, a creditor weakly prefers to obtain the asset. Now suppose each creditor
has an ex ante claim equal to 1. The interim reference point generated by the ex ante
claims is given by r = (1, 1, 1, 1). Notice that it is weakly dominant for a player to
report truthfully.15 The set of IC mechanisms coincides with all constant mechanisms,
X = {(−(1− δ1), δ1,−δ1, 1− δ1) : 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1}.
15While we assume that type 0 of a player reports the true type in case of indifference, we may instead
assume that it receives a utility of ε > 0 small from di and the incentive becomes strict.
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j pijxij, where ties
are broken randomly and fairly. The ex ante utilitarian solution is given by δ1 = 1. The
asset is allocated to creditor 1 for sure and creditor 2 obtains the asset with probability





Thus, δ∗1 > 1/2. Creditor 2, whose value is drawn from a less favorable distribution,
receives the asset with a lower but strictly positive probability.
Example 1.2: Let N = {1, 2}, D = {d0, d1}, Ti = {0, 1}, i = 1, 2. (ui)i∈N is given
by
ui(d, ti) 10 11 20 21
d0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
d1 0 1 0 1
Assume π(t) = p1,t1 × p2,t2 for all t ∈ T and for i = 1, 2, (pi0, pi1) = (p, p̄) with p < p̄.
We assume the reference point is endogenously determined by the utopia point of the
interim utility set.
Since the minimal norm program is symmetric with respect to players, the solution
is symmetric.16 We consider symmetric mechanisms. Denote µ(d1|t) = µ1(t) for t ∈ T .
We first use an intuitive technique to find a solution. For t = (0, 0) and t = (1, 1),
choosing d0 or d1 for sure would be social welfare optimal. The question then would
be the probabilities that d0 is chosen if t = (0, 1) and t = (1, 0). Suppose µ1(0, 1) =
µ1(1, 0) = α ∈ [0, 1]. The symmetric interim utility vector is given by





, p[α + (1− α)1
2
] + p). (1.6.2)
It is easy to see that no matter what the other plays, it is a dominant strategy to







1(1, 1)) = (0, p, p, 1). (1.6.3)
To verify it is indeed the solution for the entire problem, let Q = (Q
i
, Qi)i∈{1,2} be
the interim expected probabilities that d1 is chosen. Denote (Qi, Qi) = (Q,Q), i = 1, 2.
The set of IC expeceted probabilities is given by
{(Q,Q) : 0 ≤ Q ≤ Q ≤ 1}. (1.6.4)
16Suppose X is symmetric. If there is a asymmetric solution x′ ∈ X, then there is another solution
x′′ ∈ X by interchanging the players’ labels. Since X is convex, 12x
′ + 12x
′′ ∈ X is also a solution.
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The set of ex post feasible interim allocation probabilities (i.e. there exists a mechanism
µ such that (Q,Q) are the marginals) is given by17
{(Q,Q) : 0 ≤ Q,Q ≤ 1, p̄Q− pQ ≤ p̄2}. (1.6.5)
Denote Q the intersection of these inequalities (Figure 1.1a). Denote (xi0, xi1) = (x, x),




(1 +Q)). The set of symmetric feasible allocations is
given by
Xs = {(x, x) ∈ R2 : x+ x ≥ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1, 2px+ 2p̄x ≤ 1 + p̄2} (1.6.6)























pp̄, 1 − 1
2
pp̄). The ex post feasibility p̄Q − pQ ≤ p̄2 (FE2) is binding. Finally,
Q∗ = (Q∗, Q
∗
) = (pp̄, 1 − pp̄). It is easy to see that the minimal norm solution is
implemented by the stochastic mechanism given by (1.6.3).
1.7. Comparison to Literature
1.7.1. Complete Information
Yu (1973) considers a class of social choice problems with the endogenous reference points
equal to the utopia points. To formalize such a problem, let N be the set of players, let
ΣN0 be the set of all nonempty convex compact subsets of RN and let
ΣN = {X ⊆ RN : X = comp(C), for some C ∈ ΣN0 }, (1.7.1)
where comp(C) = C − RN+ . A solution f : ΣN → RN is such that for every X ∈ ΣN ,
f(X) ∈ X. The utopia point r∗(X) is defined by r∗i (X) = max{xi : x ∈ X} for all i ∈ N .
17The feasibility condition is given by Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 2.
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The Yu solution is given by




(r∗i (X)− xi)2. (1.7.2)
Roth (1977) and Conley et al. (2014) show that there is no solution satisfying Pareto
optimality, symmetry, together with IIA other than the utopia point (u-IIA), translation
invariance and scale covariance. In particular, Roth (1977) shows that the Yu solution
satisfies u-IIA, translation invariance but violates scale covariance.18
Conley et al. (2014) introduces the axiom of proportional losses for a class of trans-
ferable utility problems and the axiom of individual fairness.19 They characterize the
Yu solution with Pareto optimality, symmetry, u-IIA, translation invariance, the propor-
tional losses, individual fairness and feasible set continuity.20 The axioms of SCA, IF,
and F.CONT are modified based on their axioms.
Voorneveld et al. (2011) provides a characterization of the Yu solution, by a con-
sistency axiom, first used by Lensberg (1988). Denote N all nonempty finite subsets
of natural numbers. By varying the number of players, the domain is now given by
Σ̄ = ∪N⊂NΣN .
u-consistency: Let X ∈ ΣN and I ⊆ N , define XfI ∈ ΣI by
XfI := {x ∈ R
I : (x, fN\I(X)) ∈ X}. (1.7.4)
If r∗i (X
f
I ) = r
∗
i (X) for each i ∈ I, then fi(X
f
I ) = fi(X) for each i ∈ I.
The axiom considers a problem X with N a set of players and I a subset of N . Then,
give players in N \ I their utilities according to f in X and consider a reduced problem
XfI for the remaining members in I. The solution f is u-consistent if the prescribed
allocation to each member of I in the reduced problem XfI is the same as in the original
game X. Our characterization does not use the u-consistency axiom and instead we use
IF and F.CONT.
Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) considers a choice set X ⊂ RN with an arbitrary refer-
18IIA other than the utopia point: If X and X ′ satisfy r∗(X) = r∗(X ′) and X ⊆ X ′, and if f(X ′) ∈ X,
then f(X) = f(X ′).
Translation Invariance: For any z ∈ RN , if X ′ = X + z, then f(X ′) = f(X) + z.
Scale Covariance: For any h ∈ RN++, if X ′ = h ∗X, then f(X ′) = h ∗ f(X).
19The proportional losses: For any (λ,w) ∈ RN++ × R, let X = {x : λ · x = w} ∩ [r∗(X)− RN++]. For
any h ∈ RN++, if X ′ = h ∗X, then
hi[r
∗
j (X)− fj(X)][r∗i (X ′)− fi(X ′)] = hj [r∗i (X)− fi(X)][r∗j (X ′)− fj(X ′)], (1.7.3)
for all i, j ∈ N . Here λ · x denotes the standard inner product.
20Symmetry: For any permutation m of N and x ∈ RN , write m(x)i := xm(i). If for all m, m(X) = X,
then fi(X) = fj(X) for all i, j ∈ N .
Feasible set continuity: f is continuous with respect to the Hausdorff metric on ΣN .
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ence point r ∈ RN . They obtain a characterization of the minimal Euclidean distance
solution by a strong symmetry axiom and an IIA axiom. The strong symmetry axiom
is strictly stronger than Nash’s symmetry axiom, which only applies to the problems
symmetric to the main diagonal.
Strong Symmetry. If X is symmetric with respect to some line l(r, λ), then f(X, r) ∈
l(r, λ).21
Strong symmetry requires that if a feasible set is symmetric with respect a line
through the reference point, then the solution must lie on the line. A justification would
be that the players’ compromises over utility losses from the reference point force only
the “centric” outcomes to be chosen.
1.7.2. Incomplete Information
There is a relatively small literature on two-person bargaining problems with incomplete
information. Harsanyi and Selten (1972) (HS hereafter) first characterizes the generalized
Nash product solution by a set of axioms. Myerson (1984) characterizes the incentive
feasible neutral solution by the axioms of probability invariance, random dictatorship,
and extension. Weidner (1992) characterizes the incentive feasible generalized Nash
product solution by the axioms of HS (1972) and Myerson (1984).
1.7.2.1. The Harsanyi/Selten Solution
Harsanyi and Selten (1972) considers bargaining problems as a class of bases (π,X, 0),
where π ∈ ∆(T ) is the prior, the bargaining set X ⊂ Rn is the convex hull of interim
utility allocations from all strict equilibrium points of an extensive form game22, and
0 ∈ Rn is the disagreement point. Since none of their axioms involves changes in the
disagreement point, we follow HS to abbreviate a problem (π,X, 0) by (π,X). The HS
solution L∗ is defined by for each problem (π,X),









To compare their axioms with Axioms 1.1-1.8, we introduce their eight axioms (with
a slightly different order).
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA′). If X ⊆ X ′ and f(π,X ′) ∈ X, then f(π,X ′) = f(π,X).
21We provide a generalized strong symmetry of Rubinstein and Zhou (1999). We say X is p-symmetric
with respect to l(r, λ) if for any z ∈ X, there is z′ ∈ X such that arg minx∈l(r,λ) ‖z − x‖p = 12 (z + z
′).
p-Symmetry. If X is p-symmetric with respect to some line l(r, λ), then f(X, r) ∈ l(r, λ).
When there is no incomplete information or p = (1, ..., 1), it reduces to strong symmetry.
22An equilibrium point s∗ is strict if when a player ti deviates from equilibrium strategy s
∗
i (ti) to any
other best reply of s∗−i, then all players’ interim utilities are not affected.
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Pareto Optimality (PO). f(π,X) ∈ PO(X).
The first two axioms are similar to Axioms 1.1-1.2, except that PO is replaced by
WPO. Since the extensive form in HS is fixed, any change in the bargaining set re-
sults from varying utility functions. While it is unclear whether every extension can be
generated in this way, they assume that an arbitrary extension always exists.
Player Symmetry (PS). If (π,X ′) is derived from (π,X) by interchanging two players,
then f(π,X ′) is derived from f(π,X) by interchanging these two players.
Type Symmetry (TS). If (π,X ′) is derived from (π,X) by interchanging two types
of a player, then f(π,X ′) is derived from f(π,X) by interchanging these types of the
player.
PS and TS are the main difference from the axiom of symmetry for TU problems. It
is partly due to the fact that HS define a hyperplane problem (π,X0) by
X0 = {x ∈ Rn+ : 1 · x ≤ w}, (1.7.6)
while we define a hyperplane problem (π,X1) by
X1 = {x ∈ Rn+ : 〈1, x〉p ≤ w} (1.7.7)
for w = |N |. However, these two classes of hyperplane problems are closely related.
Applying the HS solution to X0 and X1 gives L
∗(π,X0) = p and L
∗(π,X1) = (1, ..., 1).
It follows that the HS solution satisfies an axiom of symmetry for TU problems adapted
to bargaining problems.23
Splitting Types (ST′). If (π′, X ′) is derived from (π,X) by splitting a type of a player
with probability α ∈ (0, 1), then f(π′, X ′) is derived from f(π,X) by splitting this type.
Profitability (PRO). f(π,X) > 0.
Linear Invariance (L.INV). For any h ∈ Rn++, then f(π, h ∗X) = h ∗ f(π,X).
Mixing Probabilities (MIX). If (π,X) and (π′, X) with π, π′ ∈ ∆(T ) have the same
solutions x ∈ X, and if π′′ = απ + (1− α)π′ for some α ∈ [0, 1], then f(π′′, X) = x.
ST′ is defined by the operation on the priors rather than on the marginal proba-
bilities, thus ST is much weaker than ST′. PRO is a requirement of strong individual
rationality. IF is a counterpart to PRO in our problem, except that the disagreement
point is replaced by the reference point. L.INV is another axiom different from ours.
23It is unclear unclear whether we can use this axiom to obtain an alternative characterization of the
HS solution. Instead, we may use PS and TS to obtain an alternative characterization of the minimal
norm solution.
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HS require the solution being invariant to order preserving linear transformations in the
interim utility space. The minimal norm solution violates this axiom.24 Finally, while we
do not use MIX for characterization, it is clear that the minimal norm solution satisfies
this axiom.
1.7.2.2. Myerson’s Neutral Bargaining Solution
Myerson (1984) defines a bargaining problem Γ = (S, d∗) by a social choice problem
S = (π,D, (ui)i∈N) and a disagreement option d
∗ ∈ D. Myerson proposes a set-valued
concept that generalizes Nash’s solution, called the neutral bargaining solutions. The
neutral solutions are characterized by a dual system of equations and they have no explicit
formula. Myerson shows that the neutral solutions satisfy a probability invariance axiom
and an extension axiom.
The probability invariance axiom states that only the interim expected utility is
decision-theoretically significant to the problem and that probabilities cannot be mean-
ingfully defined separately from state-dependent utility functions.
Probability Invariance (P.INV). Let S = (π,D, (ui)i∈N) and S̃ = (π̃, D, (ũi)i∈N),
π, π̃ ∈ ∆(T ). If
π̃i(t−i|ti)ũi(d, t) = πi(t−i|ti)ui(d, t) (1.7.8)
for all d ∈ D, t ∈ T , and i ∈ N , then f(S̃, d∗) = f(S, d∗).
Since interim utilities always have probabilities multiplied by utilities, two social
choice problems in the axiom have the same set of mechanisms and each mechanism
generates the same incentive feasible allocation. Note that both the HS solution and the
ex ante utilitarian solution25 violate this axiom. By replacing the disagreement point by
the reference point, the minimal norm solution also violates the axiom.
For the extension axiom, Myerson (1984) requires that any extension in the bargaining
set must result from adding decisions.
Definition 1.3: Let S = (π,D, (ui)i∈N) and S̃ = (π, D̃, (ũi)i∈N). S̃ is an extension
of S, if D̃ ⊇ D and ũi|D×T = ui for all i ∈ N .
Extension. Let S̃ = (π, D̃, (ũi)i∈N) be an extension of S = (π,D, (ui)i∈N). If
f(S̃, d∗) ∈ U(S), then f(S̃, d∗) = f(S, d∗).26
As noted by Myerson (1984), there are social choice problems that give a larger set
of feasible allocations than the original one, but that cannot be constructed from it by
24It is unclear whether any solution among the Myerson’s neutral solutions satisfies the axiom.





26Myerson’s extension axiom also allows a sequential approximation, which makes it not entirely
comparable to the one here.
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adding new decisions. On the other hand, Lemma 1.1 shows that there are polytopes
that cannot be generated by the incentive compatible allocations of any social choice
problem. Such sets cannot be extensions of any social choice problem trivially. The
following result, which is implied by either Myerson’s comment (1984, p.468) or Lemma
1.1, indicates that compared to our IIA, the definition of Myerson’s extension is very
strong: The utility set generated by an extension of a social choice problem is with
restrictions.
Lemma 1.5: There exist π ∈ Π, S ∈ S(π) and a polytope X ⊂ Rn such that U(S) (
X but X cannot be generated by any extension of S.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A. 
1.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we characterize the minimal norm solution by a set of axioms. We provide
some examples of social choice problems with reference points to illustrate this solution.
This solution can be further used to study bankruptcy problems, early contracting prob-
lems, or collective repeated consumption choices with incomplete information, where the
reference point is either generated by contract obligations, or entitlements, or repeated
interaction and choice outcomes. We also find that there are many avenues for future
research:
1. The domain of the feasible sets. Myerson (1984) and Weidner (1992) define the
domain of the feasible sets being generated by all social choice problems. If there exists
some social choice problem (π,D, (ui)i∈N) that generates the feasible set X of a p-TU
problem,27 then we can obtain a characterization on this coarser domain.28
2. The probability invariance axiom. The TU axiom is inconsistent with P.INV
because for two problems with different systems of marginals but the same feasible sets,
TU requires the problems having different solutions while P.INV requires them having
the same solutions. On the other hand, the minimal standard-norm solution does satisfy
P.INV.
3. Weak/strong Pareto optimality. For generic utility functions, it can be seen
that the class of choice problems containing nonempty WPO\PO has Lebesgue measure
zero under complete information but has measure strictly positive under incomplete
information. For a complete information problem, by slightly perturbing the players’
utility functions, WPO\PO vanishes. However, with incomplete information, perturbing
27Some examples suggest that there may exist no social choice problem that generates a p-TU feasible
set.
28In this case, IIA is replaced by a modified extension axiom, in which an extension can be obtained by
varying (D, (ui)i∈N ) arbitrarily. This axiom is stronger than IIA but weaker than Myerson’s extension
axiom.
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the players’ utility functions may not eliminate WPO\PO. For example, consider a one-
person problem with T = {t, t′} and D = {d0, d1}. The utility function at d0 and d1 are
(2,−1) and (0, 1). Then, U(S) = conv{(2, 1), (0, 1), (2,−1)}. A two-person example is
Example 2 in Section 1.5. Thus, if |N | ≤ 2, |D| = 2, and if all preference orderings over
D are possible, WPO\PO exists generically. It is unclear whether this result generalizes.
4. The extension axiom. Myerson (1984) constructs extensions by adding decision
options into the original decision set. In general, it is difficult to construct a required
extension with the desirable geometric properties. Characterization of the minimal norm
solution with the extension axiom is left for future work.
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Appendix 1.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1. First note that for any π ∈ Π, if X = U(S) or X = Uc(S) for
some S ∈ S(π), then X is a polytope. Since D is finite, U(S) is the intersection of
finitely many linear inequalities, i.e. the incentive and feasibility conditions. The latter
conditions imply that U(S) is bounded. Uc(S) is the convex hull of interim utility vectors
at each d ∈ D. Hence in either case, X ∈ X0.
(i) Let π ∈ Π. For any polytope X ⊂ Rn, the set of its extreme points, G, is finite.
For every g ∈ G, define a decision dg such that the interim utility vector at dg is g,
i.e. the utility function is defined by ûi(dg, t) = gi(ti) for all t ∈ T and i ∈ N . Then
X = Uc(S) for S = (π,D, (ui)i∈N) and X ⊆ Xc(π). Hence, Xc = X0.
(ii) Consider the simplest class of one-person social choice problems with T = {a, b},
π = (πa, 1 − πa), πa ∈ (0, 1). The interim utility space is R2. Let X be the line
segment between (0, 1) and (1, 0). We claim that there exists no social choice problem
S = (π,D, u) such that U(S) = X, by varying D and u. Denote ud = (u(d, a), u(d, b))
for d ∈ D.
First notice that |D| ≥ 2. For every d ∈ D, it follows that ud ∈ X, otherwise selecting
d constantly yields an interim utility outside X. Moreover, because mind∈D u(d, t) ≤
x(t) ≤ maxd∈D u(d, t) for all t ∈ T , i.e. every interim utility is bounded by the bounds
of the utility functions, it is necessary that the endpoints (0, 1) and (1, 0) correspond to
the utility functions at some d0, d1 ∈ D.
Now define S0 = (π,D, u) with D = {d0, d1} and u by ud0 = (0, 1) and ud1 = (1, 0).
A simple calculation shows that U(S0) = conv{(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Hence, U(S0) 6= X.
Finally, every S̃ derived from S0 by adding decisions to {d0, d1} and defining utility
functions at such new decisions, U(S̃) must contain U(S0) and U(S̃) 6= X. Hence, there
exists no social choice problem S such that U(S) = X and therefore X ( X0.29 
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Let λ ∈ Rn++. Consider the linear problem h ∗ Γ = (p, h ∗ X, 0)
29For this one-person case, a similar reasoning shows that for any polytope X ⊂ R2 with (0, 1) and
(1, 0) being its extreme points and the line segment being part of its northeast boundary, there exists
no social choice problem S such that U(S) = X. For example, X = conv{(0, 1), (1, 0), (−1, 0)} or
X = conv{(0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0), (−1,−1)}.
Moreover, it can be shown that it is impossible to construct any line segment except that the
new utility functions satisfy u(d0, t) > u(d1, t) for all t ∈ T , or u(d0, t) < u(d1, t) for all t ∈ T , i.e.
(u(d1, a), u(d1, b)) = (1, 2).
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obtained from some p-TU problem Γ = (p,X, 0) with κ ≤ min(i,j) w/pij < w < 0, where
h = λ−1. The relaxed Lagrangian (without any xij ≥ κ) for the minimal norm problem















FOCs give necessary conditions
2pijx̃ij − ηλijpij = 0, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ .
If η = 0, then x̃ij = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ Π, and x̃ /∈ X. Thus η < 0 and x̃ij = ηλij/2, for all
(i, j) ∈ T̊ .
(i) TU and IF. Set λ = (1, ..., 1), x̃ij = η/2, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ . All constraints x̃ij ≥ κ
are not binding and F (Γ) = x̃. Thus,
∑
j pijx̃ij = η/2 for all i ∈ N , and F is TU. η < 0
implies F (Γ) < 0. F is IF.
(ii) SCA. For each λ ∈ Rn++, we only need to show that for the relaxed solution x̃, all
additional constraints λijx̃ij ≥ κ are not binding and thus F (h ∗ Γ) = x̃.
Since x̃ij = ηλij/2, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ , and 〈λ, x̃〉p = w, we have η = 2w‖λ‖p and x̃ij =
λijw
‖λ‖p













for all (i, j) ∈ T̊ . F is SCA.
(iii) ST. Let Γ = (p,X, r) and Γ′ = (p′, X ′, r′). Suppose Γ′ is obtained from Γ by












where for every x′ ∈ X ′, there exists x ∈ X such that x′ij = xij for all j ∈ Ti, all i 6= 1, and
x′1j = x1j for all j ∈ T ′1\{a, b}, and x′1a = x′1b = x1s. Hence, Fij(Γ′) = Fij(Γ) for all j ∈ Ti,
all i 6= 1, and F1j(Γ′) = F1j(Γ) for all j ∈ T ′1 \{a, b}, and F1a(Γ′) = F1b(Γ′) = F1s(Γ). 
We use the following lemma to obtain Lemma 1.3.
Lemma 1.6: Let Γ = (p,X, 0) be a p-TU problem. If f satisfies IIA, SCA, WPO,
and IF, then f(Γ) = αf(Γp) for some α > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.6. Notice that by SCA, every p-TU problem Γ can be obtained from
some p-TU problem Γκ = (p,Xw,κ, 0) with w = −|N | and some κ ≤ min(i,j)−|N |/pij,
by scaling with h = (β, ..., β) ∈ Rn++ for some β > 0.
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We only need to show that for any κ < min(i,j)−|N |/pij, the problems Γp and Γκ
have the same solution. First note that Xp ⊂ X−|N |,κ. Notice that WPO(X−|N |,κ) =
PO(X−|N |,κ). By IF and WPO, f(Γκ) ∈ {x : 〈1, x〉p = −|N |, x < 0} ⊂ Xp. By IIA,
f(Γp) = f(Γκ). 
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Let Γ = (p,X, 0) be a p-TU problem and e = f(Γp). By Lemma
1.6, f(Γ) = αe for some α > 0. By IF, e < 0. Now consider λ ∈ Rn++ and let h = λ−1.
We have





λijpijxij ≤ w and λijxij ≥ κ, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊}. (1.A.2)










for all (i, j), (k,m) ∈ T̊ . Hence, the solution f(h ∗ Γ) is on the line l(0, λ ∗ e). Because
WPO(h ∗X) = PO(h ∗X), by WPO, f(h ∗ Γ) ∈ l(0, λ ∗ e) ∩ {x : 〈λ, x〉p = w}, which
is a unique point. On the other hand, a similar proof as Lemma 1.2 shows that the
solution φ(pe, h ∗X, 0) is on the line l(0, λ ∗ e). Since φ(pe, h ∗X, 0) is WPO, f(h ∗ Γ) =
φ(pe, h ∗X, 0). 
We use the following lemma to show Lemma 1.4.
Lemma 1.7: Suppose f satisfies IF, IIA, WPO, and SCA. Let Γ = (p,X, 0) be in Σ.
If y = φ(pe, X, 0) < 0, then f(Γ) = y.
Proof of Lemma 1.7. Fix Γ = (p,X, 0). Since f is IF, e = f(Γp) < 0. Let y = φ(pe, X, 0).
Then X and the ball Bpe(0, ‖y‖pe) has y as the unique point in common. Since X and
Bpe(0, ‖y‖pe) are convex and compact, by a hyperplane separation theorem, there exists
Hλ,w = {x : 〈λ, x〉pe = w} that separates X and the ball Bpe(0, ‖y‖pe) and supports the
ball at y, with the normal λ = −y. By assumption of Lemma 1.7, y < 0 and λ ∈ Rn++.
Construct a linear problem h ∗ Γ̃ = (p, h ∗ X̃, 0), where h−1 = λ ∗ (−e)−1 and Γ̃ =
(p, X̃, 0) is a p-TU problem with w̃ = w and κ̃ < 0 small enough such that X ⊂ h ∗ X̃.
Since f satisfies the axioms of Lemma 1.3, it implies f(h∗ Γ̃) = φ(pe, h∗ X̃, 0) = y. Since
f is IIA and y ∈ X, f(Γ) = f(h ∗ Γ̃) = y. 
Proof of Lemma 1.4. We consider three problems: a p0-TU problem Γ0 with complete
information, a problem Γ obtained by splitting type 1 of player 1 from Γ0, and a p-TU
problem Γp which is an extension of Γ′.
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Let Γ0 = (p0, X0, 0) be the normalized p0-TU problem satisfying N0 = N , T 0i = {1}
and p0i1 = 1 for all i ∈ N , and w0 = k0 = −|N |. Then by TU for Γ0,
fi1(Γ
0) = −1 for all i ∈ N. (1.A.4)
Now let Γ = (p,X, r) be derived from Γ0 by splitting type 1 of player 1 into a and b
with (α, 1−α). Pick any x0 ∈ X0 and define x1a = x1b = x11, and xi1 = x0i1 for all i 6= 1.
It is easy to see that
X = {x ∈ R|N |+1 :αx1a + (1− α)x1b +
∑
i 6=1
xi1 ≤ −|N |,
x1a = x1b, and xij ≥ −|N |, for all (i, j) ∈ T̊}, (1.A.5)
and r = (0, ...., 0). Now by ST for Γ0 and Γ, and (1.A.4),
f1a(Γ) = f1b(Γ) = f11(Γ
0) = −1, fi1(Γ) = fi1(Γ0) = −1, for all i 6= 1. (1.A.6)
Let Γp = (p,Xp, 0) be the normalized p-TU problem. So X ⊂ Xp. Let e = f(Γp) < 0
and y = φ(pe, X, 0). We claim that y < 0. The relaxed Lagrangian (dropping all

















FOCs give necessary conditions
2α
e1a
y1a = −η1α + η2,
2(1− α)
e1b
y1b = −η1(1− α)− η2,
2
ei1
yi1 = −η1, i = 2, ..., |N |.










for all i 6= 1. It is clear that y1a = y1b and η2 6= 0. If η1 = 0, then yi1 = 0 for all i 6= 1 and
y1a = y1b = 0, contradiction. So, η1 < 0 and yi1 < 0 for all i 6= 1. Then, y1a = y1b < 0.
Hence, y < 0.
Now by Lemma 1.7, y < 0 implies f(Γ) = y and therefore y = (−1, ...,−1). By TU
for Γp,
αe1a + (1− α)e1b = ei1 = −1, (1.A.8)
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αe1a + (1− α)e1b
. (1.A.9)
Simplify the condition, we have for any α ∈ (0, 1),
e1a = e1b. (1.A.10)
Finally, we can apply this procedure repeatedly for |T1| > 2 and for all i ∈ N . 
Lemma 1.8: Let Γ = (p,X, 0), y = F (Γ) ≤ 0, and yij = 0 for some (i, j) ∈ T̊ .
There exists a sequence Γk = (p,Xk, 0), k = 1, 2, ..., such that yk = F (Γk) < 0 for all
k = 1, 2, ..., and Xk → X in the Hausdorff metric, and yk → y.
Proof. The proof is similar to Conley et al. (2014). Let λ = −y and T̊0 = {(i, j) ∈ T̊ :
λij = 0}. Since y ≤ 0, we can restrict attention to Γ = (p,X, 0) where X ⊂ Rn−. To see
this, let X̃ = X ∩Rn−. Since F satisfies IIA, y ∈ X̃ implies F (p,X, 0) = F (p, X̃, 0). Now




(i,j)∈T̊0 1ij, k = 1, 2, ..., where 1ij is the vector with 1 on





Notice that yk < y ≤ 0. Define Xk = conv(X ∪ {yk}) and Γk = (p,Xk, 0). We claim
yk = F (Γk). By the projection theorem, we only need to show 〈−yk, x〉p ≤ 〈−yk, yk〉p for
all x ∈ Xk.
We first claim that 〈λk, x〉p ≤ 〈λk, yk〉p for all x ∈ X. To see this, note that 〈λk, yk〉p =









〈λk, x〉p ≤ 〈λk, y〉p = 〈λk, yk〉p, for all x ∈ X. (1.A.12)
Then, since each x ∈ Xk is a convex combination of some x1, ..., xm ∈ X ∪ {yk}, i.e.
x =
∑
m αmxm for some nonnegative (α1, ..., αm) with
∑
m αm = 1, we have 〈λk, x〉p =∑
m αm〈λk, xm〉p ≤
∑







〈λk, yk〉p = 〈−yk, yk〉p. (1.A.13)

Proof of Lemma 1.5. Consider the one-person problem in the proof of Lemma 1.1. Let
S = (π,D, u), where D = {d0} and (u(d0, a), u(d0, b)) = (0, 1). Let X be the line segment
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between (0, 1) and (1, 0). From the proof of Lemma 1.1, it follows that there is no exten-
sion S̃ = (π, D̃, ũ) of S such that (i) D̃ = {d0, d1} with (ũ(d1, a), ũ(d1, b)) = (y1, y2) ∈ R2
and (ii) X = U(S̃). Similarly, it is impossible to extend conv{(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} to
conv{(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2,−1)} by adding any d2 into D̃. 
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Implementation of Vector-Valued Reduced Form
Allocation Rules
2.1. Introduction
Myerson (1981) considers the problem faced by a seller i = 0 who has an object to sell,
and who does not know the value that each risk neutral buyer i ∈ {1, ..., n} might be
willing to pay for the object. Let ti be buyer i’s value and assume t̃i is independently
distributed with a continuous distribution Fi having support Ti, and let T be the set of
vectors of buyers’ values. The seller would like to find some auction procedure which
gives him the highest expected revenue. The seller has to use a feasible allocation rule
q : T → ∆({0, ..., n}), which assigns to every value profile of buyers a lottery determining
the winner of the object. The seller also has to respect the buyers’ incentive constraints.
Using the envelope condition, the expected payment for buyer i can be expressed by
an interim allocation rule Qi : Ti → [0, 1], which assigns to each type of this buyer an
expected probability of winning. Let ψi : Ti → R be the virtual valuation for buyer i
defined as in Myerson (1981).1 This allows one to express the seller’s problem solely in





s.t.(i) Qi is incentive compatible for all i = 1, ..., n,
(ii) (Q1, ..., Qn) can be implemented by some feasible q.
In this chapter, we consider subproblems arise in the context of mechanism design prob-
lems similar to (or more general than) Myerson’s optimal auction problem. Specifically,
we study an implementation problem: Under what conditions can a system of interim
allocation rules (or reduced forms) (Q1, ..., Qn) be generated by some feasible allocation
rule q? In Myerson’s model, since the allocation rule can easily be optimized point-wise
for each type profile, solving the implementation problem is not necessary for finding the
solution to this optimal auction problem.
Now consider the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing auction for n risk averse
buyers as in Maskin and Riley (1984). For each buyer i, a payment schedule (li, wi) :
1ψi(ti) = ti − (1− Fi(ti))/fi(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti.
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Ti → R2 assigns to each type of this buyer a payment to the seller in case of losing and




E[l̃i(1− Q̃i) + w̃iQ̃i], (2.1.2)
s.t.(i) (Qi, li, wi) is incentive compatible for all i = 1, ..., n,
(ii) (Q1, ..., Qn) can be implemented by some feasible q.
Again, the implementation problem arises in the seller’s problem. Different from the
risk neutral case, the allocation rule cannot easily be optimized point-wise for each type
profile. Hence, finding an optimal solution in terms of an interim allocation rule requires
first solving for its implementability. This implementation problem has been solved by
Border (1991).
Finally, consider a revenue-maximizing problem with two homogenous objects and n
risk averse buyers. A feasible allocation rule assigns each type profile of the buyers a
lottery over the winners of the two objects. For each buyer i, a vector-valued interim
allocation rule (Q1i , Q
2
i ) : Ti → [0, 1]2 arises, which assigns to each type of this buyer
expected probabilities of winning one object and two objects. For each buyer i, the




i ) : Ti → R3, which assigns to each type
of this buyer a payment in case of losing, in case of winning one object, and in case of




E[l̃i(1− Q̃1i − Q̃2i ) + w̃1i Q̃1i + w̃2i Q̃2i ], (2.1.3)













n) can be implemented by some feasible q.
For this optimal auction problem, the interim allocation rule for each player contains
interim expected probabilities for different decision outcomes. Vector-valued reduced
forms appear in the implementation problem.
The above examples show that mechanism design problems naturally give rise to im-
plementation problems. In this chapter, we discuss implementation problems in general
social choice environments.2 We define a social choice problem by a finite set of players
and for each player a finite individual type set, a common prior on the product type set,
a finite set of social alternatives, and a set of players’ utility functions, which depend on
alternatives, monetary transfers, and type profiles. The examples include:
2Note that besides the implementability of allocation rules, we may require the implementability




(i) Auctions with externalities (Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti, 1999), in which a
losing buyer’s valuation is affected by the identity of the winner;
(ii) Package auctions and exchanges with complementary objects (Milgrom, 2007).
In a package exchange problem, the players without cash can only reallocate their initial
assets through random allocation mechanisms;
(iii) Voting schemes where monetary transfers are not possible and players have car-
dinal utility. The players must determine a fair compromise among different alternatives
(Börgers and Postl, 2009).
In this chapter, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementabil-
ity of vector-valued reduced form allocation rules. We first obtain a general characteriza-
tion of the set of implementable reduced forms by an infinite number of linear inequalities.
Then, we investigate the possibility of characterization by finitely many inequalities. We
obtain a necessary condition by a class of inequalities with integral coefficients. This
class is strictly larger than the class in Border (1991) and in Che, Kim and Mierendorff
(2013). We then provide a condition such that the necessary condition becomes suffi-
cient. For the two-player case, we formulate the implementation problem as a digraph
multicommodity flow problem and establish an equivalence between these two problems.
To deal with multi-unit auctions with group capacity constraints, Che, Kim and Mieren-
dorff (2013) formulate their problem as a digraph single-commodity flow in a different
way. The network flow result in this chapter is complementary to their results.
In many social choice problems, the system of reduced form has no full dimension-
ality. We further provide an implementability condition (and a necessary condition) on
coordinate subspaces and use the necessary condition to study mechanism design prob-
lems without money. As a leading example, we study a package allocation problem as
in Miralles (2012), but with non-additive valuations. There are two players and two
objects. Each player initially owns one object and values two objects as complements.
The players can keep their objects, or allocate both objects to one player, or exchange.
Together with the incentive compatibility condition, we illustrate how the necessary
condition for the implementability can be used to find the upper bound of the ex ante
utilitarian social welfare (or ex ante trading surplus). In such a problem without money,
both the incentive compatibility and the implementability conditions can be binding in
an interim Pareto optimal solution. For this example, since a feasible allocation rule
that implements the upper bound of the ex ante utilitarian welfare exists, the necessary
condition is sufficient for the implementability.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 formulates the
implementation problem. Section 2.3 provides a characterization for implementability
(Theorem 2.1) and obtains a necessary condition by finitely many inequalities (Corollary
2.1). We provide a condition such that this necessary condition is also sufficient (Theo-
rem 2.2) and also an implementability condition in coordinate subspaces (Theorem 2.3).
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Sections 2.4 uses these implementability conditions to study mechanism design problems
without money. Section 2.5 provides some discussion for mechanism design problems
with general utility functions and the relationship to the implementation problems. Sec-
tion 2.6 concludes.
2.2. The Problem
An implementation problem is given by I = (N,D, (Ti)i∈N , (λi)i∈N). There is a finite
set of players N , |N | ≥ 2, and a finite set of social alternatives D, |D| ≥ 2. Let ∆(D)
be the set of probability distributions over D. For each i ∈ N , Ti is a non-empty finite
set of types, and denote the power set of Ti by 2
Ti . For each i ∈ N , λi is a probability
measure on Ti. We assume λi(ti) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N . The product type set
is given by T = ×i∈NTi. Let λ be the product measure ×i∈Nλi on T . For each i ∈ N ,
denote T−i = ×j 6=iTj and λ−i(t−i) = ×j 6=iλj(tj). For any A = ×i∈NAi ⊆ T and j ∈ N ,
we write λ(A) as λ(Aj ×A−j) occasionally. For Ai ∈ 2Ti , denote (Ai)c = Ti \Ai. Denote
by I the set of implementation problems.




∣∣∣∣ q(d, t) ≥ 0,∑
d∈D
q(d, t) = 1,∀d ∈ D, t ∈ T
}
.
That is, a feasible allocation rule assigns to each type profile a lottery over social
alternatives. Hence for each type profile, it satisfies a probability simplex condition.
Denote k = |D| × |T | and Rk the Euclidean space that contains D0. Define the set of




∣∣∣∣ Qi(d, ti) ≥ 0,∑
d∈D
Qi(d, ti) = 1, ∀d ∈ D, ti ∈ Ti, i ∈ N
}
.
That is, a system of reduced forms assigns to each type ti of each player i a lottery
over the set of social alternatives. Denote l =
∑
i∈N(|D| × |Ti|) and Rl the Euclidean






for all d ∈ D, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ N . For q ∈ D0, Λq is the system of interim expected
probabilities generated by the allocation rule q and the belief system λ.
Definition 2.1: Let I ∈ I. A system of reduced forms Q ∈ D1 is implementable if
there exists a feasible allocation rule q ∈ D0 such that Q = Λq.
Denote by D the set of implementable systems of reduced forms. The implementation
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problem (I) studies necessary and sufficient conditions for systems of reduced forms to
be implementable.
2.3. Characterization
Theorem 2.1 obtains a general necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability.
Corollary 2.1 provides a necessary condition with finitely many inequalities with integer
coefficients. For problems with |N | = |D| = 2, Theorem 2.2 shows that the necessary
condition in Corollary 2.1 is sufficient.
Before the statement of the theorems, we introduce some definitions. Let 〈·, ·〉 : Rl ×
Rl → R be the standard inner product. Now define a linear transformation Γ : Rl → Rl
by, for each x ∈ Rl,
(Γx)i(d, ti) = λi(ti)xi(d, ti), (2.3.1)
for all d ∈ D, ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N . For Q ∈ D1, ΓQ is the interim expected probability
vector Q weighted by the system of marginal probabilities of λ.
2.3.1. Main Results
Theorem 2.1 is the main result of this chapter. For the case |N | = |D| = 2, the result of
Theorem 2.1 was first proved by Strassen (1965). The result follows from the fact that
ΓD is a convex and compact subset in an Euclidean space. Then a standard separation
argument implies that ΓD is the intersection of all supporting half-spaces of the set itself.
Theorem 2.1: Let I ∈ I. Q ∈ D1 is implementable if and only if
〈f,ΓQ〉 ≤ sup{〈f,ΓΛq〉 : q ∈ D0} for all f ∈ Rl. (2.3.2)
Proof. See Appendix 2.A. 
Theorem 2.1 has a social welfare interpretation in terms of utility functions. We
discuss this intuition in detail in Section 2.4.
Notice that D0 is a polytope. By the Krein-Milman theorem, D is the closed convex
hull of images of ext(D0) under Λ, where ext(D0) is the set of extreme points of D0.
Hence, D has finitely many facets. For applications, it is important to characterize these
facets of D. Corollary 2.1 establishes a necessary condition that may lead to such a
nested characterization. If it is also sufficient, then the normal vector of each facet of
ΓD contains entries only from {−1, 0,+1}, and the other conditions with non-integral
coefficients in [−1, 1] are redundant.3
3It is well known that for Ax ≤ b, where A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm, if A is totally unimodular and b is
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Corollary 2.1: Let I ∈ I. If Q ∈ D1 is implementable, then
〈f,ΓQ〉 ≤ sup{〈f,ΓΛq〉 : q ∈ D0} for all f ∈ {−1, 0,+1}l. (2.3.3)
Corollary 2.1 follows immediately from Theorem 2.1. The first interpretation of
condition (2.3.3) is similar to Theorem 2.1. Alternatively, condition (2.3.3) shows that
if for each player i with type ti and alternative d, the ex ante probability λi(ti)Qi(d, ti)
represents the quantity of a good (i, d, ti), then given any price vector f , the right hand
side is equal to the monetary value of the initial endowment and hence the total budget.
The network flow approach has been used to provide a sufficient condition for the
implementability (Che, Kim and Mierendorff, 2013).4 The following result, based on
Hansel and Troallic (1978), applies a network flow approach to prove that if |N | = |D| =
2, the condition in Corollary 2.1 is sufficient. In Appendix 2.B (Lemma 2.2-2.4), we
discuss the possibility to generalize this result and establish an equivalence between the
implementation problem and a digraph multicommodity network flow problem.
Theorem 2.2: Let I ∈ I with |N | = |D| = 2. Then (2.3.3) is necessary and
sufficient for implementability.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B. 
2.3.2. Results on Coordinate Subspaces
For many economic environments we discuss later, the system of reduced forms has no full
dimensionality. In this subsection, we provide conditions for implementation problems
on coordinate subspaces.
Fix an I ∈ I and some D̃i ⊆ D for each i ∈ N . We choose D̃ = (D̃i)i∈N as a
system of essential alternatives, where D̃i is labelled as the set of essential alternatives
and D̃ci = D \ D̃i is labelled as the set of inessential alternatives for each i ∈ N . Denote
Rl̃ = ×i∈NRD̃i×Ti , a coordinate subspace of Rl. Denote Rl−l̃ the complementary subspace
of Rl̃. Now define the projection of D onto the coordinate subspace Rl̃ by
PD̃(D) = {QD̃ ∈ R
l̃| ∃QD\D̃ ∈ R
l−l̃ : (QD̃, QD\D̃) ∈ D}. (2.3.4)
Define an implementation problem on the coordinate subspace Rl̃ as follows.
(I-D̃). Let I ∈ I and D̃ = (D̃i)i∈N . For QD̃ ∈ Rl̃, find a feasible solution q ∈ D0
such that (i) there exists Q ∈ D such that q implements Q, and (ii) Q coincides with QD̃
on Rl̃.
integral, then all extreme points of the feasible region are integral.
4Flows in networks are used to model traffic in a road system, circulation with demands, or fluids
in pipes. The problem is to send as many trucks as possible, where roads have limits on the number
of trucks per unit time (maximize the flows). On the other hand, the dual problem is to destroy some




Theorem 2.1 implies the following implementability condition for coordinate sub-
spaces.
Theorem 2.3: Let I ∈ I and D̃ = (D̃i)i∈N . Define C̃ = {f ∈ Rl : fi(d, ti) =
0 for all d ∈ D̃ci , ti ∈ Ti, i ∈ N}. Then,
(i) QD̃ ∈ PD̃(D) if and only if (2.3.2) holds only for all f ∈ C̃.
(ii) If QD̃ ∈ PD̃(D), then (2.3.2) holds for all f ∈ C̃ ∩ {−1, 0,+1}l.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B. 
For certain classes of problems on coordinate subspaces, the linear inequalities given
by {−1, 0,+1}l in Theorem 2.3 (ii) turn out to be necessary and sufficient. In these cases,
we can further investigate whether some subclass of these linear inequalities is redundant.
In Proposition 2.1, Border (1991) shows that for standard single object auctions without
externalities, all inequalities other than the class {0,+1}l are redundant. However, as
soon as we depart from the environment with single object auctions without externalities,
some inequalities other than {0,+1}l are not redundant in general. In Proposition 2.2,
we illustrate this point by a two-person two-alternative voting problem. For illustration,
we consider only symmetric allocation rules and symmetric reduced forms for symmetric
players.
First consider the single object allocation problem in Myerson (1981), with the seller
0 and the bidders {1, ..., n}. Let D̃0 = {∅} and D̃i = {i} for all i ∈ N \ {0}. Then a
system of essential reduced forms is given by (Qi(i, ·))i∈N\{0}.
Proposition 2.1: (Border, 1991) Let N = D = {0, 1, ..., n}, D̃0 = {∅}, and D̃i =
{i} for all i ∈ N \ {0}. Then, (Qi(i, ·))i∈N\{0} is implementable if and only if for all




Qi(i, ti)λi(ti) ≤ λ(
⋃
i∈N\{0}
Ai × T−i). (2.3.5)
Proof. See Appendix 2.C. 
The result has the following interpretation. The sum of the ex ante expected proba-
bility of winning of all buyers with types drawn from (Ai)i∈N\{0}, is bounded above by
the ex ante probability that there exists at least one buyer i who draws a type from Ai.
For this allocation problem, all inequalities containing the entry −1 are redundant. In
Appendix 2.C, we show how we can eliminate these redundant inequalities.
Example 2.1: (Border, 1991) Let n = 2. For i = 1, 2, Ti = {0, 1} and λi(0) =
λ0, λi(1) = λ1 = 1 − λ0. In this environment, a symmetric allocation rule requires
q(1, (x, y)) = q(2, (y, x)) for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}. By symmetry, Q1(1, ·) = Q2(2, ·) = Qa.
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From Proposition 2.1, Qa is implementable if and only if
0 ≤ Qa,0, Qa,1 ≤ 1, (2.3.6)
Qa,0λ0 +Qa,0λ0 ≤ 1− λ21, (2.3.7)
Qa,1λ1 +Qa,1λ1 ≤ 1− λ20, (2.3.8)
Qa,0λ0 +Qa,1λ1 +Qa,0λ0 +Qa,1λ1 ≤ 1, (2.3.9)









Consider a two-person two-alternative voting problem. Let N = {1, 2}, D = {0, b},
and D̃i = {b}, i = 1, 2. A system of essential reduced forms is given by (Q1(b, ·), Q2(b, ·)).
Proposition 2.2: Let N = {1, 2}, D = {0, b}, and D̃i = {b}, i = 1, 2. Then
(Q1(b, ·), Q2(b, ·)) is implementable if and only if for all Bi, Bi ∈ 2Ti, Bi ∩ Bi = ∅,











λ(Bi × (B−i)c). (2.3.10)
Proof. See Appendix 2.C. 
In contrast to Border’s condition, the implementability condition for this voting prob-
lem requires the entry −1 to appear in the linear inequalities. The intuition for this result
is as follows: In Myerson (1981), selecting alternative i with a higher interim expected
probability tightens the (probabilistic) budget for alternative j. Qi(i, ·) and Qj(j, ·) are
competing. In the voting problem, however, selecting alternative b with a higher interim
expected probability for player i relaxes the budget that b can be selected for player j.
Hence, Qi(b, ·) and Qj(b, ·) are of common interest.
Example 2.2: Let T and λ be as assumed in Example 2.1. In this case, a symmetric
allocation rule requires q(b, (x, y)) = q(b, (y, x)) for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}. With symmetry,
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Q1(b, ·) = Q2(b, ·) = Qb. By Proposition 2.2, Qb is implementable if and only if
0 ≤ Qb,0, Qb,1 ≤ 1, (2.3.11)
Qb,0λ0 −Qb,1λ1 +Qb,0λ0 −Qb,1λ1 ≤ 2λ20, (2.3.12)
Qb,1λ1 −Qb,0λ0 +Qb,1λ1 −Qb,0λ0 ≤ 2λ21, (2.3.13)
and other inequalities are redundant. For λ0 =
1
2
, the set of implementable Qb is illus-









For each λ0, the corner point (1, 1) is feasible but the corner points (1, 0) and (0, 1)





q(b, (0, 0)) = 0, q(b, (0, 1)) = q(b, (1, 0)) = q(b, (1, 1)) = 1. (2.3.14)
2.4. Social Choice Problems without Monetary Transfers
In this section, we discuss social choice problems without transfers. We first provide two
examples of such problems: a voting problem and a package allocation problem. We
show that the implementation conditions in Section 2.3 can be used to find the solutions
for certain social welfare objectives in such problems (mechanism design problems). We
delay the discussion of social choice problems with money in Section 2.5.
A social choice problem without monetary transfers is given by S = (I, (vi)i∈N), where
I = (N,D, (Ti)i∈N , (λi)i∈N), and player i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : D × Ti → R
given by vi(d, ti) for d ∈ D and ti ∈ Ti. Notice that we restrict to the class of private
values. We further discuss this assumption in Section 2.5.
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Let S = (I, (vi)i∈N). An allocation mechanism is given by a feasible allocation rule
q : T → ∆(D). Given that the other players always report truthfully, the interim






q(d, (t̂i, t−i))vi(d, ti)λ−i(t−i). (2.4.1)
We say q is incentive compatible if truth telling by all players is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Denote the interim utility by Ui(q|ti) = Ui(q, ti|ti). If there is some status
quo d∗ ∈ D, it further requires q to satisfy the individual rationality condition, or
Ui(q|ti) ≥ Ui(d∗|ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N . Let M(S) be the set of incentive compatible
(and individual rational if any) mechanisms for S. A mechanism design (MD) problem





for some interim welfare weight system f̃ ∈ ×i∈NRTi++. In particular, f̃ = (1, ..., 1)
corresponds to the ex ante utilitarian social welfare function.
2.4.1. Bounds on Social Welfare
To see the welfare implication of Theorem 2.1, let S = (I, (vi)i∈N) and fi(d, ti) =
f̃i(ti)vi(d, ti) for all d ∈ D, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ N , where f̃ ∈ ×i∈NRTi++ is a system of
interim welfare weights. Then, the left hand side of (2.3.2) is given by (2.4.2), which
corresponds to the linear social welfare function with interim welfare weights f̃ .
Theorem 2.1 states that the dual variable of reduced form allocation rules is utility
functions. For S = (I, (vi)i∈N), the left hand side of (2.3.2), which corresponds to the
f̃ -weighted linear social welfare from some allocation rule, is bounded above by the
maximal social welfare from all feasible allocation rules. Hence, Theorem 2.1 obtains
the bounds on the social welfare for all linear social welfare functions by fixing (vi)i∈N
and varying f̃ , and the bounds on the social welfare for all MD problems without money
by varying (vi)i∈N and f̃ . For f̃ = (1, ..., 1), it provides an upper bound of the ex ante
utilitarian social welfare for all MD problems without money.
2.4.2. Values and Implementation on Coordinate Subspaces
Let S = (I, (vi)i∈N). The system of valuation functions (vi)i∈N induces a system of
essential decisions D̃ and an implementation problem (I-D̃) in the following two cases:
1. Suppose for all i ∈ N and d ∈ D, vi(d, ti) 6= 0 for some ti ∈ Ti. Then, Qi(d, ·) has
influence on player i’s utility. By the probability simplex condition, for some d0 ∈ D and
all i ∈ N , Qi(d0, ·) = 1−
∑
d6=d0 Qi(d, ·). We can choose d0 as the normalized alternative
and the others as essential alternatives.
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2. Suppose for some i ∈ N and d ∈ D, vi(d, ti) = 0 for all ti ∈ Ti. For such an
alternative d, Qi(d, ·) does not influence player i’s utility and Qi(d, ·) is free. We say d is
irrelevant for player i. Then, we can choose such alternatives as inessential alternatives
for player i.
To illustrate these two cases, we disucss voting problems (Proposition 2.3) and pack-
age allocation problems (Proposition 2.4) in the following subsections. We consider only
symmetric allocation rules and symmetric reduced forms for symmetric players.
2.4.3. Example: Voting
Consider a two-person n + 1-alternative voting problem with N = {1, 2} and D =
{0, 1, ..., n}, n ≥ 1. Suppose for all i ∈ N and d ∈ D, vi(d, ti) 6= 0 for some ti ∈
Ti. Let D̃i = D \ {0}, i = 1, 2. A system of essential reduced forms is given by
(Q1(d, ·), Q2(d, ·))d∈D\{0}. The following condition for voting problems with three or
more alternatives follows from Lemma 2.4 in Appendix 2.B.
Proposition 2.3: Let N = {1, 2}, D = {0, 1, ..., n}, and D̃i = D \ {0}, i = 1, 2. If











 ≤ 2λ(B1 ×B2). (2.4.3)
Proof. See Appendix 2.C. 
In particular, a three-alternative problem corresponds to the compromise problem of
Börgers and Postl (2009). Suppose player 1’s preference is given by 1  0  2 and player
2’s preference is given by 2  0  1. Each player receives utility 1 from his best and 0
from his worst alternative. Each player receives ti between 0 and 1 from the alternative
0. The interim utility for player i with type ti is given by Qi(0, ti)ti +Qi(i, ti).
A system of essential reduced forms in the problem of Borgers and Postl is given by
(Q1(0, ·), Q1(1, ·), Q2(0, ·), Q2(2, ·)). Then, it is easy to see that for each player i, replacing
Qi(j, ·) by 1−Qi(i, ·)−Qi(0, ·) in (2.4.3) of Proposition 2.3 provides a necessary condition
for the implementability to the problem of Börgers and Postl (2009).
2.4.4. Example: Package Allocation
Miralles (2012) studies the allocation of two homogeneous objects among a set of players
without money and finds the mechanism that maximizes the ex ante utilitarian welfare.
Since players have additive valuations, Miralles applies Proposition 2.1 separately to each
object. We now consider a related problem with complementary valuations, which forces
the implementability condition to be defined on the set of all social alternatives.
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Let N = {1, 2} and D = {0, 1, 2, b}. Each player has no money and initially owns
one object, or d∗ = 0. For i = 1, 2, the choice i means that player i obtains both objects
and the choice b indicates the exchange of objects. For i = 1, 2, player i has the value of
0 if no object is obtained, i.e. for all d 6= i, b and ti ∈ Ti, vi(d, ti) = 0, and player i has a
complementary valuation for the package, i.e. for all ti ∈ Ti,
vi(b, ti)− vi(j, ti) < vi(i, ti)− vi(0, ti).
For (I-D̃) derived from (I, (vi)i∈N), we have D̃i = {i, b}, i = 1, 2. A system of
essential reduced forms is given by (Q1(1, ·), Q2(2, ·), Q1(b, ·), Q2(b, ·)).
Proposition 2.4: Let N = {1, 2}, D = {0, 1, 2, b}, and D̃i = {i, b}, i = 1, 2.
If (Q1(1, ·), Q2(2, ·), Q1(b, ·), Q2(b, ·)) is implementable, then for all Ai, Bi, Bi ∈ 2Ti,
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Proof. See Appendix 2.C. 
For two-person problems, Proposition 2.4 provides a nested condition based on Propo-
sition 2.1 and 2.2. By setting Bi, Bi = ∅ for i = 1, 2, we have the condition in Proposition
2.1. By setting Ai = ∅ for i = 1, 2, we have the condition in Proposition 2.2.
Example 2.3: Let T and λ be specified as in Example 2.1. In this case, a symmetric
allocation rule requires q(1, (x, y)) = q(2, (y, x)) and q(b, (x, y)) = q(b, (y, x)) for all
x, y ∈ {0, 1}. By symmetry, Q1(1, ·) = Q2(2, ·) = Qa and Q1(b, ·) = Q2(b, ·) = Qb.
From Proposition 2.4, the bound of the set of implementable reduced forms is given by
(2.3.6), (2.3.7), (2.3.8), (2.3.9), (2.3.11), (2.3.12), (2.3.13), and
Qb,0λ0 + 2Qa,0λ0 ≤ 1− λ21, (2.4.5)
Qb,1λ1 + 2Qa,1λ1 ≤ 1− λ20, (2.4.6)
Qb,0λ0 +Qa,0λ0 +Qa,1λ1 ≤ 1− λ0λ1, (2.4.7)
Qb,1λ1 +Qa,0λ0 +Qa,1λ1 ≤ 1− λ0λ1, (2.4.8)
Qb,0λ0 +Qb,1λ1 + 2Qa,1λ1 + 2Qa,1λ1 ≤ 1. (2.4.9)
Compared to the auction and voting problems, the package exchange problem requires
many more inequalities. These linear inequalities form a 4-polytope. For λ0 = 1/2, the
42
Social Choice Problems without Monetary Transfers
system of inequalities is given by
0 ≤ Qa,0, Qa,1 ≤ 3/4,
0 ≤ Qb,0, Qb,1 ≤ 1,
Qa,0 +Qa,1 ≤ 1,
Qb,0 −Qb,1 ≤ 1/2,
Qb,1 −Qb,0 ≤ 1/2,
Qb,0 + 2Qa,0 ≤ 3/2,
Qb,1 + 2Qa,1 ≤ 3/2,
Qb,0 +Qa,0 +Qa,1 ≤ 3/2,
Qb,1 +Qa,0 +Qa,1 ≤ 3/2,
Qb,0 +Qb,1 + 2Qa,0 + 2Qa,1 ≤ 2.
By Fourier-Motzkin elimination,5 we reduce one of the four variables and compute the
projections of this 4-polytope onto the three-dimensional subspaces: (1) (Qb,1, Qa,0, Qa,1),
(2) (Qa,0, Qa,1, Qb,0), (3) (Qa,1, Qb,0, Qb,1), and (4) (Qb,0, Qb,1, Qa,0). These projections
correspond to four 3-polytopes. For λ0 = 1/2, we depict them in Figure 2.3 below.
Figure 2.3
2.4.4.1. Ex Ante Efficient Solutions to Package Allocation Problems
In the package exchange problem, we further assume that the symmetric valuation profile
is given by for each player i = 1, 2,
5The elimination of a set of variables V from a system of linear inequalities refers to the creation of
another system of linear inequalities, but without the variables in V, such that both systems have the
same solutions over the remaining variables.
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0 i j b
ti = 0 0 1 0 x
ti = 1 0 2 0 y
where (x, y) ∈ R2 are parameters. We assume that for any type of a player, the val-
uation of the objects are complementary. We consider four cases where the players
may be better off or worse off from exchanging their own objects, depending on (x, y):
(1, 1), (−1, 1), (1,−1), (−1, 1).
With the necessary condition (2.4.4), we are ready to characterize the bound that
contains the set of incentive feasible interim utility allocations. Now, the (symmetric)
interim utility vector, incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions are
given by
U0 = Qa,0 + xQb,0 ≥ Qa,1 + xQb,1, (2.4.10)
U1 = 2Qa,1 + yQb,1 ≥ 2Qa,0 + yQb,0, (2.4.11)
U0 ≥ 0, U1 ≥ 0. (2.4.12)
Together with (2.4.4), we have a linear system of six variables,
(Qb,0, Qb,1, Qa,0, Qa,1, U0, U1) ∈ R6.
By Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we reduce the first four variables and obtain the bound
of the interim utility set U(x, y) given by
U(1, 1) = {U ∈ R2+ : U0 − U1 ≤ 0, U0 + U1 ≤ 2,−
5
2








U(1,−1) = {U ∈ R2+ : −2U0 + U1 ≤ 0, 2U0 + U1 ≤
5
2
, U0 ≤ 1 },
U(−1,−1) = {U ∈ R2+ : −
4
3
U0 + U1 ≤
1
2
, 2U0 − U1 ≤ 0,−
2
3




For each constellation of (x, y), the upper bound of the ex ante (utilitarian) efficient
allocations are defined as the solutions to maxU∈U(x,y) U0 +U1. Figure 2.4 illustrates the
bounds of interim utility sets and the corresponding upper bounds of the ex ante efficient
solutions in the interim utility space.
In all cases, (U0, U1) = (
1
2
, 1) is incentive feasible, i.e. reallocating the bundle by
tossing a coin. The incentive conditions (2.4.10), (2.4.11), and the feasibility condition
Qb,0 +Qb,1 + 2Qa,0 + 2Qa,1 ≤ 2, (2.4.13)
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are binding. In the cases (−1, 1), (−1,−1), this utility vector is on the strong Pareto set,
but in the cases (1, 1), (1,−1), it is Pareto dominated. This is because in the latter cases,
reporting type 1 is punished more severely by exchanging the objects and this sustains
a better outcome.
Figure 2.4
















, 1), respectively. We provide the systems of reduced forms that
implement these utility vectors.




) is implemented by










The feasibility conditions (2.4.13) and Qb,0 −Qb,1 ≤ 1/2 are binding.




) is implemented by










The feasibility conditions (2.4.13) and Qb,1 + 2Qa,1 ≤ 3/2 are binding.




) is implemented by










Now the feasibility condition (2.4.13) and the incentive condition (2.4.10) are binding.
Case (−1,−1). The utility vector (1
2
, 1) is implemented by







It turns out that all these reduced forms are implementable. Hence, for these cases,
the necessary condition (2.4.4) is necessary and sufficient for the implementability. We
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provide feasible allocation rules that implement these reduced forms in Table 2.1. For
all cases and all type profiles, (q0, q1, q2, qb) are listed. For all cases except (−1,−1), the
solution allocation rule is unique.
(1, 1) 0 1



















, 0) (0, 0, 1, 0)
1 (0, 1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1)
(1,−1) 0 1


































Observe that in the cases (1, 1) (1,−1), and (−1,−1), the solution allocation rules are
stochastic for asymmetric reports. The result shows that for mechanism design problems
without monetary transfers, some extreme points of the interim utility set correspond to
non-deterministic allocation rules.
2.5. Discussion
In this section, we provide some remarks about the results in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. First,
we consider social choice problems with money and with general utility functions in which
the implementation problems we studied arise. Second, we compare the implementability
of reduced form allocation rules and reduced form values in the literature. Finally, we
investigate reduction of redundant inequalities in a package allocation example.
2.5.1. Non-Quasilinear Utility
A social choice problem with transfers is given by S = (I, (vi)i∈N), where player i ∈ N
has a valuation function vi : D × R × Ti → R given by vi(d,m, ti) for d ∈ D, monetary
payment m ∈ R, and ti ∈ Ti. Fix such an S. An allocation mechanism µ = (q,m) is
given by a feasible allocation rule q : T → ∆(D) together with a set of payment rules
m = (mi)i∈N , where mi : D × T → R for all i ∈ N . Notice that the payment rules
depend on both the reporting profiles and the decisions. Given that the other players
always report truthfully, the interim expected utility of player i with type ti ∈ Ti from






q(d, (t̂i, t−i))vi(d,mi(d, (t̂i, t−i)), ti)λ−i(t−i). (2.5.1)
For a social choice problem with transfers, a mechanism design problem is defined simi-
larly as that for a social choice problem without transfers.
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There are some classes of social choice problems with money in which the imple-
mentation problems (with or without full dimensionality) arise as subproblems. This
depends on assumptions on the valuation functions and the restriction of payment rules.
We discuss two classes: (1) Quasilinear utility; and (2) Nonlinear utility, deterministic
payments, and no ex post balanced budget.
1. Quasilinear utility. For each player i ∈ N , vi(d,m, ti) = ṽi(d, ti) − m for some
function ṽi : D × Ti → R. For µ = (q,m), we can set mi(d, t) = mi(t) for all d ∈ D,




Qi(d, ti)ṽi(d, ti)−Mi(ti), (2.5.2)
where




This environment is the same as Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999), when one
buyer imposes an externality on the other buyers in a single-object auction. Notice that
the separability of the expected probabilities and the payments continues to hold when
players have budget constraints. Vohra (2011) uses the reduced form approach to study
the single object auctions with budget-constrained buyers. The condition here can be
used to study the multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained buyers.
2. Non-Quasilinear utility, deterministic payments, and no ex post balanced budget.
We assume each player’s payment rule is deterministic, i.e. for all d ∈ D, t, t′ ∈ T , and
i ∈ N ,
mi(d, t) = mi(d, t
′), if ti = (t
′)i. (2.5.4)
In other words, each player’s payment is independent of other players’ reports. For
player i ∈ N with type ti ∈ Ti, the interim expected payment at d ∈ D is given by
Mi(d, ti) = mi(d, t) for all t ∈ T . Hence, for each player i with type ti, the interim utility




Qi(d, ti)vi(d,Mi(d, ti), ti), where Q = Λq. (2.5.5)
In this case, the separability of the expected probabilities and the composition of valua-
tion functions and payments holds.
To see that the requirement on no ex post budget balance cannot be dropped, consider
the bilateral trade problem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Let N = D = {1, 2}
and let T1, T2 be finite subsets of [0, 1]. The seller (player 1) is risk neutral and has linear
utility, i.e. for all m and t1, v1(1,m, t1) = t1−m and v1(2,m, t1) = −m. Now, the buyer
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(player 2) is constant absolute risk averse, i.e. for all m ∈ R and t2 ∈ T2,
v2(2,m, t2) = 1− e−(t2−m) and v2(1,m, t2) = 1− em. (2.5.6)
Assume the payment rule for the buyer is deterministic and is given by (M2(1, ·),M2(2, ·)).
The payment rule for the seller is given by M1(·). An ex post budget balanced payment






q(d, t)M2(d, t2)λ2(t2). (2.5.7)
Hence, if ex post balanced budget is required, the joint feasibility condition on allocation
rules and payment rules becomes a relevant issue.
The deterministic payment is less restrictive in case of independent beliefs than cor-
related beliefs. For example, Maskin and Riley (1984) and Matthews (1983) show that
for a subclass of constant relative risk averse utility functions, the optimal single-unit
auctions have the deterministic payments. Crémer and McLean (1988) shows that for
risk neutral buyers, the optimal single object auctions with correlated beliefs require
correlated payments.
2.5.2. Comparison to Reduced Form Values
Goeree and Kushnir (2013) is the first paper to discuss the implementability of reduced
forms for social choice problems with Quasilinear utility and interdependent values. They
define the reduced form value for each player by taking the sum of interim expected values
(over all alternatives) generated by the products of valuation functions and allocation
probabilities. A system of reduced form values contains one reduced form value function
for each player. In the following discussion, we restrict the comparison to private values.
1. Quasilinear utility. For all i ∈ N , vi(d,m, ti) = ṽi(d, ti)−m for some function ṽi.






x(d, t)ṽi(d, ti)λ−i(t−i), (2.5.8)
for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N . A system of reduced form values is given by V = (Vi)i∈N ∈
×i∈NRTi . Then, V is implementable if there exists q ∈ D0 such that V = Φvq.
Since a system of reduced form values is a lower-dimensional object than a system
of reduced form allocation rules, Theorem 2.1 implies their Proposition 2.1, by setting
fi(d, ti) = f̃i(ti)ṽi(d, ti) for all d ∈ D, ti ∈ Ti, i ∈ N , for some f̃ ∈ ×i∈NRTi , and then
varying f̃ . In contrast, Theorem 2.1 is obtained from their reduced form value imple-




The advantages of our approach are: (i) Theorem 2.1 does not need any information
on valuation functions and has fewer data as input. Hence, the same condition applies
to all problems; (ii) The set of implementable reduced form allocation rules is easier to
compute, because it does not depend on valuation functions. A disadvantage is that we
have more reduced form variables and thus more linear inequalities. At present, which
model achieves a lower computational complexity remains to be investigated.6
2. Non-Quasilinear utility and deterministic payment rules. Let m = (mi)i∈N be a
system of deterministic payment rules. Define a linear map Φv,m : Rk → ×i∈NRTi by, for






x(d, t)vi(d,Mi(d, ti), ti)λ−i(t−i), (2.5.9)
for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N .
A system of reduced form utilities is given by U = (Ui)i∈N ∈ ×i∈NRTi . U is imple-
mentable if there exists q ∈ D0 such that U = Φv,mq. Because Φv,m is parameterized by
m, the feasibility condition on U also contains m. In contrast to the reduced form utility
approach, the feasibility condition on Q is parameterized by neither v nor m.
If no balanced budget or only ex ante balanced budget is required, then the reduced
form utility approach requires working with feasibility conditions on allocation rules and
payments simultaneously. On the other hand, the reduced form allocation rule approach
has the advantage of the separation of the feasibility condition on allocation rules and
payments.
2.5.3. Reduction of Inequalities
Border (1991) investigates a further reduction of (2.3.5) in Proposition 2.1, by the class
of the upper contour sets of reduced forms instead of all characteristic functions (all
measurable subsets). For single object auctions without externalities, Border (1991)’s
Proposition 2.3.2 proves that such smaller class is sufficient. For two-alternative voting
problems, we can show that such smaller class is also sufficient, by referring to a proof
of Theorem 4 of Gutmann et al. (1991).
In contrast to single object auctions without externalities or voting problems, we
observe that in the package exchange example, Gutmann et al. (1991)’s approach cannot
be applied here to obtain a further reduction.
To see this, we consider a subclass of inequalities of (2.4.4). Let T1 and T2 be finite
subsets in R. Fix (A1, A2, B1, B2, B2, Q) such that B1 = B2 = ∅ and vary B1. Denote
B1 = B1, B2 = (B2)
c. We now compute the boundary subset B1 such that (2.4.4) holds
6In algorithmic mechanism design and computer science literature, some recent papers discuss the
computational complexity of Border’s theorem, e.g. Gopalan, Nisan and Roughgarden (2015).
49
Chapter 2: Implementation of Vector-Valued Reduced Form Allocation Rules
























Q1(b, t1)λ1(t1)− λ(B1 \A1 ×B2 \A2)− λ(
⋃
i∈N













[Q1(b, t1)− λ2(B2 \A2)]λ1(t1) +
∑
t1∈B1∩A1
Q1(b, t1)λ1(t1) + constant.
(2.5.11)
The solution is given by
B∗1(A1, A2, B2, Q) := A
∗ ∪ A1, (2.5.12)
where
A∗ = {t1 ∈ T1 : Q1(b, t1) ≥ λ2(B2 \ A2)}. (2.5.13)
Since Q1(b, t1) and A1 can be arbitrary, if A
∗ and A1 are “disconnected”, i.e. there
exists t1 ∈ T1 such that
maxA∗ < t1 < minA1, (2.5.14)
then B∗1 may not be of the form {t1 ∈ T1 : Q1(b, t1) ≥ β1} for some β1 ∈ R. For example,
let Q1(b, ·) be strictly increasing in t1. Then,
A∗ ⊂ [(Q1(b, ·))−1(λ2(B2 \ A2)),maxT1]. (2.5.15)
For A1 = {minT1} and A∗ ∪ A1 6= T1, B∗1 is “disconnected”. On the other hand,
Q1(b, ·) is strictly monotone and all its upper contour sets are “connected”.
2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we obtain a characterization of the implementability conditions for social
choice problems with vector-valued reduced forms. We provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for the implementability and a necessary condition by a class of finitely many
linear inequalities. We also provide a characterization for the implementability on co-
ordinate subspaces. We then use these conditions to study mechanism design problems
without money given certain welfare objectives. In a two-person two-object allocation
example, we show how the implementability condition can be used to find the bound of
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incentive feasible interim utility allocations and the upper bound of the ex ante utilitarian
social welfare.
The results in this chapter provide an important intermediate step to find the solu-
tions to mechanism design problems for a wide class of social choice environments, when
the ex post allocation rules cannot be easily optimized and the implementation problems
arise as subproblems. These include package allocations with complementary valuations
and auctioning multiple objects with risk averse buyers.
Finally, the implementability condition requires a large number of inequalities and
the reduction of redundant inequalities is still possible for specific problems. As the
cardinalities of the type sets increase, the number of inequalities increases very quickly
and the computational burden becomes a highlighted issue. We leave these interesting
problems for future research.
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Appendix 2.A Proof of Theorem 2.1
Lemma 2.1: (i) D0 is convex and compact.
(ii) Λ : Rk → Rl and Γ : Rl → Rl are continuous.
(iii) D and ΓD are convex and compact.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. (i) D0 is obviously convex. q ∈ D0 if and only if q(·, t) ∈ ∆(D)
for all t ∈ T . Since T is finite, D0 =
∏
t∈T ∆(D) is a product of finitely many compact
subsets ∆(D) ⊂ R|D|. By Tychonoff’s theorem, D0 is compact. (ii) Λ and Γ are linear
maps on finite-dimensional spaces and thus continuous. (iii) By the continuous mapping
theorem, the continuous image of a compact set is compact. Hence D is compact. Since
D0 is convex and Λ is linear, D is convex. A similar analysis implies that ΓD is also
compact and convex. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. (Only If) Suppose Q ∈ D, then there exists q ∈ D0 that imple-
ments Q. Since q ∈ D0, we have 〈f,ΓQ〉 is bounded above by supq∈D0〈f,ΓΛq〉, for all
f ∈ Rl.
(If) We show that if Q∗ /∈ D, then Q∗ must violate condition (2.3.2) for some f ∈ Rl.
Now suppose Q∗ /∈ D. λi(ti) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N implies ΓQ∗ /∈ ΓD. Since ΓD
is nonempty, closed and convex, by a hyperplane separation theorem, there exists f ∈ Rl
such that 〈f,ΓQ∗〉 > supQ∈D〈f,ΓQ〉, which contradicts to (2.3.2). 
Appendix 2.B Sufficient Condition: A Digraph Multicommodity Flow
Problem
An implementation problem I = (N,D, (Ti)i∈N , (λi)i∈N) with |N | = 2 can be formulated
by constructing a digraph network flow problem. The elements of network flow problems
are given in Appendix 2.D.
(i) If |D| = 2, (I) corresponds to a 1-commodity flow problem. An application
of the max flow-min cut theorem implies (2.3.3) in Corollary 2.1 is sufficient for the
implementability. Moreover, the max flow-min cut theorem provides a much tighter
condition than (2.3.3).
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(ii) If |D| ≥ 3, (I) corresponds to a (|D| − 1)-commodity flow problem. Due to the
lack of max flow-min cut theorems for such problems, it is unclear whether (2.3.3) is
sufficient for the implementability.
We now formulate (I) pinto a multicommodity flow problem. Let D = {0, 1, ..., n}.
First, single out d = 0 and define by change of variables for all d = 1, ..., n,7
Fd(t1, t2) =q(d, (t1, t2))λ(t1, t2), ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T,
ud(t1) =λ1(t1)Q1(d, t1), ∀t1 ∈ T1,
vd(t2) =λ2(t2)Q2(d, t2), ∀t2 ∈ T2.
Lemma 2.2 below shows that (I) is equivalent to the following problem (I1).








t2∈T2 vd(t2), for all d =




Fd(t1, t2) ≤ λ(t1, t2), ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T,∑
t2∈T2
Fd(t1, t2) = ud(t1), ∀t1 ∈ T1,∑
t1∈T1
Fd(t1, t2) = vd(t2), ∀t2 ∈ T2.
Lemma 2.2: Let N = {1, 2}, D = {0, 1, ..., n}, with n ≥ 1, then (I) is equivalent to
(I1).






Then we can restrict attention to all Q ∈ D1 that satisfy this condition. Also notice that
q(0, t) = 1−
n∑
d=1
q(d, t),∀t ∈ T,
Qi(0, ti) = 1−
n∑
d=1
Qi(d, ti),∀ti ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2.
Hence, (I) is equivalent to the following problem (I2).
(I2). Given (Q1(d, ·), Q2(d, ·))nd=1 ∈ R
|T1|×|T2|×n
+ and (2.B.1), find a feasible solution
7We abuse notation to denote a valuation function by vi and a utility function by ui for player i.
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q(d, t) ≤ 1,∀t ∈ T,∑
t2∈T2
q(d, t)λ2(t2) = Q1(d, t1),∀t1 ∈ T1,∑
t1∈T1
q(d, t)λ1(t1) = Q2(d, t2),∀t2 ∈ T2.
By change of variables, for d = 1, ..., n, let
q(d, ·)→ Fd, Q1(d, ·)→ ud, Q2(d, ·)→ vd.
It is easy to see that (I2) is equivalent to (I1). 
Now let {1, ..., n} be the commodities and construct a supply digraph Gn = (V,A)
with vertexes
V = ∪nd=1{rd} ∪ T1 ∪ T2 ∪nd=1 {sd}, (2.B.2)
and arcs A from each rd to each t1, from each t1 to each t2, and from each t2 to each sd.
The corresponding demand digraph Hn = (V
′, R) is given by
V ′ = {r1, s1, ..., rn, sn}, (2.B.3)
and R = {(rd, sd)nd=1}, where R contains all source-sink pairs of the commodities. Figure













Sufficient Condition: A Digraph Multicommodity Flow Problem
Now the capacity function c : A→ R+ is defined by for all d = 1, ..., n,
c(t1, t2) = λ(t1, t2), ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T,
c(rd, t1) = ud(t1), ∀t1 ∈ T1,
c(t2, sd) = vd(t2), ∀t2 ∈ T2.








A flow8 f = (fd)
n









fd(a), ∀k ∈ V, k 6= rd, sd, d = 1, ..., n, (2.B.6)
where δin(k) is the set of arcs entering k and δout(k) is the set of arcs leaving k.
The value of a flow f is given by
val(fd) = fd(δ
out(rd)) = fd(δ
in(sd)), d = 1, ..., n. (2.B.7)
A feasible flow is a flow f with value
val(fd) = φ(rd, sd), d = 1, ..., n. (2.B.8)
The n-commodity flow problem (Gn, Hn, c, φ) is to find a feasible flow. For U ⊆ V ,
denote by cap(δoutA (U)) the total capacity of arcs of A leaving U and by φ(δ
out
R (U)) the
total demands of arcs of R leaving U .
Lemma 2.3: (I1) has a feasible solution if and only if for the problem (Gn, Hn, c, φ)
there exists a feasible flow.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. (Only If) Suppose (I1) has a solution F ∗. Define f = (fd)
n
d=1 by
fd(t1, t2) = F
∗
d (t1, t2), ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T,
fd(rd, t1) = ud(t1),∀t1 ∈ T1,
fd(t2, sd) = vd(t2),∀t2 ∈ T2,
8We abuse notation to denote a flow by f . In other parts in the chapter, f is used as an element of
Rl.
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fd(rj, t1) = 0 if j 6= d,∀t1 ∈ T1,
fd(t2, sj) = 0 if j 6= d,∀t2 ∈ T2.
Then it is easy to see that f is a flow and it is a solution to (2.B.8).
(If) Suppose there exists a flow f ∗ satisfying (2.B.8). For any flow f , val(fd) ≤∑
t1∈T1 ud(t1) =
∑
t2∈T2 vd(t2), for all d = 1, ..., n. Then, f
∗ must satisfy
f ∗d (rd, t1) = ud(t1) =
∑
t2∈T2
f ∗d (t1, t2), ∀t1 ∈ T1,
f ∗d (t2, sd) = vd(t2) =
∑
t1∈T1




f ∗d (t1, t2) ≤ c(t1, t2), ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T.
Hence, f ∗ restricted to arcs in T is a solution to (I1). 
The following result shows that the cut condition of the multicommodity flow problem
(Gn, Hn, c, φ) is a subclass of linear inequalities in condition (2.3.3). It translates the
proof of sufficiency of condition (2.3.3) in a two-person implementation problem into the
proof of a generalized max flow-min cut theorem in a specific digraph. On the other
hand, there is no existing maximum flow-min cut theorem for digraph multicommodity
flow problems except for some very specific digraphs, see Schrijver (2013).
Lemma 2.4: Let N = {1, 2} and D = {0, 1, ..., n}, n ≥ 1. Consider the n-commodity
digraph flow problem (Gn, Hn, c, φ).
(i) The cut condition
φ(δoutR (U)) ≤ cap(δoutA (U)), for all U ⊆ V, (2.B.9)



















for all D′ ⊆ {1, ..., n}, B1 ⊆ T1, B2 ⊆ T2.
(ii) If the cut condition (2.B.9) is necessary and sufficient for a feasible flow, then
(2.B.9) is necessary and sufficient for the implementability.











Sufficient Condition: A Digraph Multicommodity Flow Problem





















where S1 = {(rd, t1) : rd ∈ U, t1 /∈ U}, S2 = {(t2, sd) : t2 ∈ U, sd /∈ U}, S0 = {(t1, t2) :














Let B1 = T1 ∩ U , B2 = T2 ∩ U , D′′ = {d ∈ {1, ..., n} : rd ∈ U, sd ∈ U}, and D′′′ = {d ∈



















We claim that the cut condition for every U satisfying D′′ 6= ∅ or D′′′ 6= ∅ is implied by
the cut condition for Ũ derived from U satisfying D̃′ = D′∪D′′∪D′′′ and D̃′′ = D̃′′′ = ∅,
and S̃1 = S1, S̃2 = S2. Let Ũ = {rd}d∈D̃′ ∪ S̃1 ∪ S̃2, B̃1 = B1, and B̃2 = B2. The cut



































































implies that the condition for Ũ is tighter than the condition for U . Now the cut condition















for all D′ ⊆ {1, ..., n}, B1 ⊆ T1, B2 ⊆ T2. Equivalently, (2.B.10) holds for all D′ ⊆
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{1, ..., n}, B1 ⊆ T1, B2 ⊆ T2. Hence, the cut condition corresponds to the condition in
(2.3.3) with all f satisfying fi(d, ti) = fi(d
′, ti) for all d, d
′ ∈ {1, ..., n}, ti ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2.
Therefore, (2.B.9) is a subclass of (2.3.3).
(ii) In general, (2.B.9) is only a necessary condition for the existence of a feasible
flow in general digraph multicommodity flow problems, see Schrijver (2013). If (2.B.9)
is also sufficient for the feasibility, then by Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4 (i), (2.B.9) is also
sufficient for the implementability. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let N = {1, 2} and D = {0, 1}. Construct the digraph G1 =
(V,A) with r, s ∈ V (since n = 1, we drop the subscript d = 1 for r1, s1 and all other
variables). For any flow f ,
val(f) ≤ cap(δoutA (U)), ∀U ⊂ V, r ∈ U, s /∈ U. (2.B.19)
In particular,











val(f) ≤ cap(δoutA (U)), (2.B.21)
for all U ⊂ V , r ∈ U, s /∈ U .

































λ(Si × S−i), (2.B.23)
for all Si ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2.











λ(Si × (S−i)c), (2.B.24)
for all Si, Si ∈ 2Ti , Si∩Si = ∅, i = 1, 2. Hence, (2.B.23) is a subclass of (2.B.24) by setting
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Si = Si and Si = (Si)
c, i = 1, 2. Since (2.B.23) is sufficient for the implementability,
(2.B.24) is also sufficient for the implementability. 





for all d ∈ D̃i, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ N . Then
PD̃(D) = Λ̃D0. (2.B.26)
Define a linear map Γ̃ : Rl̃ → Rl̃ by, for each x ∈ Rl̃,
(Γ̃x)i(d, ti) = λi(ti)xi(d, ti), (2.B.27)
for all d ∈ D̃i, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ N . Then, a similar step as Theorem 2.1 shows that
PD̃(D) and Γ̃PD̃(D) are convex and compact. A hyperplane separation theorem shows
that QD̃ ∈ PD̃(D) if and only if
〈fD̃, Γ̃QD̃〉 ≤ sup{〈fD̃, Γ̃Λ̃q〉 : q ∈ D0}, for all fD̃ ∈ R
l̃. (2.B.28)
This corresponds to condition (2.3.2) with all f ∈ Rl satisfying fi(d, ti) = 0 for all d ∈ D̃ci ,
ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ N . 
Appendix 2.C Proof of Proposition 2.1-2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.1. See Che, Kim and Mierendorff (2013) for a recent proof of the
condition (2.3.5) based on a single-commodity network flow problem. Here we show that
if the necessary condition given by all f ∈ {−1, 0,+1}l is sufficient for the implementabil-
ity, the necessary condition given by all f ∈ {0,+1}l is also sufficient.
Since (Qi(i, ·))i∈N\{0} are essential, by Theorem 2.3, we set f0(d, ·) = 0 for all d ∈ D,
and fi(d, ·) = 0 for all d 6= i, i ∈ N \ {0} in (2.3.3). Denote this subclass of f by C.
For any f̃ ∈ C that satisfies f̃ has some coordinate being −1, i.e. f̃j(j, ·)(t∗) = −1
for some j ∈ N \ {0} and tj = t∗, define f̂ ∈ C by replacing f̂j(j, t∗) = 0 while f̂ = f̃ for
all other coordinates. We show that in (2.3.3), the condition given by f̂ is tighter than






fi(d, ti)} = max{0, max
i∈N\{0}
fi(i, ti)}. (2.C.1)
Let T ∗ = {t ∈ T : tj = t∗}. For any t ∈ T ∗, d = j is not an optimal solution to (2.C.1)
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given f̃ . Then for each t ∈ T ∗,
max
i∈N





























It is easy to see that L(f̃) ≤ L(f̂) since Qj(j, t∗) ≥ 0. Repeat this procedure and replace
all −1 by 0. This completes the proof. 
For general implementation problems, the extreme allocation rules that generate the
extreme points of the set of implementable reduced forms generalize the “hierarchical
allocation rules” of Border (1991) for single object auctions without externalities.
Definition 2.2: q∗ ∈ D0 is a generalized hierarchical allocation rule, if there exists
f ∈ Rl such that sup{〈f,ΓΛq〉 : q ∈ D0} is attained at q∗.
Denote by h(f) = sup{〈f,ΓΛq∗〉 : q ∈ D0} the value of the support function at
f . The proofs of Propositions 2.2 and 2.4 provide a characterization of the generalized
hierarchical allocation rules for social choice problems in Section 2.4.
In the remainder of the proofs, we represent a vector in {−1, 0,+1}l by a system of
sign functions. For any Ai = (Ai, Ai) ∈ 2Ti × 2Ti such that Ai ∩ Ai = ∅, define a sign
function by χAi = χAi − χAi . Then it is easy to see that if f ∈ {−1, 0,+1}
l, then for
i ∈ N , ti ∈ Ti, fi(d, ti) = χAi(ti) for some Ai.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The formal proof has been given by Theorem 2.2. We now
compute the hierarchical allocation rules. Let Bi, Bi ∈ 2Ti , Bi ∩ Bi = ∅, i = 1, 2.
Consider f = (f1(b, ·), f2(b, ·)) = (χB1 − χB1 , χB2 − χB2). For each t ∈ T , consider the





(χBi(ti)− χBi(ti))q(b, t). (2.C.6)
In Table 2A.1, the first two columns denote type profiles, i.e. (1, 1) corresponds to
t ∈ B1 × B2. The third column provides the point-wise solution and the last column is
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the maximum value of this problem. The set of all hierarchical allocation rules with the
normal vector f , denote D∗0(f), is found by combining the solutions for all type profiles
in Table 2A.1.










= λ(B1 × (B2)c) + λ((B1)c ×B2).
f1(b, t1) f2(b, t2) q
∗(b, t) Value
1 1 1 2
1 0 1 1
1 −1 [0, 1] 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 [0, 1] 0
0 −1 0 0
−1 1 [0, 1] 0
−1 0 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
Table 2A.1

Proof of Proposition 2.3. See Lemma 2.4 in Appendix 2.B, by setting |D| = 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Since (Q1(1, ·), Q2(2, ·), Q1(b, ·), Q2(b, ·)) are essential, by The-





fi(i, ti)q(i, t) +
∑
i∈N
fi(b, ti)q(b, t) = max{0, f1(1, t1), f2(2, t2), f1(1, t1) + f2(2, t2)}.
First notice that a similar argument as Proposition 2.1 implies that we need only to
consider f = (f1(1, ·), f2(2, ·), f1(b, ·), f2(b, ·)) where fi(i, ti) ≥ 0, for all ti ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2.
Let Ai, Bi, Bi ∈ 2Ti , Bi∩Bi = ∅, i = 1, 2. Consider f = (χA1 , χA2 , χB1−χB1 , χB2−χB2).








(χBi(ti)− χBi(ti))q(b, t). (2.C.7)
The solutions are given in Table 2A.2. The first two columns denote type profiles, i.e.
(1, 1, 1, 1) corresponds to (A1 ∩ B1) × (A2 ∩ B2). The third column provides the point-
wise solution and the last column is the point-wise maximum value of this problem. All
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hierarchical allocation rules, or D∗0(f), are found by combining the solutions for all type
profiles.
f1(1, t1) f1(b, t1) f2(2, t2) f2(b, t2) (q
∗(1, t), q∗(2, t), q∗(b, t)) Value
1 1 1 1 qb = 1 2
1 1 1 0 q1 + q2 + qb = 1 1
1 1 1 −1 q1 + q2 = 1 1
1 1 0 1 qb = 1 2
1 1 0 0 q1 + qb = 1 1
1 1 0 −1 q1 = 1 1
1 0 1 1 q1 + q2 + qb = 1 1
1 0 1 0 q1 + q2 = 1 1
1 0 1 −1 q1 + q2 = 1 1
1 0 0 1 q1 + qb = 1 1
1 0 0 0 q1 = 1 1
1 0 0 −1 q1 = 1 1
1 −1 1 1 q1 + q2 = 1 1
1 −1 1 0 q1 + q2 = 1 1
1 −1 1 −1 q1 + q2 = 1 1
1 −1 0 1 q1 = 1 1
1 −1 0 0 q1 = 1 1
1 −1 0 −1 q1 = 1 1
0 1 1 1 qb = 1 2
0 1 1 0 q2 + qb = 1 1
0 1 1 −1 q2 = 1 1
0 1 0 1 qb = 1 2
0 1 0 0 qb = 1 1
0 1 0 −1 0 ≤ q1 + q2 + qb ≤ 1 0
0 0 1 1 q2 + qb = 1 1
0 0 1 0 q2 = 1 1
0 0 1 −1 q2 = 1 1
0 0 0 1 qb = 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 ≤ q1 + q2 + qb ≤ 1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 ≤ q1 + q2 ≤ 1, qb = 0 0
0 −1 1 1 q2 = 1 1
0 −1 1 0 q2 = 1 1
0 −1 1 −1 q2 = 1 1
0 −1 0 1 0 ≤ q1 + q2 + qb ≤ 1 0
0 −1 0 0 0 ≤ q1 + q2 ≤ 1, qb = 0 0
0 −1 0 −1 0 ≤ q1 + q2 ≤ 1, qb = 0 0
Table 2A.2
Case 1. t ∈ T ′ = B1×B2. For such a profile, the probability weighted value is 2λ(t).
Case 2. t ∈ T ′′, the intersection of (A1)c× (A2)c and T \ ((B1× (B2)c)∪ (B1)c×B2).
For such a profile, the probability weighted value is 0.
Case 3. t ∈ T \ (T ′ ∪ T ′′). For such a profile, the probability weighted value is λ(t).
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Now, compared to λ(T ) = 1, where each type profile counts once, the support function
counts t ∈ T ′ twice and t ∈ T ′′ zero times. The value of the support function at f is
given by
h(f) = 1 + λ(T ′)− λ(T ′′). (2.C.8)
Denote
TA = (A1)
c × (A2)c, TB = (B1 × (B2)c) ∪ ((B1)c ×B2).
Then, T cA = ∪i∈N(Ai × T−i), T ′′ = TA ∩ T cB, and
h(f) =1 + λ(T ′)− λ(TA ∩ T cB) = λ(T ′) + λ((TA ∩ T cB)c) = λ(T ′) + λ(T cA ∪ TB).
Furthermore,
λ(T ′) + λ(T cA ∪ TB) =λ(T cA) + (λ(T ′) + λ(TB))− λ(T cA ∩ TB)
=λ(T cA) + λ(B1 × (B2)c) + λ((B1)c ×B2)− λ(T cA ∩ TB)
≤λ(T cA) + λ(B1 × (B2)c) + λ((B1)c ×B2).
Hence, compared to the conditions in Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, the condition in Proposi-
tion 2.4 is tighter. 
Appendix 2.D Single and Multicommodity Flow Problems
We first introduce a single commodity maximum flow problem. Let G = (V,A) be a
directed graph and let r, s ∈ V be the source and the sink. For any k ∈ V , denote δin(k)
as the set of the arcs entering k and δout(k) the set of arcs leaving k. Let c : A→ R+ be
a capacity function. A function f : A→ R+ is an r − s flow if





f(a),∀k ∈ V \ {r, s}. (2.D.2)








So, the value is the net amount of flow leaving r (δin(r) = ∅). It is also equal to the net
amount of flow entering s.
A set C of arcs is a r − s cut if C = δout(U) for some subset U ⊂ V with r ∈ U and
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The 1-commodity maximum flow problem now is to find an r−s flow of maximum value.
Lemma 2.5: (Ford-Fulkerson, 1956) For any one-commodity flow problem with di-
graph G = (V,A), r, s ∈ V and c : A→ R+, the maximum flow is equal to the minimum
cut, or
max
f : r−s flow
val(f) = min
U : r−s cut
cap(δoutA (U)). (2.D.5)
Now we introduce a multicommodity flow problem. Let G = (V,A) be a supply
digraph with multiple commodities d = 1, ..., n, sources and sinks (rd, sd)
n
d=1, and the
capacity function c : A→ R+. The corresponding demand digraph H = (V ′, R) is given
by V ′ = {r1, s1, ..., rn, sn} and R = {(rd, sd)nd=1}, which contains all source-sink pairs. A
demand function is given by φ : R → R+. A flow f = (fd)nd=1 contains fd : A → R+,









fd(a),∀k ∈ V, k 6= rd, sd, d = 1, ..., n. (2.D.7)
The value of the flow f is given by
val(fd) = fd(δ
out(rd)) = fd(δ
in(sd)), d = 1, ..., n. (2.D.8)
For U ⊆ V , denote cap(δoutA (U)) the total capacity of arcs of A leaving U , and denote
φ(δoutR (U)) the total demands of arcs of R leaving U . A flow f subject to c with value φ
is called feasible. A problem (G,H, c, φ) is to find a feasible flow.
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Nonexistence of Monotone Solutions in
Two-Person Bargaining Problems with
Incomplete Information
3.1. Introduction
For bargaining problems between a buyer and a seller with incomplete information,
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that if the seller and the buyer have independent
beliefs with a common support, there is no ex post (Pareto) efficient, ex post budget
balanced, individually rational, and incentive compatible trading mechanism. In the ex
ante efficient mechanism that maximizes the trading surplus, each player’s interim utility
is responsive to his valuation of the object.1 However, in this environment, trade is not
always ex post efficient.2 This raises a question: If the disagreement payoffs are private
information for both players and trade is always ex post efficient, does there exist a
trading mechanism that is ex post efficient and responsive to the players’ disagreement
payoffs?
To illustrate this problem, let us consider a simple example. There are two risk
neutral players that jointly produce a private good from complementary inputs, one
from each player. Assume that it is common knowledge that producing the object and
allocating it to one player yields utility 3 for this player and 0 for the other player. The
costs of inputs are privately observed by each player and independently drawn from 0
and 1 with equal probabilities.
For this bargaining problem with incomplete information, several incentive compat-
ible and individually rational solutions have been proposed. The ex ante utilitarian
solution (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983), which maximizes the ex ante trading sur-
plus, requires producing the object with probability one and yields interim utility 3/2
for both types of the players. The ex ante utilitarian solution is ex post efficient but
not monotonic with respect to the costs at the interim stage. The generalized Nash so-
1For illustration, suppose the seller and the buyer have independent private values and ṽs, ṽb ∼ U [0, 1].
In the ex ante efficient mechanism, trade occurs if vb > vs + 1/4 and no trade occurs otherwise. The
interim utilities are given by Us(vs) = Us(1) −
´ 1
vs




Qs(x) = max{0, 34 − x} and Qb(x) = min{1,
1
4 + x} for x ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, Us is increasing in vs and Ub
is increasing in vb.
2There exists some vb < vs such that trade is inefficient.
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lution (Harsanyi and Selten, 1975, Myerson, 1979), which maximizes the Nash product
weighted by the marginal probabilities of the types, requires producing the object with
a probability less than one and yields interim utility 3/4 for the low type and 3/2 for
the high type of each player.3 The generalized Nash solution is monotonic but not ex
post efficient. Do these drawbacks disqualify these solutions? We show that the answer
is No, because there is no solution that is both ex post efficient and monotone.
Requiring each player’s utility outcome being responsive to his disagreement payoff is
a desirable property. In case of an exchange economy, it requires that a player is rewarded
for having a larger initial endowment. The monotonicity is consistent with but weaker
than an equal sharing of the trading surplus between the players. The players may accept
the monotonicity as an egalitarian criterion. In the axiomatic theory of bargaining, the
Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and the egalitarian solution are weakly
responsive to the disagreement payoffs (Thomson, 1987). For bargaining procedures
with complete information, Crawford (1979) studies a class of multistage procedures
where the right to propose a division is auctioned off to players. A prominent aspect of
this procedure is that any change in the status quo is reflected in the final outcome.4
Hence, if there is complete information, the most well-known bargaining solutions are
monotonic in the disagreement payoffs and “disagreement point monotonicity” has even
been proposed as an axiom.
In this chapter, we consider bargaining problems with possibly correlated information
on the disagreement payoffs of the players. When the status quo is always ex post
inefficient, requiring ex post efficiency of the solution implies that the disagreement
is never implemented. The uncertainty of the disagreement payoffs has no material
consequence but it may still have strategic meaning. To characterize such monotonicity
for bargaining with incomplete information, we introduce the following property on utility
outcomes: Each player’s equilibrium interim utility is non-constant and is nondecreasing
in one’s own disagreement payoff throughout the support. We find that if the players’
beliefs are independent, then each player’s interim utility is independent of the type of
this player. Thus, searching for any possibility result of non-constant interim utility must
go beyond independent beliefs.5 In some contexts, the players’ disagreement payoffs are
positively correlated, i.e. either (i) both players face similar outside market conditions
3A random allocation mechanism that implements the generalized Nash solution is as follows: If both
players report 0, then allocate the object to each player with probability 1/2; If only one player reports
1, with probability 1/2, allocate the object to this player, and with probability 1/2, there is no joint
production; If both players report 1, then with probability 1, there is no joint production.
4In contrast, Rubinstein (1982)’s bargaining procedure requires that a slight increase in a sufficiently
low status quo does not affect the outcome.
5In Myerson and Satterthwaite’s environment, the correlation between players’ beliefs might overcome
the impossibility result. By extending the full extraction of surplus result in Crémer and McLean (1988)
to a continuum of states, McAfee and Reny (1992) shows that for a broad class of correlated beliefs,
there exists some ex post efficient and individually rational mechanism, provided that ex post budget
balance is replaced by ex ante budget balance.
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or (ii) they have been in some agreement in which they share some common interest.
In other contexts, the players’ disagreement payoffs can be negatively correlated; for
example, when the players play a zero-sum game in case of conflict.
With positively correlated beliefs, it is not obvious that a better outside option will
improve one’s interim expected utility in an ex post efficient mechanism. After all, a
player who draws a higher disagreement payoff has a more pessimistic belief on the
other’s disagreement payoff and his interim expected utility may hence turn out to be
lower. With negatively correlated beliefs, a player with a better disagreement payoff is
more optimistic and the interim expected utility is more likely to be higher. However,
we find this is not the case even for negatively correlated beliefs, provided that trade
is always ex post efficient. The main results show that for finite type sets, incentive
compatible, ex post efficient and monotone solutions do not exist for both positively and
negatively correlated beliefs, if (i) The support of beliefs contains two types for each
player, and (ii) The beliefs have uniform marginal probabilities.
Myerson (1979, 1985) implicitly mentions the tradeoff between ex post efficiency and
interim monotonicity. Myerson (1979) considers a two-person public project example
with one-sided private information, where building the project is always ex post efficient.
He shows that the incentive compatible generalized Nash solution yields a monotone
but inefficient utility allocation. Myerson (1985) considers a version of Akerlof’s lemon
problem, in which only the seller has private information related to the quality of the
object. The buyer always values the object higher than the seller and trade is always ex
post efficient. Myerson shows that for one of the neutral bargaining solutions he propose,
the seller’s interim utility is also monotone but the outcome is ex post inefficient. This
chapter develops Myerson’s observations into more general impossibility results for two-
sided uncertainty and correlated beliefs. The implications are twofold. First, it reflects
a conflict of ex post efficiency and interim utility monotonicity: Either the players have
to forgo some gains from agreement or they have to accept a constant division even if
their outside options turn out to be different. Second, it provides a theoretical model for
why the breakdown of an obviously beneficial agreement is observed so often in the lab
(Roth, 1995).
Our model relates to Börgers and Postl (2009), which considers a modified Myer-
son and Satterthwaite environment where (i) players’ ordinal preferences are common
knowledge while cardinal preferences are private information, and (ii) there is no status
quo. While our assumption on players’ ordinal preferences is similar to Börgers and Postl
(2009), we consider a different assumption on the cardinal preferences. It is worth to
notice while the two models differ in the assumptions on the supports for private values,
the models have the same set of decisions options and the same feasibility problem. In
both models, to characterize the set of incentive compatible mechanisms, the same feasi-
bility problem arises. While the ex ante utilitarian solution in Börgers and Postl (2009)
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is still open, the ex ante utilitarian solution in the model of this chapter is trivial.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model. Sections
3.3 and 3.4 discuss efficiency and monotonicity separately. Section 3.5 characterizes the
non-constant ex post efficient solutions. Section 3.6 discusses the ex post properties and
the model with more than two players. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. Model
Two players have the opportunity to jointly produce one unit of a private good from
complementary inputs, one from each player. The set of social alternatives is D =
{d0, d1, d2}. The choice d0 is the disagreement point, in which case players i = 1, 2
receive payoffs t = (t1, t2) ∈ T ⊂ R2. For i = 1, 2, the choice di means that producing
the object and allocating it to player i, which yields utility Vi > 0 for player i and 0 for
the other player. We assume that (V1, V2) are commonly known by the players and that
each player i privately observes his own disagreement payoff ti. The players bargain over
which decision to select and randomization is allowed. We now introduce the model’s
assumptions.
Assumption 3.1: (t̃1, t̃2) has a joint probability density f : T → R++, where T =
S × S and either (i) S = [0, 1] and f is a continuous density function, or (ii) S =
{s1, ..., sn} ⊂ [0, 1] for some n ≥ 2.
In Section 3.6, we discuss other support assumptions.
Assumption 3.2: f(s, s′) = f(s′, s), for all s, s′ ∈ S.
For i = 1, 2, denote fi(ti) the marginal probability of player i, or
´
S
f(t)dtj, for j 6= i,6
and fj(tj|ti) the conditional probability of player i, or f(t)/fi(ti). Independent beliefs
correspond to f(t) = f1(t1)f2(t2) for all t ∈ T . Denote F the set of beliefs satisfying the
assumptions 3.1 and 3.2.
Assumption 3.3: For i = 1, 2, player i has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function ui : ∆(D)×S → R given by ui(q, ti) = q0ti+qiVi, where q = (q0, q1, q2) ∈ ∆(D),
and V1 = V2 = V .
We assume the players have private values on their disagreement payoffs. V1 = V2 is
a normalization. Since a player has a vNM utility function, we can normalize his utility
from the best alternative to V and the worst alternative to 0. Then, the symmetric
supports in Assumption 3.1 require some interpersonal comparison of utilities.
We say q ∈ ∆(D) is ex post (Pareto) efficient at t ∈ T if there exists no q′ ∈ ∆(D)
such that ui(q, ti) ≤ ui(q′, ti), with at least one inequality strict. q ∈ ∆(D) is ex post
6Here we use the integral symbol for both continuous and finite supports.
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utilitarian efficient at t ∈ T if q is a solution to maxu1(q, t1)+u2(q, t2). We now introduce
the final assumption in this chapter.
Assumption 3.4: V > 2.
Note that Assumption 3.4 implies that for every t ∈ T , every q′ ∈ ∆(D) with q′0 > 0
is ex post Pareto dominated: there exists q ∈ ∆(D) with q0 = 0 such that ui(q′, ti) <
ui(q, ti), i = 1, 2. Hence, ex post Pareto efficiency and ex post utilitarian efficiency
coincide in our model, which requires that for each state, d0 is selected with probability
0. The linearity of the utility functions then implies that an increase in q1 requires the
same decrease in q2 and the transfer rate is 1:1 for the players. This feasibility constraint
mimics a balanced budget constraint in the quasilinear case, except that transfers are
now bounded. In Börgers and Postl (2009), it is assumed that V = 1. In that case, the
status quo is not always ex post inefficient, which is similar to the support condition of
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
A random allocation mechanism is given by q : T → ∆(D). If player i = 1, 2 reports
t̂i instead of his true type ti, while the other player is honest, then i’s interim expected




ui(q(t̂i, tj), ti)fj(tj|ti)dtj. (3.2.1)
We say q is incentive compatible (IC) if truthful reporting by both players constitutes
a Bayesian equilibrium. Denote the interim utility under truthful reporting by Ui(q|ti) =
Ui(q, ti|ti). We say q is individually rational (IR) if Ui(q|ti) ≥ ti, for all ti ∈ S, i = 1, 2.
q is ex post efficient (EFF) if q1(t) + q2(t) = 1, for all t ∈ T . Notice that if q is ex post
efficient, then q is fully determined by q1.
In general, a mechanism may be asymmetric among players. Since our environment
is symmetric, i.e. it has symmetric beliefs and symmetric utility functions of players,
Lemma 3.1 shows that we can restrict our attention to symmetric mechanisms (SYM),
where q1(s, s
′) = q2(s
′, s), q0(s, s
′) = q0(s
′, s), for all s, s′ ∈ S.
Lemma 3.1: Let f ∈ F . Consider any asymmetric mechanism q. If q satisfies
IC, IR and Ui(q|ti) is (weakly) increasing in ti on S for i = 1, 2, then there exists a
symmetric mechanism q̃ that satisfies IC, IR and Ui(q̃|ti) is (weakly) increasing in ti on
S for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Define q∗ = (q0, q2, q1). Then, q
∗ is also IC and IR. Since q, q∗ are IC, IR, and the
integral operator is linear, q̃ = 1/2q+1/2q∗ is IC, IR and SYM. Since for i = 1, 2, Ui(q|ti)
and Ui(q
∗|ti) are (weakly) increasing in ti on S, Ui(q̃|ti) = 1/2Ui(q|ti) + 1/2Ui(q∗|ti) is
(weakly) increasing in ti on S. 
7For a pair of types (ti, tj), the first coordinate in q corresponds to player i. For a pair of types
without specifying players i and j, the first coordinate in q corresponds to player 1.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we say a mechanism is feasible if it satisfies incentive
compatibility, individual rationality, and symmetry. The (symmetric) constant solution
is defined by q(t) = (0, 1/2, 1/2) for all t ∈ T . We say a feasible mechanism q is interim
utility equivalent to the constant solution if Ui(q|ti) = V/2, for all ti ∈ S, i = 1, 2.
3.3. Existence of Efficient Solutions
In Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), the status quo (no trade) is ex post efficient for
some states of the world. In their case, there does not exist any incentive compatible,
individually rational, budget balanced, and ex post efficient mechanism. In our model,
the Myerson and Satterthwaite impossibility does not arise, because the constant solution
is ex post efficient.
Lemma 3.2: Let f ∈ F . There exists a feasible and ex post efficient mechanism.
Notice that there may exist other feasible and ex post efficient mechanisms. To see
the multiplicity, suppose f(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1]2. Consider a class of feasible and ex







h(t1 − t2) for all t ∈ [0, 1]2, (3.3.1)
where
(i) h : [−1, 1]→ R is continuous, and
(ii) h(x) = h(x+ 1) for all x ∈ [−1, 0], and
(iii) h(x) = −h(−x) for all x ∈ [−1, 0], and
(iv) ‖h‖∞ = maxx∈[−1,1] h(x).












, for all t2 ∈ [0, 1]. (3.3.3)
To see the result intuitively, notice that for each reporting profile, the mechanism pre-
scribes a fair lottery plus a probability premium determined by the difference of the
players’ reports. The condition (ii) is used for incentive compatibility while the condi-
tions (iii) and (iv) are required by ex post feasibility. Player 1 receives the same utility
by reporting 1 or 0, and the expected value of the premium (multiplied by 2‖h‖∞) is








h(x)dx = 0. (3.3.4)
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Similarly, for any other report in [0, 1], the expected value of the premium is also zero.
Hence, player 1 is indifferent among all reports.8
3.4. Existence of Monotone Solutions
For this bargaining problem, we introduce an interim monotonicity property: At the
interim stage, each player’s interim expected utility is (i) non-constant and (ii) nonde-
creasing everywhere in his disagreement payoff.
Definition 3.1: Let f ∈ F and let q be a feasible mechanism. We say q is interim
monotone (I-M) if, (i) for i = 1, 2 and all u ∈ R, the event {ti ∈ S : Ui(q|ti) = u} has




We discuss the extension to the ex post utility profile and ex post monotonicity in
Section 3.6. Notice that for α ∈ [0, 1/2), the lottery mechanism q(t) = (1− 2α, α, α) for
all t ∈ T , which is independent of reports, yields an interim monotone allocation. The
following result is immediate.
Lemma 3.3: Let f ∈ F . There exists a feasible and interim monotone mechanism.
3.5. The Impossibility Results
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we have shown that there exist (i) some feasible and ex post effi-
cient solution which is not interim monotone, and (ii) some feasible and interim monotone
solution which is not ex post efficient. In this section, we show that the incompatibility
of efficiency and interim monotonicity holds for all independent beliefs and for a broad
class of correlated beliefs.
3.5.1. Independence
The example in Section 3.3 illustrates that the set of feasible and ex post efficient mech-
anisms can be quite large for independent beliefs. However, the next result shows that
all these mechanisms yield the same interim utility.
8There exists another class of asymmetric solutions. For a ∈ [−1, 1], define
qa1 (t) =
1
2 (1 + a− 2a(t1 + t2) + 4at1t2).
Then, qa is a solution to this problem. To see the intuition, let a = 1. If player 2 reports t2 > 1/2, then
to maximize q1, player 1 will report 1. If player 2 reports t2 < 1/2, then player 1 will report 0. Hence, a
higher report may increase or decrease the probability of winning for player 1. For player 2 with types
uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the mechanism ensures that player 1 is indifferent between these reports.
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Proposition 3.1: Let f ∈ F and let the beliefs be independent. If a feasible mech-
anism is ex post efficient, then it is interim utility equivalent to the constant solution.
Proof. Let q be a feasible and ex post efficient solution. q0(t) = 0 for all t ∈ T implies that
for i = 1, 2, ui(q(t̂i, tj), ti) = ui(q(t̂i, tj), t
′
i), for all tj, t̂i, ti, t
′
i ∈ S. Independence implies
fj(tj|ti) = fj(tj), for all tj, ti ∈ S. Thus, for all t̂i, ti, t′i ∈ S, Ui(q, t̂i|ti) = Ui(q, t̂i|t′i). IC
implies Ui(q|·) is a constant and by SYM, it is V/2. 
Notice that ex post efficiency and independence imply that a player’s disagreement
payoff has neither payoff consequences nor strategic consequences. In other words, a
player’s interim utility from any report is independent of his true type.
Proposition 3.1 is robust to an increase in the number of players. Let N be a finite
set of players, |N | ≥ 3, and assume that the assumptions from Section 3.2, appropriately
modified, continue to hold. A similar analysis shows that if V > |N |, the impossibility
result remains true.
3.5.2. Correlation
Proposition 3.1 implies that any possibility result for interim non-constant solutions
requires correlated beliefs. In this subsection, we obtain an impossibility result for two
classes of correlated beliefs on finite supports. Firstly, this result holds if only two values
are possible. Secondly, it holds if the beliefs have the uniform marginals.
Proposition 3.2: Let S = {0, 1}. If a feasible mechanism is ex post efficient, then
it is interim utility equivalent to the constant solution.
Proof. Let q be a feasible and ex post efficient solution. Consider IC for player 1 of type
s ∈ S (multiplied by f1(s)/V ),∑
t2∈S




′, t2), for s
′ 6= s. (3.5.1)
In other words, for s′ 6= s,
f(s, s)(q1(s, s)− q1(s′, s)) ≥ f(s, s′)(q1(s′, s′)− q1(s, s′)). (3.5.2)
By SYM and EFF, q1(s, s
′) = 1 − q2(s, s′) = 1 − q1(s′, s) and q1(s, s) = q1(s′, s′) = 1/2.
For q1(s, s
′) < 1/2, IC for type s is violated. For q1(s, s
′) > 1/2, IC for type s′ is violated.
Hence, q1(s, s
′) = q1(s
′, s) = 1/2. Each player’s interim utility must be a constant. 
Intuitively, in case of reporting profile (1, 1) or (0, 0), the winning probability for
each player is 1/2. In case of reporting profile (0, 1) or (1, 0), one of the players must be
rewarded with a winning probability more than 1/2. Suppose the player who reports 1
72
The Impossibility Results
is rewarded. Then, it is a dominant strategy for any player to report 1. Hence, there
exists no mechanism that rewards one player while punishes the other in case the players
make different reports.
This result is independent of positively and negatively correlated beliefs. It counters
the intuition that having negatively correlated beliefs makes it easier to have a monotone
solution.
Proposition 3.3: Let S = {s1, ..., sn}, n > 2, and∑
t2∈S
f(t) = 1/n, for all t1 ∈ S, (3.5.3)∑
t1∈S
f(t) = 1/n, for all t2 ∈ S. (3.5.4)
If a feasible mechanism is ex post efficient, then it is interim utility equivalent to the
constant solution.
Proof. Let q be a feasible and ex post efficient solution. IC for player 1 of type s ∈ S
(multiplied by f1(s)/V ) is the same as (3.5.1). SYM implies q1(s, s
′) = q2(s
′, s) for all
s, s′ ∈ S. EFF implies q2(s, s′) = 1 − q1(s, s′), and q1(s, s) = 1/2 for all s, s′ ∈ S, Sum











































[f1(sk)− f1(sk+1)]q1(sk+1, sk), (3.5.5)








f(sk, t2) + f(sk, sk+1)−
∑
t2 6=sk
f(sk+1, t2)− f(sk, sk+1)





[f1(sk)− f1(sk+1)]q1(sk+1, sk). (3.5.7)
Because f1(sk) = f1(sk+1) for all k = 1, ..., n,
n∑
k=1
[f1(sk)− f1(sk+1)]q1(sk+1, sk) = 0. (3.5.8)
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Hence, all 2n× (n− 1) inequalities are binding. Each player’s interim utility must be a
constant. By SYM, this constant is V/2. 
The class of correlated beliefs with the uniform marginals is not too “small” com-
pared to the class of independent beliefs, in terms of the number of free parameters in
beliefs. For beliefs without restrictions, the probability simplex condition implies the
total degrees of freedom are n2 − 1. For the class of independent beliefs,
f1(s1), ..., f1(sn−1), f2(s1), ..., f2(sn−1),
are 2(n− 1) parameters. The degrees of freedom are given by
n2 − 1− 2(n− 1).
For the class of correlated beliefs with the uniform marginals,
f(s1, s1), ..., f(s1, sn−1), ..., f(sn−1, s1), ..., f(sn−1, sn−1),
are (n− 1)2 parameters. The degrees of freedom are given by
n2 − 1− (n− 1)2.
For n = 3, the two classes of beliefs have the same degrees of freedom. For n > 3, the
class of independent beliefs has larger degrees of freedom.
The class of symmetric beliefs with uniform marginals corresponds to n × n doubly
stochastic matrices satisfying symmetry, by multiplying n for each f(t) in (3.5.3). The
Birkhoff theorem shows that the set of n × n doubly stochastic matrices is the convex
hull of the set of n× n permutation matrices.9
An increase in the number of types introduces more variation in the beliefs and may
expand the set of feasible outcomes. However, Proposition 3.3 shows that if beliefs
have uniform marginals, pooling all incentive constraints of a player altogether makes
all such constraints binding. The impossibility result holds again for both positively and
negatively correlated beliefs.
Remarks. In Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, ex post efficiency is indispensable for our
results. We consider two ways to relax it to ε-ex post inefficiency, for ε > 0 small.
We may define a feasible mechanism q as ε-ex post inefficient, if {t ∈ T : q0(t) > 0}
has Lebesgue measure ε (on R2). Alternatively, we may require q to satisfy q0(t) = ε
for all t ∈ T . For the second definition, even in case of independent beliefs, interim
monotonicity is easily reconciled with other constraints. A solution mechanism is simple:
q = (ε, 1/2− ε/2, 1/2− ε/2). In this case, each player i gets εti + (1− ε)V/2 for all type
profiles.
9Katz (1970) shows that the set of n × n symmetric doubly stochastic matrices is the convex hull
of the set of all matrices of form 12 (P + P





3.6.1. Ex Post Properties
We now consider stronger solution concepts by requiring a mechanism being robust
to beliefs. We say a mechanism q is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC),
if truthful reporting by both players constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium, or
ui(q(ti, tj), ti) ≥ ui(q(t′i, tj), ti) for all ti, t′i, tj ∈ S, i = 1, 2.
In many contexts, the players may compare their utility outcomes after they know
the state. To describe such ex post utility comparison, we introduce an ex post mono-
tonicity property. At the ex post stage, the expected utility is (i) non-constant and (ii)
nondecreasing everywhere in disagreement payoff.
Definition 3.2: Let f ∈ F and let q be a feasible mechanism. We say q is ex post
monotone (EP-M) if, (i) for i = 1, 2 and all u ∈ R, the event {t ∈ T : ui(q(t), ti) = u}
has a probability measure (on R2) less than 1, and (ii) if for i = 1, 2, ui(q(ti, t′j), t′i) ≤
ui(q(ti, tj), ti) for all t
′
i ≤ ti, tj ≤ t′j, and ti, t′i, tj, t′j ∈ S.
By definition, ex post non-constant is necessary for interim non-constant and ex post
(interim) monotonicity, while ex post monotonicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for
interim monotonicity without further specifying beliefs.10
Ex post monotonicity also implies that for all states in which one player has a higher
disagreement payoff, he receives weakly more than the other player. An example is the
ex post Egalitarian solution: for i = 1, 2 and all t ∈ T , ui(q(t), ti) = ti + (V − ti − tj)/2.
In Proposition 3.4 below, we find that if strong conditions such as dominant strategy
incentive compatibility or ex post monotonicity are required, we have impossibility results
on the ex post non-constant solutions.11
Proposition 3.4: Let f ∈ F . If a feasible mechanism is (i) ex post efficient and
dominant strategy incentive compatible, or (ii) ex post efficient and ex post monotone,
then it is the constant solution.
Proof. (i) Take t′i > ti. DSIC implies ui(q(ti, tj), ti) ≥ ui(q(t′i, tj), ti), for all tj,∈ S. By
EFF, ui(q(ti, tj), ti) ≥ ui(q(t′i, tj), ti) = ui(q(t′i, tj), t′i), for all tj ∈ S, and ui(q(t′i, tj), t′i) ≥
ui(q(ti, tj), t
′
i) = ui(q(ti, tj), ti), for all tj ∈ S. Hence, ui(q(ti, tj), ti) = ui(q(t′i, tj), t′i), for
all tj ∈ S. By SYM and EFF, q1(t) = q2(t) = 1/2 for all t ∈ T .
10It is worth noting that de Clippel (2012) introduces the following interim egalitarian criterion, which
is much stronger that I-M because the latter requires the interim surplus to be equalized across players
and types and thus the interim utility is a positive affine transformation of disagreement payoffs, i.e. a
feasible mechanism q is interim egalitarian, if for all t1, t2, U1(q|t1)− t1 = U2(q|t2)− t2.
11Recent papers show that an interim utility of any Bayesian mechanism can by obtained with a
dominant strategy mechanism with the same ex ante social surplus, in a linear IPV environment (Manelli
and Vincent, 2010; Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and Shi, 2012). Because we do not allow
transfers, the equivalence does not apply in our environment.
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(ii) Take t′i > ti. By EP-M and EFF, for all tj ∈ S, ui(q(ti, tj), ti) ≤ ui(q(t′i, tj), t′i) =
ui(q(t
′






i, tj), ti)fj(tj|ti)dtj = Ui(q, t′i|ti). By IC, it implies Ui(q|ti) ≥
Ui(q, t
′
i|ti). Hence, ui(q(ti, tj), ti) = ui(q(t′i, tj), t′i) for almost all tj ∈ S. By SYM,
q1(t) = q2(t) = 1/2, a.e. t ∈ T . 
To interpret part (ii) of Proposition 3.4, notice that for i = 1, 2, ex post monotonicity
requires that the probability of player i obtaining the object is nondecreasing in player i’s
report, given any report of the other player. Hence, player i has incentive to overreport.
The result immediately follows a lack of incentive compatibility for the ex post Egalitarian
solution, which is ex post efficient and ex post monotone.
3.6.2. Three Players
We now discuss how the results change if there are more than two players. For the case
of correlated beliefs, we provide a three-player example where Proposition 3.2 does not
generalize.
Example 3.1: Suppose V > 3 and f : {0, 1}3 → R++ satisfies the following condi-
tions:12
(i) f010 = f001 = f100, f011 = f110 = f101, fi(0) = fi(1), i = 1, 2, 3,
(ii) f000 > f011, f111 > f100,
(iii) 1
3




(iv) f110 > f100.
Then there exists a feasible and ex post efficient mechanism that delivers an interim
monotone utility.
Proof. Let q : {0, 1}3 → ∆({0, 1, 2, 3}) be the mechanism given by,





























It is easily shown that given conditions (i)-(iv) on the beliefs, q is feasible, EFF and
I-M.13 
12For simplicity, denote fxyz = f(x, y, z) for x, y, z ∈ {0, 1}.



























The interim monotonicity requires
1





Intuitively, a player is punished if he is the only person who reports 1 or 0. He will
be rewarded if he belongs to the majority. The beliefs assumption allows the mediator
to better identify which player is more likely to be a deviator.
Condition (ii) ensures incentive compatibility. For a player with type 0, if the other
two players draw (0, 1) or (1, 0), then a deviation to report 1 will not change his allocation.
If the others draw (0, 0), the deviation loses an allocation probability of 1/3. If the others
draw (1, 1), the deviation wins an allocation probability of 1/3. The profitability of the
deviation depends on the likelihoods of (0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 1). A similar analysis applies
to a player with type 1. Condition (iii) ensures interim monotonicity. The condition
implies a higher ex ante utility of type 1 compared to type 0. If condition (iv) holds, q
is individually rational.






− 4ε, f111 =
1
2
− 5ε, f100 = ε, f110 = 2ε, (3.6.2)
For each player i, the interim utility vector is given by
(Ui(0), Ui(1)) = (
1
3
V (1− 2ε), 1
3
V (1 + 2ε)). (3.6.3)
As ε→ 0, the beliefs become almost perfectly correlated and the mechanism q remains
a solution. In case ε = 0, condition (iii) is violated. Hence, the existence of a monotone
solution does not satisfy a continuity in beliefs.
The result shows that varying the number of players expands the support of beliefs,
the set of allocation rules, and hence the set of interim utility outcomes.
3.6.3. A Triangular Support
Instead of assuming the unit square support for the beliefs, we may consider a triangular
support T = {t ∈ R2 : t1 > 0, t2 > 0, t1 + t2 < 1}, and the joint density f is continuous
and strictly positive on the support. Then it remains true that at all states, the status
quo is ex post Pareto dominated for V > 2. With this support assumption, the previous
results on correlated beliefs may no longer hold. First, a distribution with uniform
marginals cannot have an everywhere positive density on the triangle support. Second,
a player with a type greater than 1/2 knows that the other player’s type is lower than
1/2.
The individual rationality requires
V ( 13f000 + f001) ≥ 0, and V (
1
3f111 + f110) ≥ fi(1) = f111 + f101 + f110 + f100.
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3.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a bargaining problem with incomplete information when the
status quo is ex post inefficient for all states of the world. We discuss the existence
of ex post efficient and monotone bargaining solutions, for which each player’s interim
utility is responsive to his disagreement payoff. The assumption on the ex post inefficient
status quo makes Myerson and Satterthwaite’s impossibility not to arise, for example,
the constant mechanism is a solution. However, if non-constant solutions are considered,
tensions between efficiency and monotonicity arise, since a mechanism must now satisfy:
(i) incentive compatibility, (ii) feasibility and efficiency, i.e. any punishment for a player
must be fully translated into rewards for the other, and (iii) some variation in utility
allocation.
For independent beliefs, we obtain an impossibility result. For correlated beliefs on
finite supports, we obtain an impossibility result for two classes of beliefs. In particular,
we show that if the support contains only two points for each player, the impossibil-
ity result holds for all beliefs. We also find that if stronger solution concepts such as
dominant strategy incentive compatibility or ex post weak monotonicity are required, a
stronger nonexistence result holds.
We also study how the results change when there are more than two players. With
independent beliefs, the impossibility result remains true irrespective of the number of
players. With correlated beliefs, we provide an example of the positive result for three
players. The implications are twofold: (i) An increase in the number of players enlarges
the set of mechanisms such that an efficient and monotone solution arises.14 In case of
two players, it is difficult for the arbitrator to identify a deviator if their reports are not
aligned, even if beliefs are correlated. In case of three players, the arbitrator can reward
the majority. (ii) It suggests an empirical prediction: In the negotiations where trade is
always ex post efficient and the players’ outside options are correlated, the fully efficient
outcome is more likely to arise for large groups than for small groups.15
14Here we consider only the grand coalition and the single player coalitions.
15Isaac, Walker and Arlington (1994) studies some experiments on voluntary contribution mechanisms
and provides some evidence that a group’s ability to provide the efficient level of a pure public good is
positively related to group size.
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4.1. Introduction
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) (MS thereafter) introduces a bilateral trade problem
in which a seller has an indivisible object to sell and a buyer wants to buy it. The
seller and the buyer have private information on their values of the object, which are
independently drawn from a common support. The authors prove the nonexistence
of an incentive compatible, individually rational, balanced budget, and ex post efficient
trading mechanism in this environment. They also study the optimal trading mechanism
that maximizes the ex ante trading surplus. In their context, each player observes his
private value perfectly. However, for many other contexts, there is some intermediary
that controls the information that is accessible to the players, and the players only have
coarse information when making a decision.
Suppose the intermediary can release less information to the players compared to the
MS information structure. What is the optimal information structure and the trading
procedure consistent with this information structure that maximizes the ex ante trading
surplus? If we look at broader classes of trading environments, for which classes is the
MS information structure (not) optimal? In this chapter, we provide a partial answer
to the first question, by showing that the MS information structure is not optimal. We
show that there exist some coarser partitions (for both the seller and the buyer) such
that we can find a trading mechanism that attains a higher ex ante trading surplus than
the optimal mechanism of the MS.
There are at least two countervailing effects when we vary the information partitions.
A pair of finer partitions increases the possibility of efficient information aggregation and
efficient trade, and thus the ex ante trading surplus. However, the finer partitions worsen
the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraints, and thus restrict
the set of feasible trading outcomes. If the second effect dominates the first, then coarse
partitions increase the ex ante trading surplus.
That a coarse information structure may increase the ex ante social welfare has been
noticed by Hirshleifer (1971). In the context of an exchange economy for risk, he assumes
that the players are risk averse and that the endowments of wealth from different states
differ across the players. If the players trade in complete markets for contingent claims ex
ante, then they will share some of the risk. If the players perfectly learn the state before
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they trade, then there will be no trade at all. The no trade allocation is ex ante Pareto
dominated by the allocation of risk with no information. In his model, the decisions are
made either ex ante or ex post. This differs from mechanism design environments where
the decisions are made at the interim stage.
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) considers the problem of designing information
structures and auctions. The seller aims to choose the accuracy by which bidders learn
their values and the auction to maximize his revenue. They show that an optimal
information structure that maximizes the seller’s revenue exists, which is represented by
monotone partitions being asymmetric across players. Bergemann, Brook and Morris
(2015) characterizes the information structure which minimizes the seller’s revenue for
any value distribution, in a first-price auction. In these auction models, coarser partitions
of the buyers always lower the ex ante social welfare.
The chapter also relates to the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion. Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) considers a problem of a sender who commits to a signal structure
in order to persuade the receiver to take the sender’s preferred action. The authors
characterize the optimal signal for any given set of preferences and prior beliefs. Roesler
and Szentes (2016) considers a problem where the buyer designs his own information
structure in order to induce the seller to charge his preferred price. The buyer can
choose a costless, unbiased signal about his true value. The seller makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the buyer, knowing the joint distribution of the buyer’s value and signal
but not their realizations. Compared to theirs, our model is a classical mechanism design
problem with two-sided incomplete information.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
model. Section 4.3 presents the main results. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2. Model
In Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), the seller (player 1) owns an indivisible object and
the buyer (player 2) wants to buy it. Each player i = 1, 2 has a value ṽi distributed
according to a c.d.f. Fi(·) with continuous and positive density fi(·) over the support
[0, 1]. The players’ values are assumed to be independent. The players are risk neutral
and have quasi-linear utility given by u1(q,m, v1) = −qv1+m, and u2(q,m, v2) = qv2−m,
where q ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of trade, m ∈ R is the monetary payment from the
buyer to the seller, and vi is the value of player i.
In the MS information structure, each player knows his own value at the time of
bargaining, but considers the other’s value as random. For player i, a partition (of [0, 1])
is defined by a family of sets Ti such that (i) ∅ /∈ Ti, and (ii)
⋃
A∈Ti A = [0, 1], and (iii)
if A ∈ Ti and B ∈ Ti, then A ∩ B = ∅. For vi ∈ [0, 1], denote ti(vi) be the element of
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Ti that contains vi and denote t̃i the corresponding signal induced by ṽi. A partition Ti
is monotone if for each A ∈ Ti, A is convex. A partition Ti is said to be finite if Ti is a
finite set.
For each player i with type ti ∈ Ti, his conditional belief on vi is given by Fi(vi|ti) =
λ(ṽi ≤ vi, t̃i = ti)/λ(t̃i = ti), where λ is the Lebesgue measure. Denote E(ṽi|ti) =´ 1
0
vidFi(vi|ti).
For the players, a pair of partitions is given by T = (T1, T2). The MS information
structure T = (T 1, T 2) is then given by ti(vi) = vi, for all vi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2. We say T
is coarser than T if T1 and T2 are partitions and Ti 6= T i for some i.
For a pair of partitions T , a direct mechanism is given by µ = (q,m) : T → [0, 1]×R.
The allocation rule q assigns to each type profile a probability of trade and the payment
rule m assigns to each type profile a monetary payment from the buyer to the seller.
Given the other player reports truthfully, the interim expected utility of player i with










i, tj(vj)), vi)dFi(vi|ti)dFj(vj). (4.2.1)
We say that µ is incentive compatible if truth telling by both players is a Bayesian
equilibrium. For an incentive compatible mechanism µ, denote the interim utility by
Ui(µ|ti) = Ui(µ, ti|ti). µ is individually rational if Ui(µ|ti) ≥ 0, for all ti ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2.
For any T , a mechanism is T -feasible if it is incentive compatible and individual rational.
Let M(T ) be the set of T -feasible mechanisms.
A mechanism µ = (q,m) is ex post efficient, if for all v ∈ [0, 1]2,
q(t1(v1), t2(v2)) =
{
0 if v1 ≥ v2,
1 otherwise.
A mechanism µ is (constrained) ex ante efficient if






That is, µ yields the highest ex ante trading surplus. We say an allocation rule q is
ex ante efficient if µ = (q,m) is ex ante efficient. The efficiency loss of µ is given by the
ratio of the ex ante trading surplus from µ to that from the ex post efficient allocation.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that the presence of private information
and voluntary participation implies the impossibility of ex post efficiency. Intuitively,
the seller types with high reservation values and the buyer types with low reservation
values have little incentive to participate in a trading mechanism at the interim stage.
To induce them to participate, the third party must pay them some incentive costs.
In an ex post efficient mechanism, the incentive costs are so large such that voluntary
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participation is not attainable without any subsidy from the third party.
Lemma 4.1: (Myerson-Satterthwaite) (i) There exists no T -feasible and ex post effi-
cient mechanism. (ii) Suppose v1 +
F1(v1)
f1(v1)
and v2 − 1−F2(v2)f2(v2) are strictly increasing. Let
c1(v1, α) = v1 + α
F1(v1)
f1(v1)




Then there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that
qα(v1, v2) =
{
0 if c1(v1, α) ≥ c2(v2, α),
1 otherwise.
(4.2.4)
is ex ante efficient.
The parameter α reflects the Lagrangian multiplier of the individual rationality con-
straint of the players. A larger α implies a higher shadow price and hence a larger




0 if v1 ≥ v2 − 14 ,
1 if v1 < v2 − 14 ,
(4.2.5)
The MS solution yields the ex ante trading surplus 0.14. The efficiency loss is 15.6% and
the probability of no trade is 71.9%.
4.3. Results
The following result shows that even if we consider coarser partitions than those in MS,
ex post efficiency is not possible. The reason is as follows: A pair of coarse partitions
requires that at least one player will receive a coarse signal with positive probability.
Then, for a T -feasible mechanism, there exists an event such that either (i) the mechanism
requires no trade while trade is efficient, or (ii) the mechanism requires trade while no
trade is efficient. In other words, any pair of coarser partitions aggregates information
inefficiently with positive probability.
Proposition 4.1: If T is a pair of monotone partitions, there does not exist a T -
feasible mechanism that is ex post efficient.
Proof. Consider at least player 1 has a coarser partition T1 with element E1 = [a1, b1] for
some a1 < b1. Let l be the unique line segment (E1 × [0, 1]) ∩ {v ∈ [0, 1]2 : v1 = v2} and
let [a2, b2] be its projection on T2. Then a2 = a1 and b2 = b1. Let A = [a1, b1]× [a2, b2].
For every E2 ∈ T2, the convexity of E2 implies that E2 is either a singleton or an interval
being closed, or open, or half open. Hence, E2 is measurable. We have two cases.
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Case 1. There exists an element E2 ∈ T2 such that p(([0, 1]×E2)∩A) > 0, where p is
the Lebesgue measure in R2. Denote A2 = ([0, 1]×E2)∩A. Then, {v ∈ [0, 1]2 : v1 = v2}
separates A2 into A21 = {v ∈ A2 : v2 > v1} and A22 = {v ∈ A2 : v2 < v1}, with
p(A21) > 0, and p(A22) > 0. On the other hand, an allocation rule q(t1, ·) must be
measurable with respect to T2, for all t1 ∈ T1. So, the decision q is constant on E1×E2,
which implies q is constant on A2, or q(A21) = q(A22). This contradicts to ex post
efficient q∗(A21) = 1 6= 0 = q∗(A22).
Case 2. For each element E2 ∈ T2, p(([0, 1]×E2)∩A) = 0. For every E2∩ [a2, b2] 6= ∅,
E2 ∩ [a2, b2] is a singleton. Then player 2 must perfectly observe v2 for some [c2, d2] ⊂
(a2, b2), c2 < d2. Ex post efficiency requires q([a1, b1], v2) ∈ {0, 1} for all v2 ∈ [c2, d2].
Then, there exists B2 ⊆ [c2, d2] such that q([a1, b1], v2) = χB2(v2) for all v2 ∈ [c2, d2].
Since q([a1, b1], ·) is Lebesgue measurable on [c2, d2], B2 is a measurable subset. Let
A2 = [a1, b1]×B2.
If p(A2) > 0. then {v ∈ [0, 1]2 : v1 = v2} separates A2 into A21 = {v ∈ A2 : v2 > v1}
and A22 = {v ∈ A2 : v2 < v1}, with p(A21) > 0, p(A22) > 0. A similar analysis as Case
1 implies inefficiency occurs with positive probability.
If p(A2) = 0, then C2 = [a1, b1]× ([c2, d2] \B2) satisfies p(C2) > 0. A similar analysis
as before implies inefficiency occurs with positive probability.
Finally, for an element with half-open or open intervals of T1, the analysis is similar
to the closed interval case above, since they differ only in zero measure events. 
Proposition 4.2 below is the main result of this chapter.
Proposition 4.2: Assume ṽ1, ṽ2 ∼ U [0, 1]. There exists a pair of partitions T and
a T -feasible mechanism (q,m) that yields a higher ex ante trading surplus than the MS
ex ante efficient mechanism.
Proof. We provide an example of such an information structure and the corresponding
mechanism. Let y = 0.166 and z = 0.606. Consider a pair of finite monotone partitions
T = (T1, T2) given by
T1 = {[0, y], (y, z], (z, 1]} and T2 = {[0, 1− z], (1− z, 1− y], (1− y, 1]}.
We denote these elements of partitions (or types) by ti, t̂i, ti for i = 1, 2. For this T ,
we define the mechanism (q,m) as follows.
The allocation rule q is given by Figure 4.1a). The horizontal axis is the seller’s value
and the vertical axis is the buyer’s value. By construction, the lowest type of the seller
(and the highest type of the buyer) always trade. The highest type of the seller (and the
lowest type of the buyer) trade with a strictly positive probability.
The payment rule m is given by Figure 4.1b). Let x = 0.197. The payment rule
requires: (i) In case of trade and the report profile is not (t1, t2) or (t1, t2), the buyer
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pays the seller 1/2. (ii) In case of trade and the report profile is (t1, t2), then the buyer
pays the seller x; if the report profile is (t1, t2), then the buyer pays the seller 1− x. (iii)


























b) Payment rule m
Figure 4.1
It is easy to check that such a mechanism is T -feasible. The ex ante trading surplus
from this scheme is 0.159.1 The efficiency loss is 4.6% and the probability of no trade is
51%. 
The driving forces for this result are as follows. First, note that such a mechanism
(q,m) is not T -feasible, because in that case, the individual rationality condition for the
seller with v1 = z is violated, or
−y + y(1− x) < 0. (4.3.1)
For the partitions T , this condition is replaced by
−yE(ṽ1|(z, 1]) + y(1− x) ≥ 0. (4.3.2)
Hence, a coarser partition relaxes the individual rationality constraint for the seller with
higher values. Instead of perfectly observing his value and opting out with probability
one, the seller with a value in [z, 1] is only informed his conditional expected value, hence
he has more incentive to participate. A similar analysis applies to the buyer.













(z2 − y2)z − 1
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Second, for the partitions in MS, the incentive compatibility condition for the seller
with v1 = z is given by
−z · z + z1
2
≥ −y · z + y(1− x). (4.3.3)
For the partitions T , this condition is replaced by
−zE(ṽ1|(y, z]) + z
1
2
≥ −yE(ṽ1|(y, z]) + y(1− x). (4.3.4)
A coarser partition relaxes the incentive constraint for the seller with a value equal to z
and thus also for the seller with a value lower than z. A similar analysis applies to the
buyer.
Hence, T generates new utility allocations that are not attainable under T . On
the other hand, T eliminates some utility allocations that were attainable under T . The
players must bear some losses in the ex ante trading surplus from aggregating information
imprecisely. These two effects finally determine the gains in the ex ante trading surplus
from a coarser information structure.
4.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that the original information partition in MS is not the optimal
information partition that maximizes the ex ante trading surplus. With uniform priors,
we construct a pair of coarser partitions and a feasible mechanism that outperforms the
ex ante efficient solution of the MS information partition.
The main message is that if the mechanism designer can control the information
structure of the players2, the original information partition from MS will not arise. The
result has implications in practice. Firstly, there are many situations such that a player
has only access to coarse information about his own preferences. For a one-to-one match-
ing market, the value from matching a partner will be fully revealed after a match. For
experience goods, a buyer usually has a rough idea about the consumption experience
at the time of purchase. Secondly, some intermediaries indeed have some control over
players’ information. Two-sided platforms, such as B2C platforms and dating websites,
provide users access to a substantial number of opportunities in which they are inter-
ested. Before matching with their trading partners, a buyer has to decide how much and
what to search about his value for the good, and a seller has to decide how much to learn
about his outside option. For an isolated pair of partners, the profit-maximizing platform
may concern whether the existing trading partners benefit from coarser information on
2Hurkens and Vulkan (2006) shows that games with exogenous information structures that have a
unique Nash equilibrium are robust to endogenization of the information structures. Hence, such games
can be analyzed using an exogenous information structure even when they in fact describe economic
situations where information gathering seems natural.
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their matching values and outside options.3
It remains to be investigated whether coarsening the partition of only one player can
improve efficiency. For one-side uncertainty on the buyer’s value, the answer is no. An
ex post efficient mechanism exists in the case that the buyer perfectly knows his value4
but not in the case with coarse partitions.
Finally, we notice that in contrast to the MS environment, in the auction environment
of Myerson (1981), coarser information always reduces ex ante efficiency. It is because
misallocation of the object must occur with positive probability under coarser partitions.
A natural question then arises: Start from the players perfectly knowing their private
values and consider a pair of coarser partitions, is the result in this chapter specific for the
bargaining problem of the MS? Does it remain true for other classes of mechanism design
problems than MS? Characterization of all classes of such problems is an interesting
question and left for future work.
3Hagiu and Jullien (2011) studies how intermediaries can use information on consumers characteris-
tics in order to affect matching between firms and consumers. They study the sources of an intermedi-
ary’s incentives not to optimize the search process by which consumers find the stores (sellers) that the
intermediary provides access to.
4For illustration, assume v1 = a ∈ (0, 1) and ṽ2 ∼ U [0, 1], ex post efficiency requires the seller posts
a price a and the buyer accepts or rejects such a price.
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Bounds on Revenue of Auctions with Two
Complements and Resale
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a seller’s revenue maximization problem with two comple-
mentary objects, for example, spectrum licenses. In practice, large companies might
value multiple licenses to serve large geographical locations more than the sum of the
values of the separate licenses because the marginal cost of serving a larger area can
be lower. The auctions widely used by the governments, e.g. simultaneous ascending
auctions (SAA),1 may suffer from an exposure problem: Bidders face the risk of paying
too much for part of a package of licenses when the rest of the package is won by other
bidders. The exposure problem2 generates inefficient outcomes.3 For illustration, con-
sider a seller who wants to allocate two licenses A and B efficiently. Bidder 1 values the
packages (A,B,AB) as complements, (1, 2, 6), while bidder 2 values them as substitutes,
(4, 4, 4). In an SAA, bidder 2 demands at least one unit until the prices reach (4, 4). But
then bidder 1 would better not win AB at such prices.
Inefficient initial allocation of spectrum resources introduces resale opportunities. A
private seller may organize his own auction to sell its spectrum holdings. Unlike the
auctioning of government-owned assets, revenue maximization, rather than efficiency, is
a private seller’s objective. In this case, a revenue-maximizing auction (Myerson, 1981)
may lead to splitting licenses among buyers inefficiently and neither buyer obtains the
synergy. A natural question then is: Given a resale market among the buyers, can the
initial seller obtain the revenue that he could get if such resale would be banned?
1Vickrey auctions are often considered as a means of efficiently allocating spectrums. However, due
to its complexity of pricing rule and other several drawbacks (Milgrom, 2004), it is rarely observed in
practice.
2Szentes and Rosenthal (2003) mentions various measures used to soften exposure problems: in
spectrum auctions the simultaneous designs typically involve ascending prices, which allow bidders time
to assess gradually the likelihood of successfully acquiring various combinations of spectrum blocks; and
provisions for bid withdrawals are often included.
3Consider the Netherlands DCS-1800 auction in 1998. Eighteen lots were offered for sale. Two of
the lots were designed to be large enough that a new entrant could use them to establish a new wireless
telephone business. Alternatively, a new entrant who acquired perhaps four or six small licenses could
combine them to support entry. The smaller licenses would therefore likely be complements for the new
entrants, but substitutes for the incumbents. Finally, the final prices per unit of bandwidth for the two
large lots were more than twice as high as for any of the sixteen smaller lots. The entrants, willing to
pay high prices for large spectrums, were reluctant to bid for small spectrums.
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While resale can restore full efficiency when there are no market frictions, Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that, if resale takes place under incomplete information
and players’ beliefs have overlapping supports, then no resale mechanism can produce the
efficient outcome. Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987), on the other hand, shows
that if players have relatively symmetric ownerships, then efficient resale is possible. In
this chapter, we investigate a resale market with possibly symmetric ownerships and
study its effects on the seller’s revenue.
To motivate our model, consider the following example. Assume that the seller
has two identical objects which he himself does not value. Buyer i = 1, 2 attaches a
value equal to i for a single unit, and this is common knowledge. While buyer 1 has
additive values for the units, buyer 2 values the units as complements with his value
of the bundle being t̃2, which is uniformly distributed on [4, 6]. If resale is impossible,
Myerson’s optimal auction asks buyer 2 to report a price and the bundle is allocated to
this buyer if the reported price is higher than 4.5. Otherwise, the seller splits the units
between the buyers at prices equal to the single unit values, so 1 and 2. Hence, the
maximal expected revenue is 4.125.
Now assume that buyer 1 can sell his unit to buyer 2 after the seller’s auction. To
implement the expected revenue 4.125, the adjustment to Myerson’s auction is simple:
The seller splits the units with a price of 2 to buyer 2 and a price of 2.125 to buyer 1.
Since there is no new information, buyer 1 will resell his unit to the other at a price
equal to 2.5. Buyer 2 accepts if t2 − 2.5 ≥ 2. The cutoff value in allocation is exactly
4.5. Notice that buyer 1 receives a total utility of zero since the trading surplus and
the utilities of seller and buyer 2 are the same as before.4 The example illustrates that
the Myerson revenue is implementable if one buyer has additive values with complete
information and the other has complementary values, given a monopoly resale market.
But what would happen if buyer 1 also has complementary values for units?
To answer this question, we consider a two-buyer two-object environment in which
the buyers have one-dimensional private information on the bundle. The Vickrey auction
allocates the bundle to one of the two buyers ex post efficiently and serves as a lower
bound for the seller’s revenue. The Myerson auction splits licenses among the buyers
with positive probability. We assume fully transparent auction outcomes, i.e. both
the bids and the allocation of the objects are announced publicly. At the resale stage,
a mediator offers a resale mechanism that maximizes the surplus of the initial buyers
given the auction outcome. We find that the Myerson revenue is unattainable and the
maximal revenue is bounded above by the revenue from a modified Myerson auction
(MMA). This auction requires selling the bundle with personalized reserve prices and
the seller withholding one object in case the reserve prices are not met.
4Alternatively, with probability 1/4, buyer 1 does not sell the object and loses 9/8, and with proba-
bility 3/4, he sells and gains 3/8.
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Several papers discuss single object auctions followed by resale under complete infor-
mation. For asymmetric independent private values (IPV) bidders, Gupta and Lebrun
(1999) shows that revenue ranking between the first and second price auctions depends
on how the surplus is divided in the resale market. Haile (2003) considers a model
with bidders having only noisy information regarding their true values, which are re-
vealed to them only after the auction. There is again no general revenue ranking. A
second strand of literature investigates single object auctions followed by resale under
uncertainty. Ausubel and Cramton (1999) introduces the concept of “perfect resale”, by
assuming that all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. They characterize the optimal
auction with perfect resale and IPV bidders, and find that it is optimal to assign goods
to those with the highest values. Their result continues to hold in the multi-unit case.
Hafalir and Krishna (2008) investigates the first price auction with resale for asymmetric
IPV bidders, where the winner can resell the object to the loser through a monopoly
offer. They find that the outcome of this game yields a higher seller’s revenue than the
efficient outcome in the second price auction.
Zheng (2002) is the first paper to consider optimal sale of one object with resale and
without any restrictions on the number of periods, i.e. the current owner in each round
can choose the current auction and cannot control future resale. The paper shows that
under some conditions the seller can still achieve the Myerson revenue. Zhang and Wang
(2015) considers one regular buyer with private values and one publicly known value
buyer, with resale structured by a stochastic ultimatum game where the probabilities of
being the proposer determines the buyers’ bargaining powers. They find that the seller’s
revenue is increasing in the publicly known value buyer’s bargaining power in the resale
market. Myerson revenue is attainable only if this buyer has full bargaining power.
There are only a few papers that discuss auctioning complementary objects with
resale.5 In a framework introduced by Leufkens, Peeters, and Vermeulen (2006), Xu,
Levin, and Ye (2015) studies sequential second price auctions followed by resale for two
complements and two bidders. Very different from our setting, they assume that no
bidder knows his valuation for the second object during the first auction, while it is
common knowledge that winning the first auction increases this valuation by a factor.
They find that if the loser of the first item makes an offer to the winner, a monotone
equilibrium exists and the expected revenue to the seller can either increase or decrease
5For multi-unit auctions without resale, Ausubel and Cramton (1998) observes that bidders may
have an incentive to reduce demand, i.e., to bid for fewer units than they actually want, in order to
pay a lower price for the objects they do win. Bukhchandani and Huang (1989) analyzes a multi-unit
discriminatory or uniform price auction with common values and resale. They examine the information
linkage between auction and resale through announced bids. Hafalir and Kurnaz (2015) considers multi-
unit discriminatory auctions with resale where symmetric IPV bidders have single-unit demands. When
the winner (which turns out to be unique in a symmetric equilibrium) uses the optimal mechanism in
the resale stage, there may not exist a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two
units.
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with resale.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we investigate
the optimal auction with two complements and one-dimensional private values, where
inefficient splits open the possibility of resale. Compared to previous works, we introduce
an extreme resale procedure: a centralized market in which the third party organizes
resale mechanisms for the buyers. Second, this chapter establishes the impossibility of
obtaining the Myerson revenue. In contrast to single object models, we find that the
two-object models make the rule of selecting the re-seller after splits a crucial modeling
assumption. Since there is no natural generalization of the winner’s optimal mechanism
to two-object case, we conjecture that unattainability of the Myerson revenue remains
to hold for other reasonable resale markets, which might indicate an intrinsic difference
between one and two object environments.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the model. Section 5.3
introduces the Vickrey and Myerson auctions. Section 5.4 investigates resale games. It
provides the solution to the mediator’s problem and the solution to the seller’s problem.
Theorem 5.1 is the main result of this chapter. Section 5.5 discusses some other resale
market. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2. Model
The seller has two identical units for sale, to which he attaches value 0. There are two
(initial) buyers. Each buyer i = 1, 2 has a value of ai for a single unit and a value
ti ∈ [ti, ti] for the bundle. We assume that the values a1 and a2 are commonly known
with 0 < a1 < a2, and that ti is private information of buyer i. We assume t̃i, i = 1, 2, are
independently distributed according to Fi with absolutely continuous density fi > 0 on
[ti, ti]. Denote Ti = [ti, ti] and T = T1×T2. We assume Fi is regular: Ji(ti) = ti−
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
is strictly increasing in ti. We also assume the following support condition throughout.
Assumption 5.1: t1 > a1 + a2 and t2 > 2a2.
This condition states that bundling is always more efficient than splitting the objects
among the buyers. If the condition is not satisfied, then a buyer who obtains the bundle
may find it profitable to resell one unit to the other buyer. Assumption 5.1 is stronger
than that each buyer values two units as complements.6 Denote a12 = a1 + a2.
Let D0 = {0, 01, 02, 1, 2, s} be the set of all partitions of the objects, i.e. either the
seller keeps both objects (d = 0), or the seller splits with buyer i (d = 0i), or one buyer
gets the bundle (d = i), or the buyers split the objects (d = s).
6If buyer 1 only has small complementarity, or t1 ∈ [2a1, a1 + a2), then our main result (Theorem
5.1) may not hold. We further discuss this point after Theorem 5.1.
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Assumption 5.2: The seller can commit to not resell any unit after the initial sale.
The assumption is strong since if the seller himself initially withholds some unit(s),
he has an incentive to resell.7 So we assume that the resale takes place only among the
buyers. If Assumption 5.2 holds, then d = 0 and 01 are redundant, i.e. 0 and 01 are
chosen with zero probability by a revenue-maximizing seller. This is because 0 and 01
are always dominated by 02 for the seller’s revenue, and since the seller can implement
02 whenever he wants. Hence, throughout this chapter, we restrict our attention to
D1 = {02, 1, 2, s}.
For the seller, a direct mechanism (auction) is given by (q,m) : T → ∆(D1)×R2. The
allocation rule q contains the allocation of objects among the players for each reporting
profile, and the payment rule m = (m1,m2) specifies the payments from the buyers to the
seller for each reporting profile. Denote by ∆(Ti) the set of all probability distributions
on Ti. A behavioral reporting strategy for buyer i is given by σi : Ti → ∆(Ti) satisfying´
Ti
σi(t̂i|ti)dt̂i = 1, for all ti. Here σi(ti) can be degenerate with one or more mass points
and the integral abuses notation.8
Definition 5.1: An auction (q,m) is BNE-feasible, if it has at least one BNE.
Denote M0 the set of BNE-feasible auctions and denote A0 = {q : (q,m) ∈ M0} the
set of BNE-feasible allocation rules, which consists of final allocation rules that the seller
can implement if resale between the players would be forbidden.
5.3. The Vickrey and Myerson Auctions
From Assumption 5.1, the ex post efficient allocation rule qe requires that for all t ∈ T ,
if ti > tj, then buyer i obtains the bundle and ties are broken randomly fairly. Any
splitting or withholding is inefficient. In this setting, the Vickrey auction is simple: the
buyers simultaneously report their values for the bundle and if ti > tj, then buyer i wins
the bundle and pays tj to the seller. The truthful equilibrium of the Vickrey auction
provides a lower bound on the seller’s revenue.9
7In two period models without discounting, we may assume that if resale is between the seller and
the initial buyers and only the seller can sell, then further resale among the initial buyers are impossible.
If the seller cannot commit to not resell, then the seller can simply wait until the second period and then
sell both units. If the seller is further assumed to have to sell at least one unit in the first period, then
after selling one unit, given Assumption 5.1, selling the additional unit to the winner maximizes the
seller’s revenue. In the final allocation, the seller’s withholding one unit is implemented with probability
0 but the buyers’ splits can be implemented with a positive probability. Whether the seller’s revenue is
higher or lower than that in Theorem 5.1 is ambiguous.
8Instead of restricting buyers’ action sets to type sets, the seller may allow buyer i to choose actions
from some abstract set Ai where T ⊆ Ai. However, given our assumption on the disclosure rule, using
other action sets does not expand the seller’s implementable outcomes. This is because if players ran-
domize over actions in equilibrium, the seller can incorporate such randomization and offer an outcome
equivalent direct mechanism. It is unclear whether the claim generalizes to other disclosure rules.
9When resale is possible, truthful reporting may no longer be a dominant strategy equilibrium action.
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The Myerson auction (MA) is defined as the incentive compatible and individually
rational auction that maximizes the seller’s revenue, when resale (by the seller and among
the buyers) is forbidden. The allocation rule from the MA is the Myerson allocation rule.
Denote by R0 the revenue from the MA.
In the remainder of the chapter, we assume the following,
Assumption 5.3: Ji(ti) = ti − 1fi(ti) < a12, i = 1, 2.
This assumption requires that Ji(ti) is not too large such that the virtual valuation
of the bundle for a buyer with the lowest type falls below the virtual valuation of splits
(e.g. a12).
10 For Ji strictly increasing and Ji(ti) > a12, there is a unique x
∗
i ∈ (ti, ti) such
that Ji(x
∗
i ) = a12.
Proposition 5.1: The Myerson auction (q∗,m∗) is given by11
q∗(t) =
{
δi if Ji(ti) > max{Jj(tj), a12},
δs if a12 > maxi Ji(ti),
and for i = 1, 2,
m∗i (t) = tiq
∗





q∗i (tj, xi)dxi. (5.3.1)
Proof. See Appendix 5.A. 
The Myerson auction requires that the seller never keeps an object. One source
of inefficiency is that the buyers split the two objects for some states. With positive
probability, the buyers’ values lie in the region where a12 > maxi J(ti) but maxi ti > a12.
The objects then fail to be allocated to the buyer with the higher complementarity.
Another source of inefficiency is that some buyer with a higher virtual value (rather
than true value) obtains the bundle. If beliefs are symmetric, i.e. F1 = F2, the second
inefficiency vanishes.
5.3.1. The Modified Myerson Auction
For the seller, a natural response to avoid resale after splits is to avoid splitting altogether.
We define the modified Myerson auction (MMA) as the auction that maximizes the
seller’s revenue given that splitting is chosen with probability zero. This auction will
play an important role for our analysis of resale. Denote
A1 = {q|q(t) ∈ ∆(D1), q(t) 6= ds for almost all t ∈ T}, (5.3.2)
10If Assumption 5.3 does not hold, i.e. if for at least one of the buyers the virtual value is always
higher than a12, the problem is trivial because the optimal auction always sells two units as a bundle.
11δd denotes that decision d is chosen with probability 1. δi denotes i 6= j being chosen with probability
1.
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and denote by R1 the maximal revenue from M1 = {(q,m) ∈M0|q ∈ A1}.
Proposition 5.2: The modified Myerson auction (q∗∗,m∗∗) is given by
(i) If maxi Ji(ti) < a2, then,
q∗∗(t) =
{
δi if Ji(ti) > max{Jj(tj), a2},
δ02 if a2 > maxi Ji(ti),
and
m∗∗i (t) = tiq
∗∗





q∗∗i (xi, tj)dxi. (5.3.3)
(ii) If maxi Ji(ti) > a2, then,
q∗∗(t) = δi if Ji(ti) > Jj(tj),
and





q∗∗i (xi, tj)dxi. (5.3.4)
The revenue from the MMA is strictly lower than that from the MA, i.e. R1 < R0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A. 
In Proposition 5.2 (i), the MMA requires that the objects to be allocated the buyer
with the highest virtual valuation, given that the alternative of splits is eliminated. It
is implemented by a generalized second price auction for the bundle with reserve bid a2,
personalized reserve prices ri = J
−1
i (a2), i = 1, 2, and the following payment rule:
mi(b) =

J−1i (max{a2, bj}) if bi > max{a2, bj},
a2 if max{b1, b2} < a2 and i = 2,
0 otherwise.
The buyers bid their virtual valuations in equilibrium. In case of winning the bundle,
buyer i’s payment does not depend on his own bid and will be at least ri > ti. In case
no buyer bids above a2, the seller sells one object to buyer 2 for a price of a2. Thus, the
seller may withhold one unit with positive probability. In Proposition 5.2(ii), the lowest
virtual valuations of the bundle are sufficiently high and the modified Myerson auction
always sells both units. Note that the MMA is ex post efficient if beliefs are symmetric.
Compared to the MA, all types of the buyers in the MMA are weakly better off. This
is because q∗∗i (t) ≥ q∗i (t) for all t ∈ T and the lowest types always receive zero. Hence
for the buyers, the MMA interim Pareto dominates the MA. The seller is strictly worse
off. The effect on the social surplus is ambiguous.
Example 5.1: Suppose a1 = 1, a2 = 2, t̃1 ∼ U [4, 8], and t̃2 ∼ U [5, 9]. Then
J1(t1) = 2t1 − 8 and J2(t2) = 2t2 − 9. A1 holds since J1(4) < J2(5) < 3. Moreover,
max{J1(4), J2(5)} < 2, hence we are in case (i) of Proposition 5.2. The reserve prices
are given by r1 = 5 and r2 = 5.5.
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5.4. Resale
Now we are moving to the case with resale possibility. In case the seller splits with
buyer 2 (d = 02), given Assumption 5.2, no resale occurs. Hence, we restrict attention
to D = {1, 2, s}. To specify the degree of transparency after the auction, let Si be the
set of possible messages that the seller can send to buyer i. Throughout this chapter,
we assume high transparency of the auction outcome. That is, each buyer observes the
“bids” (or reports) as well as the decision. Since they know the payment rule, it is not
needed to tell them the payments. Formally, Si = T × D and ηi(t̂, d) = (t̂, d) for all t̂
and d. The information disclosure rule is given by η = (η1, η2). A system of posterior
beliefs µ = (µ1, µ2) is given by µi : T ×D → ∆(Tj), where µi is the belief of buyer i’s on
buyer j’s type given the reports and the decision.
The resale market is centralized and organized by a strategic mediator, whose ob-
jective is to maximize the total expected surplus of the buyers. We assume that this
mediator also observes the auction outcome. Hence, the mediator chooses the resale
procedure given the initial decision d and the belief system µ. While the mediator relies
on type reports in the seller’s auction to update beliefs, in the resale procedure, he “ask”
for type reports again.
A resale mechanism is given by (φ, p) : T → ∆(D)× R2, where the reallocation rule
φ assigns to each reporting profile a vector of reallocating probabilities of the objects,
and the payment rule p = (p1, p2) assigns to each reporting profile the payments from
the initial buyers to the mediator. Given such a resale mechanism, we assume that the
buyers participate in the resale voluntarily, and the buyers simultaneously make reports
to the mechanism, which determines the final allocation. The mediator runs no budget
deficit ex post and the buyers must balance the budget themselves.
5.4.1. Resale Games
Let the seller’s auction (q,m) ∈ M0 be given and consider the resale game G(q,m).
The timeline of this game is as follows. (i) The buyers make reports to the seller’s
auction. (ii) The outcome (t̂, d) is publicly announced. (iii) The mediator chooses a
resale mechanism. (iv) The buyers make reports to the mediator. (v) The reports
determine the final outcome.
Formally, a strategy α for the mediator specifies a resale mechanism α(h) for all
h = (t̂, d). For each buyer i = 1, 2, a strategy (σi, βi) specifies the first period reports
σi(hi) ∈ ∆(Ti) for all hi = ti and the second period reports βi(hi) ∈ ∆(Ti) for all
hi = (ti, t̂, d, (φ, p)).
Definition 5.2: Let (q,m) ∈ M0. A PBE of G(q,m) contains a strategy profile
e∗ = (σ∗, α∗, β∗) and a belief system µ∗ satisfying:
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(i) Given µ∗, every i and hi = (ti, t̂, d, (φ, p)),
β∗i (hi) ∈ argmax
si∈∆(Ti)
Ui(si|hi, µ∗). (5.4.1)





E[Ui(t̃i|h, (φ, p), µ∗, β∗], (5.4.2)
where Φ(h, µ∗) is the set of incentive compatible, individual rational and ex post balanced
budget resale mechanisms in the usual sense, and Ui(ti|h, (φ, p), µ∗, β∗) is the continuation
payoff of buyer i with type ti from (φ, p) assuming both buyers follow β
∗.
(iii) Given µ∗, α∗, β∗, every i and ti,
σ∗i (ti) ∈ argmax
si∈∆(Ti)
Ui(si|ti, µ∗, α∗, β∗). (5.4.3)
(iv) Given e∗ and every (t̂, d), F̃ := µ∗(t̂, d) satisfies the following requirements (1)-
(3):
(1) F̃ = (F̃1, F̃2) are statistically independent, where f̃i is the density (if any) of F̃i
supported by Ei and E = E1 × E2. This follows from the fact that σ∗ is independent.






(3) If t̂ is not in the support of σ∗, then the players must form beliefs after such
off-path histories. Any restriction on the beliefs does not affect our results, because our
analysis is based on the equilibrium paths and the results are robust to the specifications
of off-path beliefs.
Definition 5.3: Let (q,m) ∈M0. G(q,m) is feasible, if it has at least one PBE.
We say an auction (q,m) is feasible if G(q,m) is feasible and denote M the set of all
feasible auctions. For (q,m) ∈M , a final allocation rule generated by a PBE (e∗, µ∗) of
G(q,m) is given by o : T → ∆(D1). Note that M ⊆M0. For (q,m) ∈M , G(q,m) has a
BNE and hence it satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality associated
with the BNE-feasible auctions. On the other hand, some BNE-feasible auction with
resale may have no PBE. A direct consequence is that the maximal revenue with resale
is not higher than the maximal revenue without resale.
Finally, we introduce the notion of a resale-proof equilibrium for a given resale game.
Definition 5.4: Let G(q,m) be a feasible resale game. A PBE (e∗, µ∗) is resale-
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proof, if resale does not arise on any equilibrium path.
5.4.2. Optimal Resale Mechanisms
Let G(q,m) be a feasible resale game and let (e∗, µ∗) be a PBE of this game. We provide
a characterization of the solutions to the mediator’s problem for each equilibrium path
of this game. First note that due to the equilibrium play, the equilibrium beliefs may
be no longer regular: They can be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure or have atoms or a mixture of absolutely continuous parts and atoms. Also, the
supports may not be convex and virtual valuations may not be monotone.12 For these
cases, while complete characterization of the mediator’s solutions can be difficult, we can
obtain necessary conditions for the solutions.
A public history (t̂, d) is an equilibrium path, if e∗ induces (t̂, d) with positive prob-
ability. We first establish that if (t̂, s) is an equilibrium path, then irrespective of the
equilibrium beliefs F̃ , an ex post efficient, individually rational and balanced budget
resale mechanism exists. Since this mechanism yields the highest social surplus, α∗(t̂, s)
must be utility-equivalent to this efficient mechanism. In this case, splits are chosen with
zero probability.
To construct such a mechanism given F̃ and d = s, we introduce a class of modified
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (MVCG) mechanism, which requires the player with a higher
report obtains the bundle and for each reporting profile, a player pays the difference
between the expected VCG payments of the two players (up to a constant). In contrast
to VCG mechanisms, the class of MVCG mechanisms depends on the beliefs F̃ .
Let (qe, pv) be the VCG mechanism defined by the efficient allocation rule qe and the
payments from the buyers to the mediator,
pvi (t) = tj1{ti>tj} +
1
2
tj1{ti=tj}, for all t ∈ E, i = 1, 2. (5.4.6)
The interim expected payment from the VCG mechanism (qe, pv) is given by13
P vi (ti) =
ˆ
Ej
pvi (t)dF̃j(tj), for all ti ∈ Ei, i = 1, 2. (5.4.8)
12In non-absolutely continuous cases, F̃i can be decomposed into an absolutely continuous part G̃i(x)












13For beliefs not absolutely continuous, we have













i (ti, xjk). (5.4.7)
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The class of MVCG mechanisms {(qe, p∗(·|π))} is parameterized by the constants
π = (π1, π2), π1 + π2 = 0, with the payments given by
p∗i (t|π) = P vi (ti)− P vj (tj)− πj, for all t ∈ E, i = 1, 2. (5.4.9)
It is easy to see that an MVCG is ex post efficient, ex post budget balanced, and
incentive compatible. Following Krishna and Perry (2000) and Kos and Manea (2009), we
show that an individually rational MVCG mechanism exists, which implies the following
result.
Lemma 5.1: Let G(q,m) be a feasible resale game and let (e∗, µ∗) be a PBE. If (t̂, s)
is an equilibrium path, then α∗(t̂, s) implements splits with zero probability.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A. 
We now establish that for i = 1, 2, if (t̂, i) is an equilibrium path, then irrespective
of the equilibrium beliefs, the re-seller’s virtual cost (the re-seller’s inflated value of the
bundle due to incentive distortion) is always higher than the virtual valuation of splits.
Hence, any resale mechanism with the highest social surplus again requires splits to be
chosen with zero probability. α∗(t̂, i) must be utility-equivalent to such a mechanism.
Lemma 5.2: Let G(q,m) be a feasible resale game and let (e∗, µ∗) be a PBE. For i =
1, 2, if (t̂, i) is an equilibrium path, then α∗(t̂, i) implements splits with zero probability.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A. 
5.4.3. The Solution to The Seller’s Problem
We are able to establish the following impossibility result on the Myerson revenue. With
optimal resale mechanisms, the seller’s revenue is bounded above by the revenue from
the MMA in Proposition 5.2. If prior beliefs are symmetric, this bound is tight. If beliefs
are asymmetric, it is unclear whether the revenue can be strictly lower.
Theorem 5.1: Let R∗ be the maximal revenue from all feasible auctions.
(i) If F1 6= F2, then R∗ ≤ R1 < R0.
(ii) If F1 = F2, then R
∗ = R1 < R0.
Proof. (i) By Lemma 5.1 and 5.2, for any feasible resale game G(q,m) and its PBE
(e∗, µ∗), if (t̂, s) or (t̂, i) is an equilibrium path, then splits cannot arise with positive
probability in a final allocation on this path. Hence, the final allocation rule o must
satisfy o(t) 6= ds for almost all t ∈ T . Now, the set of feasible final allocation rules, or
A = {o|o is generated by a feasible G(q,m) with some PBE (e∗, µ∗)} (5.4.10)
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is a subset of A1 in (5.3.2). Moreover, besides the incentive compatibility and the indi-
vidual rationality associated with the static mechanisms, a PBE of a feasible resale game
requires sequential rationality constraints at the resale stage.
Recall that R1 is the maximal revenue from {(q,m) ∈M0|q ∈ A1}. Then the revenue
ranking R∗ ≤ R1 holds, because A ⊆ A1 and the seller’s revenues are the same for the
two allocation rules o ∈ A and q ∈ A1 satisfying o = q while leaving ti, i = 1, 2, the
same expected utilities. The proof is complete if R1 < R0, which has been proven in
Proposition 5.2.
(ii) If F1 = F2, then consider the MMA as the seller’s auction. Truthful reports are
part of a resale-proof equilibrium: For every equilibrium path (t̂, i), the mediator puts
probability one on t̂i > t̂j. For every off-equilibrium path (t̂, d), the mediator may again
put probability one on t̂i > t̂j. Hence, for all public histories, no resale mechanism will
be offered. Hence, R∗ = R1. 
Proposition 5.3: Let the MMA be the seller’s auction.
(i) If F1 6= F2, then truthful reports are not part of a resale-proof equilibrium.
(ii) If F1 = F2, then truthful reports are part of a resale-proof equilibrium.
Proof. (i) Suppose truthful reports are part of a resale-proof equilibrium. F1 6= F2
implies that there exists at least one i such that on the equilibrium path (t̂, i), t̂j > t̂i
occurs with positive probability. The mediator puts mass point on t̂. An optimal resale
mechanism sets a constant trading price between t̂j and t̂i, independent of reports. Both
players will accept this price and the resale occurs, which contradicts to resale-proofness.
(ii) has been shown by Theorem 5.1(ii). 
The result in Proposition 5.3(i) does not rule out the possibility that the MMA has
some untruthful reporting equilibrium that implements R1.
If beliefs are symmetric, the MMA is a solution to the seller’s problem while there
exist other auctions that yield the same revenue. For example, we may define a second
price auction for the bundle with some reserve price. If both bids are below the reserve,
then sell one object to buyer 2 at price a2. The advantage of this auction is that for any
beliefs, its truthful equilibrium is resale-proof.14
Theorem 5.1 may not hold if t1 > a12 is replaced by 2a1 < t1 < a12. In this
case, on the equilibrium path after buyer i obtains the bundle, splits may have the
highest virtual valuation for some type profiles. The mediator may implement splits
with positive probability. On the other hand, the optimal resale mechanism may remove
some inefficiency. In this case, whether the Myerson revenue is attainable is unclear.
14However, such truthful equilibrium must yield a revenue lower than R1. Similar to the MMA, it




5.5. Other Resale Market
Theorem 5.1 depends on the assumptions that (i) the buyers have symmetric bargaining
powers15 and (ii) they move simultaneously at the resale stage. In this case, Theorem
5.1 shows that the seller’s revenue is strictly lower than the Myerson revenue. In this
section, we show that this result is not specific for sequentially optimal centralized resale
markets. Other resale markets with simultaneous moves may lead to multiple equilibrium
outcomes, with some of them having low revenue for the seller.
In order to focus on the inefficiency caused by splits and characterize the equilibria
explicitly, we assume that the buyers have symmetric prior beliefs F1 = F2 = F on [t, t]
in the remainder of this section. Denote Re the revenue from the truthful BNE of the
Vickrey auction. Without resale possibility, the seller can guarantee Re by running either
one of the following auctions:
(FPA) If buyer i bids above the reserve price r = t and is the high bidder, he wins
the bundle and pays his own bid. If no buyer meets the reserve, the seller withholds
both objects.16
(MFPA) If buyer i bids above the reserve price r = t and is the high bidder, he wins
the bundle and pays his own bid. If no buyer meets the reserve, the buyers split the
objects with the prices equal to (a1, a2).
Now suppose the resale market is organized by the McAfee bidding procedure (M)
introduced in McAfee (1992). At d = i, the re-seller i sets an ultimatum price for the
bundle. At d = s, the two buyers simultaneously submit their bids for buying the other’s
unit, i.e. [0,∞). The high bidder wins the other’s unit and pays his own bid to the other
bidder. Ties are broken randomly.
We observe that compared to FPA, allowing the possibility of splits in MFPA intro-
duces multiple equilibria and a possibly lower revenue than Re. We mention the following
result without proof.











(i) In FPA-M, there exists a resale-proof and efficient equilibrium outcome in which
both buyers bid for the bundle as in a single object first price auction. The seller’s
revenue is R2.
(ii) In MFPA-M, the resale-proof outcome of FPA-M remains an equilibrium out-
15That is, the buyers’ welfare weights are equal in the mediator’s problem. It remains to be investi-
gated whether the seller obtains a higher or lower revenue if the buyers’ weights are asymmetric.
16For simplicity, we assume that the bid is 0 when it is below the reserve.
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come. Moreover, there exists another efficient equilibrium outcome in which both buyers
always bid below the reserve and split. The resale is efficient. The seller’s revenue is a12.
Hence, the efficient allocation can be implemented both without equilibrium resale
and with equilibrium resale. The efficient allocation does not have to be implemented
with zero probability of resale. For single unit auctions, we are not aware of any similar
results.
The multiplicity of efficient equilibria suggests a coordination problem between the
buyers.17 For the buyers, the low revenue outcome interim Pareto dominates the resale-
proof outcome. That is, all types of the buyers are better off in the low revenue outcome
at the beginning of the seller’s auction. Hence, the low revenue outcome is more likely
to be played by the buyers. For the seller that maximizes the revenue given efficiency,
eliminating splits from the set of decision options avoids the multiplicity and guarantees
the efficient revenue.18
It is worth to note that Assumption 5.1 implies that splits are always inefficient and
there is no reason for the seller to allow splits in the first place. However, consider
an alternative environment where splitting is efficient for some valuation profiles, for
example,
t < a12 < t+ ε for some ε > 0 small.
In this environment, an efficient allocation requires some splits for the lower values. We
find that the previous analysis remains true. For such a case, completely eliminating
splits has a second-order loss in the efficiency but a first-order gain in the revenue.19
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the optimal selling procedure for two complementary
objects, when inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. We assume that the buyers have
independent private values on the bundle and that one buyer acquiring the bundle is
efficient. Assuming that the auction bids and the allocation of objects are publicly
observable, we discuss the seller’s attainable revenue, assuming that a mediator chooses
17McAfee and McMillan (1992) note that in practice a bidding ring’s own “knockout auction” often
happens after rather than before the legitimate auction. Garratt, Troger and Zheng (2009) construct
a family of non-value-bidding equilibria for an English auction that allows inter-bidder resale, for inde-
pendent private value environments.
18Notice that the multiplicity of equilibria does not only arise for this resale game but it may arise
in any of feasible resale games. If the seller’s move is taken into account, then the equilibria must be
selected in a way that maximizes the seller’s revenue to ensure the equilibrium existence.
19Consider the seller runs FPA with r = a12, or (ii) MFPA with r = a12. For some parameters, the
game MFPA-M has multiple equilibrium outcomes. It is also unclear whether the seller can eliminate
the multiple outcomes without eliminating splits.
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a resale procedure that maximizes the buyers’ surplus.
We characterize the modified Myerson auction (MMA) that completely eliminates
splits, which is a natural response to prevent resale. It requires selling the bundle with
two personalized reserve prices, and selling one object to the buyer with the higher single
unit value in case no buyer bids above his reserve price. We show that, in case of resale,
the Myerson revenue is unattainable, and the maximal revenue is bounded above by the
revenue from the modified Myerson auction. Hence, this chapter provides an example of
resale markets where symmetric bargaining powers of buyers and simultaneous bidding
in the resale market are conducive to a low revenue at the auction stage.
This chapter is related to Ausubel and Cramton (1999), which characterizes the
optimal mechanisms when the resale market is perfect in the sense that any inefficiency
will be corrected in the resale market. Given such a perfect resale market, they find that
the seller should induce an efficient allocation directly in the initial market. In contrast,
our impossibility result on the Myerson revenue does not rely on a resale market to be ex
post efficient. Instead, we find that if the inefficiency of a social alternative is commonly
known by the resale participants and their bargaining powers are symmetric, then it will
be corrected. In case of optimal resale mechanisms, a perfect resale market followed by
splits exists and is implemented by a modified VCG mechanism.
Many interesting points have not been discussed in this chapter. We assume that the
level of post-auction transparency is given rather than being chosen by the seller. Hence,
our model provides a lower bound for the seller’s performance. With moderate degrees
of transparency, each buyer observes the outcome of the initial allocation, his own bid,
and payment. In this case, post-auction beliefs are no longer common knowledge and the
mediator may even require players to report their beliefs. With a minimal transparency,
we have private winners and payments, where each buyer observes his own bid, his own
winner identity and payment. In this case, there is no public history for the players to
coordinate and organize the resale followed by splits. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) studies
revenue maximizing auctions with resale and allows the seller to disclose information to
the re-seller. They find that it is impossible to maximize revenue with a deterministic
selling procedure (also see Bergemann and Pavan (2015) for a survey). We leave these
cases for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let (q,m) ∈M0 and Ui(t̂i; ti) = (Q0i(t̂i)+Qs(t̂i))ai+Qi(t̂i)ti−
M̄i(t̂i), where Qd is the expected probability that d is chosen, and M̄i is the expected
payment for buyer i = 1, 2. As Lemma 5.2 in Myerson (1981), (q,m) is incentive com-




The interim expected payment of buyer i is given by




The expected revenue for the seller,
∑





where the sum of buyers’ virtual valuations v(d, t) for d ∈ D0 is given by
v(0, t) = 0, v(0i, t) = ai, v(s, t) = a12, v(i, t) = Ji(ti), for all t ∈ T . (5.A.3)
Setting Ui(ti) = 0, i = 1, 2, leaves no rent for the buyers with the lowest types. The
maximization requires the objects to be allocated in a way that pointwise maximizes the
sum of buyers’ virtual valuations. Because Ji, i = 1, 2 is regular, it follows that q
∗
i (t) is
nondecreasing in ti for all tj ∈ Tj. Now Q∗i is nondecreasing implies q∗ is indeed incentive
compatible. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. The seller’s problem is similar to Proposition 5.1 except d = s
is eliminated. Then d = 02, which was dominated by d = s, now may have the highest
sum of virtual valuations, i.e. a2 among all decisions for some t ∈ T . In either case (i)
or (ii), q∗∗i is nondecreasing in ti for all tj ∈ Tj. Hence q∗∗ is incentive compatible. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. (qe, pv) is efficient and dominant strategy incentive compatible.




i (t) = maxi ti− a12 ≥ 0, for all t ∈ E. Thus, this mechanism




pvi (t̃)]− a12 ≥ 0. (5.A.4)
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Then, if F̃ is absolutely continuous or discrete, by Theorem 2 of Krishna and Perry (2000)
and Theorem 5.1 of Kos and Manea (2009), there exists an efficient and individually
rational mechanism that balances the budget. Now suppose F̃i is general. Consider
the modified VCG mechanisms (qe, p∗(·|π)) parameterized by π = (π1, π2) satisfying
π1 + π2 = 0.
The interim pavements for pv and p∗(·|π) differ up to constants and thus (qe, p∗(·|π))
is incentive compatible as well. Also, (qe, p∗(·|π)) is balanced budget. Finally, because
(qe, pv) runs an ex ante surplus, there exists (π∗1, π
∗
2) such that
E[P ∗j (t̃j|π∗)] + π∗j ≥ ai, for j = 1, 2. (5.A.5)
Hence (qe, p∗(·|π∗)) is also individually rational. 
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Denote ci = inf{ti : F̃i(ti) > 0} and ci = sup{ti : F̃i(ti) < 1} and
similarly for j. If the gains from resale are common knowledge, i.e. cj > ci, then the
problem is simple, i.e. the players trade at a price equal to (cj − ci)/2. We focus on the
case with no common known gains from resale.
i. Suppose F̃i is absolutely continuous on [ci, ci] and f̃i > 0, and this also holds for
j. The mediator’s problem is similar to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). For any
incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced (φ, p) ∈ Φ(t̂, i, µ∗), by
the envelope theorem Ui(ti) = Ui(ci) +
´ ci
ti




where Ψi,Ψj are the expected probabilities of resale. Then (φ, p) is individually rational
if and only if20
Ui(ci) + Uj(cj) ≥ a12. (5.A.6)





t1φ1(t) + t2φ2(t) + a12φs(t)dF̃ (t). (5.A.7)
By the ex post balanced budget, the sum of ex ante expected payments,
∑
iE[Pi(t̃i)], is
zero, and we have





ṽ(d, t)φd(t)dF̃ (t), (5.A.8)
where
ṽ(i, t) = ti +
F̃i(ti)
f̃i(ti)
, ṽ(j, t) = tj −
1− F̃j(tj)
f̃j(tj)
, ṽ(s, t) = a12, (5.A.9)
20Notice that Ui(ti)− ti is decreasing in ti and Uj(tj)− aj is increasing in tj . Hence, the individual
rationality condition for ti = ci and tj = cj implies the condition holds strictly for other types.
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for all t ∈ E. Combine with ps(t) = 1−
∑
i pi(t) for all t ∈ E, we rewrite (5.A.6) as
ˆ
E
[ṽ(i, t)− a12]φi(t) + [ṽ(j, t)− a12]φj(t)dF̃ (t) ≥ 0. (5.A.10)














− a12]φj(t)dF̃ (t) + a12.
(5.A.11)
For ti > a12, at least buyer i (the re-seller) has a virtual cost always higher than the
virtual valuation of splits, or





− a12 > 0, (5.A.12)
for all ti ∈ Ei.
Following Myerson (1981), let h̃i(x) = J̃(F̃
−1




convex hull of H̃i is given by
G̃i(x) = min{wH̃i(x1)+(1−w)H̃i(x2) : w, x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1], wx1+(1−w)x2 = x}, (5.A.13)
with derivative g̃i(x) = G̃
′
i(x). The ironed virtual cost is defined by J̄i(ti) = g̃(F̃i(ti)). We
have two cases: (i) J̃i(ti) is nondecreasing on [ci, ci + ε). For x around 0, G̃i(x) = H̃i(x)
and g̃i(x) = h̃i(x) and J̄i(ci) = J̃i(ci) > 0. (ii) J̃i(ti) is decreasing on [ci, ci + ε). For x
around 0, G̃i(x) < H̃i(x). An ironed region is given by [ci, c
∗
i ] for some c
∗
i > ci. For all x






J̃i(x)dF̃i(x) > 0. (5.A.14)
In both cases, for all x ∈ Ei, J̄i(x) ≥ J̄i(ci) > 0.
ii. Suppose F̃i : R → [0, 1] is not absolutely continuous, supported by Ei ⊆ [ci, ci].
Player i’s generalized virtual cost can be defined by Monteiro and Svaiter (2010). We












Let Hν(x) = ν((−∞, x]). Denote Γ = {(y, z) ∈ R2 : y+zF̃i(x) ≤ Hν(x), for all x ∈ R}.
Define ϕ : R→ R the generalized convex hull of Hν by
ϕ(x) = sup{y + zF̃i(x) : (y, z) ∈ Γ}, (5.A.16)
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and li(x) : [ci, ci]→ R the generalized virtual valuation of Hν by
li(x) = inf{z : y + zF̃i(x) = ϕ(x), ∃(y, z) ∈ Γ}. (5.A.17)
Theorem 4 in Monteiro and Svaiter (2010) shows that li is nondecreasing and for every







Now we need to show that li(x) ≥ 0 for almost all x ∈ [ci, ci]. First, ti−a12 ≥ 0 implies ν
is a nonnegative measure and Hν(·) is a nondecreasing function. (Hν(ci), 0) ∈ Γ implies
ϕ(x) ≥ Hν(ci) for all x ≥ ci and ϕ(ci) = Hν(ci).









where ϕ(ci−) = min{0, Hν(ci)} = 0.
Case 2. If ci is not an atom, F̃i(x) > 0, for all x ∈ (ci, ci + ε1], ε1 > 0 small. Fix
an x in this interval, let (y, z) ∈ R2 be such that (i) y + zF̃i(x) = ϕ(x) and (ii) z < 0.
Note that Hν(ci) ≤ ϕ(x) ≤ Hν(x) and Hν(·) is nondecreasing on (ci, x]. For z < 0,
y + zF̃ (·) is a nonincreasing function on (ci, x]. Then, there exists ε2 ∈ (0, ε1) such that
y + zF̃i(x) > Hν(x), for x ∈ [ci, ci + ε2]. Hence, (y, z) /∈ Γ.
To summarize, li is nondecreasing on [ci, ci], and li(x) ≥ 0 for almost all x ∈ [ci, ci+ε],
ε > 0 small. The optimal resale mechanism selects splits with zero probability. 
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